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Abstract

This dissertation examines the role of law as a tool in struggles against social inequalities,
by tracing the history of Ontario’s human rights legislation and enforcement from the enactment
of fair practices statutes in the 1950s through the restructuring of the enforcement regime in 2006.
Ontario was the first Canadian province to pass anti-discrimination legislation and to establish a
human rights commission enforcement process. This legislation and the commission
enforcement process were the models for all other Canadian jurisdictions.
The dissertation approaches the role of law through the framework of tensions between
the “aspirations” and the “practices” of law. On the one hand, law holds out the promise of
enhancing citizen agency and imposing responsibility for conduct by promoting access to justice
through the power of legal norms, institutions, and enforcement and other processes. On the
other hand, efforts to fulfill this promise raise questions about the content of legal norms, the
operation of legal institutions, the practice of legal processes, and the relationship between law
and social power.
The historical record examined in the dissertation shows human rights advocates
successfully engaging the power of the state to enact anti-discrimination legal norms, but then
facing new challenges in their efforts to engage the power of the state to enforce these norms.
Although access to the coercive power of law was a consistent theme in the advocacy for antidiscrimination legislation and enforcement, in practice there has been relatively little access to
this power. Both the government agency model, and the tribunal model which replaced it, have
emphasized informal, non-public and voluntary resolution over formal, public, more coercive
adjudication. The emphasis on private, voluntary resolution of anti-discrimination claims may
increase the potential for private social outcomes; however, these social outcomes may also
reflect rather than redress imbalances in social power relations. The emphasis on private,
voluntary resolution also has the potential to limit the public development of anti-discrimination
legal norms. Thus, while anti-discrimination legislated norms have become important tools for
citizen agency, this agency has arguably been most effective outside of the formal legal
enforcement processes.
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Preface

Empowerment, Zeph. What is this new thing? What happened to what we used to call
justice? 1

I entered Osgoode Hall Law School in September 1984, after abandoning the idea of
becoming a philosophy academic in favour of pursuing a more activist career. My interest in
ethics came with me to law school, informing my goals for studying law and working as a
lawyer. As a law student, I took very few “core” courses, focusing instead on what have come to
be called “outsider” courses (e.g. courses in feminist legal theory and occupational health and
safety) and spending one semester at Parkdale Community Legal Services, the student legal aid
community clinic attached to Osgoode. In the context of law school, my interest in ethics
became an interest in how law could be used as a tool by people who are relatively socially
disempowered – because they are poor, because they are workers, because they are women,
because they are racial or religious minorities, because they have disabilities, because they are
immigrants and refugees, etc. Many of my law professors were extremely skeptical of the idea
that law could be a useful tool for positive social change where that social change was directed at
changing some social balance of power. Intellectually, I understood and respected their critique.
However, I had decided to find my way by providing legal services, and I refused to be deterred.
My goal was to be a “cause lawyer”, to use the descriptor coined by socio-legal commentators. 2
I articled and then practiced law for about 14 years, from 1987 to 2002, with the Toronto
law firm then known as Cavalluzzo Hayes Shilton McIntyre & Cornish, and now called
Cavalluzzo. In my law practice I was involved in successes and failures, but never lost my belief

1

Nadine Gordimer, None to Accompany Me (New York: Penguin, 1994) at 285.
Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, eds., Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional
Responsibilities (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
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that law had some positive role to play in struggles against social inequalities. 3 Both during and
after my law practice, I was also involved in a variety of capacities with the Women’s Legal
Education and Action Fund (“LEAF”), including as co-counsel on their Supreme Court of
Canada intervention in Newfoundland v. NAPE, 4 and as co-author of their study on the
implications of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Law v. Canada 5 for statutory human
rights. 6
Human rights was a significant area of my legal practice, and has continued to be a major
area of interest for me after leaving practice. When I originally applied to the LLM programme,
I was interested in exploring whether restorative justice methods could be effective in statutory
human rights enforcement. In the end my research and thesis did not address that question,
although it continues to interest me, especially in light of Ontario’s move to a “direct access”
process for enforcing statutory human rights claims. The “direct access” debates in Ontario were
taking place while I was completing my LLM and turning my thoughts to doctoral work. I was
an interested by-stander to the debates, with friends, acquaintances and colleagues on both sides
of the debate. My spouse has been a Vice-Chair of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario since
September 2009.
I understood the concerns on both sides of the “direct access” debate. I had difficulty
deciding where I would align myself if I had to take a firm position, and I still do not have a clear

3

My LL.M. thesis, Contesting Women’s Solidarity: Human Rights Law and the FWTAO Membership Case (LL.M.
Thesis--York University, 2007), centred on a major legal failure with which I was deeply involved for almost the
entire duration of my legal practice.
4
Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., [2004], 3 SCR 381. LEAF’s factum in the Supreme Court of was
intervention was published in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & Kate M. Stephenson, Making Equality Rights Real:
Seeking Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2006) 471.
5
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497.
6
Karen Schucher and Judith Keene, “Statutory Human Rights and Substantive Equality: Why and How to Avoid
the Injury of the Law Approach” (March 2007):
http://leaf.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2007-statutory-human-rights-substantive-equality.pdf.

answer to that dilemma. I understood the significant problems with how the Ontario Human
Rights Commission process worked in practice. On the other hand, I heard what sounded to me
like naïveté about the realities of legal process in the advocacy supporting “direct access”. My
goal in this dissertation is not to criticize, but to analyze and to reflect. The lawyer advocates
who participated in the “direct access” debates, and in the five-year review of the move to “direct
access” are also “cause lawyers”, who are committed to the potential for human rights law to
address social inequalities.
This dissertation evolved from my interest in two opposing questions about law and
enforcement. One question is whether the conventional model of “law” creates barriers to a
remedial approach to addressing social issues, including human rights issues, and whether there
is a role for more restorative justice approaches in more legal process venues. This question grew
in part out of my experiences with how people react to allegations of discrimination in a range of
different social contexts: the workplace, community organizations, political organizations, and
informal social settings. I observed that people are often shocked and offended when they are
faced with allegations of discrimination, and that they are typically reluctant to hear the basis for
the allegation. They focus on defending themselves against the allegation, instead of being open
to considering the potential impact of their conduct. This observation led me to consider whether
there is a stigma attaching to allegations of discrimination, which undermines the stated remedial
goal of human rights legislation.
The opposing question is whether formal legal process can require people to listen to
claims and perspectives they otherwise refuse to acknowledge. This question grew out of my
experiences - in the same contexts noted above - with how people often refuse to listen to claims
that conflict with their deeply-held interests, perspectives, and values. I was interested in

exploring the utility of legal process as a method for interrupting these “states of denial”, 7 by
compelling people at least to listen to things they do not want to hear. Through my experiences
as a legal practitioner, I had observed situations where legal process worked effectively to
provide a venue for dialogue on competing perspectives, as well as situations where legal
process failed to create such a venue.
These two questions coalesced for me around the Ontario initiative to eliminate the
human rights commission enforcement model. I wanted to examine this initiative in the context
of history of the promise and practice of human rights law that led to this initiative, as well as to
consider what the change may mean for future efforts to use statutory human rights as a tool in
struggles against social inequalities.

7

I borrow the phrase “states of denial” from the work of Stanley Cohen, who examines this question from the
perspective of sociology and organizational psychology in States of Denial: Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 2001).

Introduction

‘We have a tendency’, it has been said, ‘to lose sight of actual living
conditions in the logical pursuit of abstract legal doctrines.’1
Law, like any remedial mechanism, is more likely to be employed at a
distance: courts correcting police rather than internal police disciplinary
procedures, war crimes punished years or decades later. Law prefers to
articulate procedural rules rather than dictate outcomes. It expresses
universal values in the language of rights but abdicates distributive
questions to politics and the market. It is more powerful as a shield against
abuses than as a sword to achieve substantive goals, as the protector of
negative liberties rather than the guarantor of positive ones.
For all its limitations, however, law is indispensable, a source of hope
and leverage to those who lack any other.2
This dissertation explores the “promise and practice”3 of law as a tool in struggles
for social equality. The central theme of the dissertation is the tension between law as a
tool for achieving social goals and law as an end in itself. My interest in these questions
is shaped by my own conflicting experiences with law, including my experiences as a
social justice legal practitioner. I understand the seductive force of law’s promise, and
the depth of disappointment when law fails to deliver on that promise.

1

Bora Laskin, “The Problem of Interests by Statute and the Problem of ‘Contracting Out’” (1938), 16 Can.
Bar Rev. 669 at 672, quoting Morris R. Cohen, Law and the Social Order: Essays in Legal Philosophy
(1933) at vi. [Laskin, “Interests by Statute”].
2
Abel, Richard, “Speaking Law to Power: Occasions for Cause Lawyering” in Austin Sarat & Stuart
Scheingold, eds., Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibilities (New York,
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 69 at 103 [Abel, “Speaking Law”].
3
The phrase “promise and practice” is inspired by Colleen N. Sheppard’s “The Promise and Practice of
Protecting Human Rights: Reflections on the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms” in Nicholas
Kasirer and Roderick Macdonald, eds. Mélanges Paul-André Crépeau, (Cowansville, Québec : Éditions
Yvon Blais, 1997) 641 [Sheppard, “Promise and Practice”]. Similar, but perhaps more cautionary, ways of
framing this idea are: Byron Sheldrick’s “perils and possibilities”, in Perils and Possibilities: Social
Activism and the Law (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 2004) [Sheldrick, “Perils and Possibilities”], and
Shirley Tillotson’s the “attractions and treacheries of human rights law”, in “Human Rights Law as Prism:
Women’s Organizations, Unions, and Ontario’s Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act, 1951” (1991)
Can Hist’ Rev 532 at 535-544 [Tillotson, “Human Rights as Prism”].

1

Different points of view about the extent to which law might provide remedies for
social inequalities raise questions about how we define social inequalities and about what
we expect from law. In relation to human rights law, the kinds of questions that arise
include: What are the goals of human rights laws? Are human rights laws designed to
facilitate equality of opportunities, equality of outcomes or other objectives? Should all
material differences be judged inequalities or only some, and if only some - which ones?
What processes should be used to resolve disagreements about which social practices and
conditions should be judged discriminatory? In order to examine these questions, we
must look at both the promise of law and the practice of law. The “promise” refers
generally to the goals established by law; the “practice” refers generally to how these
goals are achieved through various approaches to engaging with these goals, including
formal processes for enforcing law. However, the categories of promise and practice are
not mutually exclusive. Promise both affects process, and is affected by process.
Examining the role of law as a tool in struggles for social equality is significant
for social activists and for the choices they make about where and how to pursue
struggles for social equality. This analysis is also significant for questions about the role
and obligations of the state in furthering social equality goals. My dissertation examines
these questions through the example of Canadian human rights law. Canadian human
rights law provides an interesting site of inquiry because it claims a direct connection
with issues of social inequality, because it has had complex and contested enforcement
processes, and because Canadian equality rights advocates are now asking whether

2

human rights statutes can provide a more effective legal avenue than constitutional
equality rights.4
My dissertation focuses on law in the form of prescriptive norms, set out in
legislation and in decisions of courts and tribunals, and law in the form of a range of
processes for enforcing these prescriptive norms, including the institutions and the people
involved in these processes. Most of the forms of law I examine have some connection
with the state, and the role of the state in law is an important topic in my dissertation. I
am not, however, advancing a position that might be considered “legal centric” from a
legal pluralistic perspective. I focus on forms of law connected with the state because
they play an important role in efforts to use law as a tool for social equality, and because
they raise important questions about the public and private action and responsibility. My
focus is on these forms of law as tools for social engagement, not on these forms of law
in themselves, separate from their role in society.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first three sections examine the
broad themes relating to law and social inequalities which informed my research and
which I have explored through my analysis of the research. These three broad themes
are: (1) Law: Coercion, Justice, and Social Power, (2) Agency through Law: Legal
Norms, Enforcement, and Dispute Resolution, (3) Responsibility at Law: Fault, Remedy,
4

My understanding of this development is based on my experiences in legal practice described in the
Preface, as well as my experiences in various volunteer roles with the Women’s Legal Education and
Action Fund (LEAF) and my experience as a staff lawyer with the Clinic Resource Office at Legal Aid
Ontario. In particular, I was a member of a LEAF’s sub-committee on statutory human rights and coauthor with Judith Keene of a position paper on how to try to avoid importing the negative jurisprudential
developments under s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, The Constitution Act, 1982,
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 into the statutory human rights context: Karen
Schucher and Judith Keene. “Statutory Human Rights and Substantive Equality: Why and How to Avoid
the Injury of the Law Approach” (March 2007):
http://leaf.ca/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2007-statutory-human-rights-substantive-equality.pdf.

3

and Responsive Regulation. In the fourth section of the chapter I provide a brief
overview of the role of Canadian human rights law as the specific site of my research. In
the fifth and final section, I introduce the three case studies that form the substance of this
dissertation, explain the methodology I used to identify and conduct these case studies,
and outline the concluding chapter of the dissertation.

1

Law: Coercion, Justice and Social Power

The law, an intrinsically powerful discourse coupled with the physical means
to impose compliance on others, can be seen as a quintessential instrument of
normalization.5
…. the authority of law is seen to derive not from its sanction, but from its
integrity.6

Coercive power and justice are key elements of law’s appeal as a tool in struggles
against social inequalities. Social inequalities are often linked with social power
imbalances. The coercive power of law holds out the promise of being able to reduce
imbalances in social power through access to the power of law.7 Appeals to justice hold

5

Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field” (1987), 38 Hastings LJ
814 at 838 [Bourdieu, “Force of Law”].
6
Roderick A. Macdonald, Prolegomena to a Theory of Legal Relevance (University of Toronto LLM
Thesis, 1975) at 180.
7
I understand social inequality connected with power inequality to have many dimensions, such as Richard
Abel described, for example: “Power inequality assumes many guises. Some have a material base: control
of the means of production in the Marxist formulation, wealth and income disparity in the liberal. Both
approaches have recently broadened their conception of resources to include intangibles like knowledge,
educational credentials, and cultural capital. A second manifestation of inequality reflects differential
ability to participate in and influence the polity: the size and organization of interest groups, their material
resources and political sophistication, access to the media, ideological position, and incumbency. A third
kind of inequality is located in the social system: status differences associated with nationality, language,
gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, and physical or mental disability. Public and private forms of
power are inextricably connected, sometimes indistinguishable.” - “Speaking Law” at 69.

4

out the promise that the goals sought to be achieved through law are worthy because they
seek to reduce injustice and unfairness. Justice is a many-facetted ideal that has both
substantive and procedural aspects. Questions of justice are also often linked with
questions of morality, and there are recurring debates over when it is appropriate to
engage the power of law in relation to morality and what consequences flow from doing
so.
The coercive power of law is often linked with state power and, as noted earlier,
my dissertation focuses on forms of law that have connections with the state.8 Although
access to this coercive power is one of law’s attractions in struggles against social
inequalities, there is a range of arguments about the extent to which this power can in fact
be harnessed. Since law has been used to create and sustain social inequalities, it is fair
to ask whether law can also be engaged to challenge social inequalities. Similarly, it is
fair to ask whether it is possible for the state, through law, to act against the interests of
dominant social power. Different positions on the question of whether law can be
engaged to address social inequalities are informed by different views about how social
relations are constituted, different views about the role law as a social institution,
different views about which social conditions constitute inequalities that law might
address, and different views about whether coercive power is inherently, or necessarily, a
bad thing.

8

I would argue that coercion is an aspect of any social practice that is considered to be a form of law.
However, it is not necessary for me to make this argument because my dissertation focuses on forms of law
that all have at least some connection with the state.

5

Many theorists argue that law is an integral part of a political economy based on
social stratification and substantive inequalities and that, in a liberal capitalist society,
law functions primarily to maintain social structures that reflect liberal capitalist norms
and values. As articulated by Jeanne Gregory with reference to anti-discrimination
legislation:

[Anti-discrimination legislation] is on the statute book in order to protect,
not threaten, the fundamental structures of capitalist society, and therefore
cannot by itself constitute the vehicle for achieving a non-racist, nonsexist society.9

These theorists argue that law functions to sustain substantive social inequalities by
creating processes through which claims can be asserted, then dismissing these claims
and providing ideological rationalizations that legitimate the inequalities. For example,
Alan Freeman has argued with reference to anti-discrimination legal doctrine in the
American context:

As surely as the law has outlawed racial discrimination, it
has affirmed that Black Americans can be without jobs, have their children
in all-black, poorly-funded schools, have no opportunities for decent
9

Jeanne Gregory, “Sex Discrimination, Work and the Law” in Bob Fine, Richard Kinsey, John Lea, Sol
Picciotto and Jock Young, eds., Capitalism and the Rule of Law: From Deviancy Theory to Marxism
(London: Hutchinson & Co., 1979) 137 at 138, 140 and 150 [Gregory, “Sex Discrimination”]. See also:
Alan David Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical
Review of Supreme Court Doctrine” in Piers Beirne & Richard Quinney, eds., Marxism and Law (New
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1982) 210 [Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination”]; Judy Fudge, “The
Paradoxes of Pay Equity: Reflections on the Law and the Market in Canada and PSAC” (2000) 12 CJWL
313 [Fudge, “Paradoxes of Pay Equity”]; Judy Fudge, “What do We Mean by Law and Social
Transformation?” (1990) 5 Can. J. L. & Soc’y 47 [Fudge, “Law and Social Transformation”]; Jeanne
Gregory, Sex, Race and The Law (London, Newbury Park, Beverly Hills, New Delhi: Sage Publications,
1987) [Gregory, Sex, Race]; Nicola Lacey, “Legislation Against Sex Discrimination: Questions from a
Feminist Perspective” (1987) 14 JL & Soc’y 411 [Lacey, “Feminist Perspective”]; Margaret Thornton, The
Liberal Promise: Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Australia (Auckland, Melbourne, New York, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1990) [Thornton, Liberal Promise].

6

housing, and have very little political power, without any violation of
antidiscrimination law.10

According to Freeman, law must hold out a “promise of liberation” and “occasionally
offer at least illusions of reconciliation and resolution”, but ultimately “fail to deliver on
that promise”.11
These theorists argue that law can sometimes be successfully used in liberal
capitalist societies to challenge formal inequalities, to challenge state-imposed
inequalities, and to challenge abuses of state power.12 Carol Smart, for example, argued
that when women have engaged the power of law in sex equality struggles, this power
has been most effective when it has been invoked to remove impediments created by law
itself.13 Successful challenges to formal inequalities, to state-imposed inequalities and to
abuses of state power do have social impact. For example, Ruth Fletcher has observed
with reference to sex discrimination that challenges to formal inequalities are important
and do have some substantive effect:

Historically, women were excluded from the category of human ‘likes’
on the grounds of their difference from men and their perceived closeness
to nature. When difference was the excuse used to deny women rights, it
was almost inevitable that women would argue that they were like men in
order to access those rights. The idea that women are the same as men in
10

Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination” at 210-211. See also Bourdieu, “Force of Law” at 818:
“… judicial decisions can be distinguished from naked exercises of power only to the extent that they can
be presented as the necessary result of a principled interpretation of unanimously accepted texts.”
11
Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination” at 210.
12
Abel, “Speaking “Law”; Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination”; Fudge, “Paradoxes of Pay
Equity”; Fudge, “Law and Social Transformation”; Gregory, “Sex Discrimination”; Gregory, Sex, Race;
Lacey, “Feminist Perspective”; Thornton, Liberal Promise.
13
Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989) at 138 [Smart, Power of Law] at 138-139.
See also Lise Gottell, “Litigating Feminist Truth: An Antifoundational Critique” (1995) 4 Soc & Leg Stud
99.
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the sense that they share membership of the human species was, and still
is, a powerful tool in the face of dehumanizing tactics.14

However, the argument remains that the power of law cannot be used to transform
substantively unequal social relations.
Other theorists focus on the potential harm of using the power of law in struggles
against social inequalities. One argument is that excessive reliance on law as a tool can
have a negative effect on democratic and other social political processes, and undermine
the power of these other processes. In Canada, many of these debates have taken place in
relation to the adoption of constitutionally entrenched rights and freedoms in the early
1980s.15 Another argument is that when efforts are made to use law to define social
problems as legal harms, there is a tendency to label people who experience the harms as
“victims”, and a corresponding tendency for the victim label to make it difficult for those
persons to exercise agency through law.16 These arguments provide important cautions
about the implications of ceding social power to law.
A third group of theorists argues that law is not simply the tool or product of those
who already exercise social power but is also a producer of social relations and social
power. Law is a social institution with which all people can engage and, therefore, there
14

Ruth Fletcher, “Feminist Legal Theory” in Reza Banakar and Max Travers, eds. An Introduction to Law
and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) at 150-151.
15
See, for example: Judy Fudge, “The Canadian Charter of Rights: Recognition, Redistribution, and the
Imperialism of the Courts” in Tom Campbell, K.D. Ewing, and Adam Tomkins, eds., Sceptical Essays on
Human Rights. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
16
See, for example: Kristin Bumiller, The Civil Rights Society: The Social Construction of Victims
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988) at 52 [Bumiller, Civil Rights Society] and Kathryn
Abrams, “Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory” (1995) 95 Colum. L.R 304
[Abrams, “Sex Wars Redux”]. Abrams proposed a concept of “partial agency” to capture both the
possibility of agency and the reality of constraints on agency. See also Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive
Equality: The Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada (Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010) at 137-138 [Sheppard, Inclusive Equality].
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is legitimate role for law in struggles against both formal and substantive social
inequalities. I would argue that legal practitioners and academics who share this third
perspective on law and social power are lawyers who Sarat and Scheingold describe as
“cause lawyers”, that is, lawyers who are “not indifferent to the ends to which services
are put.”17 Catharine MacKinnon framed her perspective on this argument in terms of the
role of law in defining social relations, accountability, and responsibility:

When law is abandoned to the powerful, corruption and physical force
remain the real law, a fact ignored by those who, having a choice, urge
abdicating this ground. It is hard to avoid the feeling that women are
urged to think law can do nothing for them precisely because it can do so
much.
…
In whose interest is it for women to leave a power like this to men? Law
can mean community; your people stand behind you, hear you, support
you. It can mean reality: what you say happened is found to have
happened; your knowledge is validated. It can mean vindication: it is
wrong that you were wronged; someone took something that belongs to
you; you count. It means hope: what happened to you might not happen
again.18

Colleen Sheppard framed the argument in terms of the potential for law to shape social
relations grounded either in caring for others or lack of caring for others:

Focusing on human relations is consistent with the traditional project of
law. Law is deeply implicated in creating, interpreting, rationalizing,
applying and enforcing rules of social interaction between individuals and
groups. Though not always acknowledged in relational terms, law is
integrally connected to the nature, quality and character of human
17

Austin Sarat and Stuart Scheingold, “Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority:
An Introduction” in Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, eds., Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and
Professional Responsibilities (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 3 at 3 [Sarat and
Scheingold, “Cause Lawyering Introduction”].
18
Catharine A. MacKinnon, “Law in the Everyday Life of Women” in Women’s Lives – Men’s Laws
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005) 32 at 42-43.
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relationships. It is in this capacity that law has contributed to the absence
of caring and the widespread existence of relations of permanent
inequality. Ironically, this same capacity also gives law the potential to
promote more caring relationships and thereby enhance equality.19

Jennifer Nedelsky similarly argued that examining law through the lens of social relations
illuminates law’s role in shaping social relations and thus creates opportunities to
consider how changes in law can help change social relations: “[A] relational approach
turns our attention to the ways law inevitably structures relations, in ways that, in turn,
affect core values and who can enjoy them.”20 Nedelsky commented that it is “not so
much a choice to use law as a means of seeing how law is currently being used and its
consequences.”21 She also observed that while law “is an important way power is
exercised, shaped, and justified”, social relations “structured by law often serve to hide
power and to hide the role of the state in that power.22 Diana Majury has similarly
emphasized pragmatic considerations, arguing that law is a social form that cannot and
should not be ignored because it is deeply implicated in shaping social struggles and
resistance to these struggles:

Using law against itself, seeing law simultaneously as a tool, as foe, and as
focus for change, demystifying law as institution, and recognizing law as
19

Colleen N. Sheppard, “Caring in Human Relations and Legal Approaches to Equality” (1993) 2 NJCL
305 at 329 [Sheppard, “Caring in Human Relations”]. A relational approach to law and inequality was also
a dominant theme more recently in Sheppard, Inclusive Equality. In both “Caring in Human Relations” and
Inclusive Equality, Sheppard also argued that redistribution of income cannot, by itself, ensure greater
equality of access to substantive goods, and that this goal requires restructuring of human relations. In her
view, once we identify the basic substantive goods or concerns, we have to consider whether individuals
and groups have access to these things in accordance with their needs and desires, which ultimately leads to
an inquiry into how they are being treated by others in society.
20
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, and Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011) at 72 [Nedelsky, Law’s Relations].
21
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations at 72.
22
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations at 72.
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presenting multiple sites of struggle rather than a solid one-dimensional
monolith may by now be post-modern truisms, but these understandings
provide grounding for contemporary feminist legal equality struggles, as
in the past the grounding may have been provided by the liberal promise
of equal opportunity.23

As Majury noted, law can also be used against people in struggles against social
inequalities. Sometimes, therefore, there is no choice about whether or not to engage
with the power of law.
In my view, all three categories of argument contribute to analyzing the
experiences that socially disempowered individuals and groups may have when they try
to engage the power of law in struggles against social inequalities. It is also my view that
elements of each category tend to be seen when we examine the historical records of
efforts by socially disempowered individuals and groups to engage the power of law in
their struggles against social inequalities.

2

Agency through Law: Establishing, Using and Enforcing Legislated Norms
Questions about whether people can affect social inequalities by gaining access to

the power of law are also questions about whether people can exercise agency through
law. Can law be a tool for human agency? If so, how can law be a tool for human
agency? Legal norms, and the processes for enforcing these norms, are important tools
through which people seek to exercise agency through law. My dissertation focuses

23

Diana Majury, “Women’s (In)Equality before and after the Charter” in Radha Jhappan, ed., Women’s
Legal Strategies in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002) 101at 102 [Jhappan, Women’s
Legal Strategies]. I also like Bryan Palmer’s articulation of the idea of “strugg[ling] for law against law”.
See “What’s Law Got to do With It? Historical Considerations on Class Struggle, Boundaries of Constraint,
and Capitalist Authority”(2003) 41 Osgoode Hall LJ 465 at 479.
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primarily on legislated legal norms, the opportunities for citizen agency in establishing
legislated norms, and the legal processes established specifically for enforcing these
legislated norms. However, I also examine the ways in which using legal norms as a tool
goes beyond specific legal enforcement processes and the tensions that exist between the
public and private dimensions of using legislated norms as tools for social equality.

Agency through Establishing Legal Norms, Legislated and Common Law

Law is not based on the natural existence of a normative order, which all
members of society implicitly accept. It is based on the desire to make a
normative order, to have some order established, even in the face of
continued normative diversity within society at large.24

Legal norms have both symbolic and concrete roles. Symbolically, they reflect
and help to define social values and morals. Concretely, they provide direction on how
people are expected to conduct themselves. All legal norms derive their authority through
being established in accordance with accepted procedures. Many legal norms also claim
legitimacy on the grounds that they promote justice and, sometimes, morality. Thus,
debates and arguments over the content of legal norms are often debates over different
views about what justice objectives or moral objectives a legal norm should promote.
Legal norms with a direct connection to the state are established by legislation and by
common law.25

24

Jeremy Webber, “Legal Pluralism and Human Agency” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall LJ 167 at 177.
Legal norms specific to individual situations can also be set out in “private” legal documents, including
contracts and wills, although they too will reflect and comply with the relevant public legal norms.

25
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Access to the power of law through legislation may provide opportunities for
citizens to engage the power of the state on behalf of socially disempowered individuals
and groups. Legislated legal norms are the most public legal norms because they require
state support and they establish expectations for society as a whole.26 An important role
of the state is to generate ideas to improve legislated norms, and such legislative agendas
are often part of political parties’ election campaigns. Members of the public, as
individuals and as groups, can also be involved in the processes for establishing
legislation: they can put pressure on government to change or pass legislation; they can
participate indirectly in debates about the content of proposed legislative reforms by
working with their elected representatives; and they can participate directly in debates
about the content of proposed legislative reforms when the state holds public hearings on
proposed legislation. The legislative process thus provides an opportunity for citizens to
exercise agency by making or opposing efforts to change existing legislated norms or to
establish new legislated norms.
Common law norms are established by courts, through litigation. Litigation, as a
process, may create the illusion of enhanced agency. It may appear to provide a more
direct route to the power of law than the legislative process, which involves and requires
the cooperation of the state, acting through many people in many different social
26

I use the concept of the public to refer to a collectivity in the sense that this collectivity is subject to the
same state government. Within this collectivity, however, there will be many different social groupings,
and many different points of view on government decisions and actions. As Andhil Fineberg wrote: “There
are many publics. There’s the high-minded, unprejudiced public, and the mildly prejudiced public, and the
public that hates one group, and the public that hates some other groups, and also a lunatic public whose
members can be readily aroused to hate any out-group. To talk about ‘the public’ or ‘the masses’ as though
they were one great herd of people, innocent of all prejudice and simply deceived by others, is infantile. …
Unprejudiced folk will be found among the rich and among the poor, among the educated and uneducated,
among the great and the unknown, among those of every religion and of every race.” Punishment without
Crime: What You Can Do About Prejudice (New York: Doubleday, 1949) at 35.
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locations. However, there are many barriers to litigation as well, including access to
financial resources and being able to frame the social goal as a legal claim that can be
adjudicated. There are also limited opportunities for individuals and groups who are not
parties to the litigation to participate in the litigation. In addition, common law norms
tend not to have the same symbolic and concrete roles as legislated norms. They tend to
be regarded as applying to the particular dispute and the particular parties to the
litigation, even when the norm is framed in broad language, e.g. a manufacturer owes a
duty of care to the consumers of its products. The courts’ primary focus is on the dispute
before them and the parties to that dispute, even though they are are public adjudicative
bodies (created and maintained by the state) and have some obligation to act in the public
interest. Common law norms are usually also less accessible to the public, unless they
receive significant media attention.
Thus, legislation is generally a more systemic method of establishing legal norms
than litigation: when a legislated norm is established, there is in principle no dispute that
it applies to society as a whole. Although the process of establishing legal norms
through legislation may be more mediated, in a democratic society it can be expected that
the process of engaging the power of the state to establish a state-imposed legal norm
with broad application to the public will be a mediated process.

Agency through Using and Enforcing Legislated Norms
Once a legislated norm has been established, it becomes immediately effective
when people act to comply with its requirements. Legislated norms do not have to be
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formally enforced in order to be effective; indeed, it would be impossible for legislated
norms to be effective if they were effective only when formally enforced: “… the
primary objective in laying down standards of conduct is perhaps even more to induce
people to comply with them than to deal with the situation when they do not.”27
Legislated norms can also be effective without recourse to formal enforcement when
people invoke them, rely on them, and informally seek compliance with them – all of
which are ways in which law can in a sense be informally “enforced” by being used as a
tool in people’s daily lives:

[L]egal norms play the role of opening spaces for ongoing engagement about
current practice in relation to aspirations that have been identified to be of public
significance. Law is elaborated through dynamic interactions on the ground. Law
institutionalizes occasions for analysis, reflection, relationship-building, boundary
negotiations and institution-building.28

Engaging directly with legislated norms is an important dimension of agency through
law. For example, if a trade union believes that an employer is failing to comply with
legislated norms, the union can raise this concern with the employer and the employer
may change its practices to comply with the legislation without the need for formal legal
intervention. Similarly, if a tenants’ association believes that a landlord is failing to
comply with requirements of residential tenancy legislation, it can bring this to the
attention of the landlord and the landlord may change its conduct to comply with the

27

T. Hadden, “Contract, Tort and Crime: The Forms of Legal Thought” (1971) 87 Law Quarterly Review
240 at 256.
28
Sheppard, Inclusive Equality at 73, quoting Susan Sturm, “Owen Fiss, Equality Theory and Judicial
Role” in Issues in Legal Scholarship, the Origins and Fate of Antisubordination Theory (2003) art. 18 at 7
(on line).
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legislation without the need for formal legal intervention.29 This form of engaging with
legal norms can also be coercive - even when people voluntarily comply with the norm if this compliance requires them to do things they would rather not do or prohibits them
from doing things they would like to do.
However, effective formal enforcement is needed for those situations where
people refuse to accept or comply with legal norms. Enforcing legal norms is arguably
the paradigm of the coercive power of law, captured by metaphors such as “hard” law (as
opposed to “soft” law), and law with “teeth”. Enforcing legal norms connotes forcing
people to act in particular ways and imposing consequences when they fail to comply
with legal norms. Effective formal enforcement makes it clear that people are expected
to comply with the norm. Conversely, lack of effective formal enforcement diminishes
the coercive dimension of the legal norm, signaling that it is “soft law” rather than “hard
law”. When legal norms are not enforced, this can send a number of messages to society:
it can suggest that the legitimacy of the norm may be in question; it can suggest that the
norm, although legitimate, is not a high priority; or it can suggest that the norm is not
really intended to be a norm but is rather a guideline, with which compliance is voluntary
rather than mandatory.
Effective formal enforcement is also important to the impact of legislated norms.
Formal enforcement develops the meaning and scope of all legal norms, especially legal
norms that are prescribed in more general and abstract terms. However, there is almost
always room for argument about what legal norms mean, whether they should apply to
29

Individual employees and individual tenants may similarly raise these concerns, although doing so may
place them at risk of reprisal.
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particular situations, and how they should apply to particular situations. As Roderick
Macdonald wrote, “legal rules are not self-evident and self-applying characterizations of
human behavior” and “there can be more than one appropriate legal characterization of
human conduct”.30 The meaning and scope of all legal norms is continually shaped
when they are placed “at the level of the debate concerning a specific application” 31 –
sometimes to be expanded, sometimes to be narrowed.
The state is closely involved in the enforcement of many, if not most, legislated
norms. Criminal law norms and their enforcement are arguably the paradigm of the
coercive power of state law. A significant element of the rationale for this exercise of
coercive power is that criminal law norms address the most harmful, most wrong or most
immoral social conduct. The legal processes for enforcing legislated norms generally
involve “informal” and “formal” options. The more “informal” options are the
alternative dispute resolution processes, usually mediation or negotiation (plea bargaining
in the criminal law context). The more “formal” options are the adjudication processes.
Courts are the adjudicative bodies for criminal law, some quasi-criminal law, and some
civil law (family law, in particular). Administrative tribunals are the adjudicative bodies
for most civil administrative law (i.e. non-criminal) and some quasi-criminal law.32

30

Ontario Law Reform Commission, Study Paper on Prospects for Civil Justice: A Study Paper by
Roderick A. Macdonald with commentaries (Toronto: Queen’s Printer, 1995) at 47-48 [Macdonald,
Prospects for Civil Justice]. See also Bourdieu, “Force of Law” at 821: “The practical meaning of law is
really only determined in the confrontation between different bodies (e.g. judges, lawyers, solicitors)
moved by divergent interests.”
31
Bourdieu, “Force of Law” at 822.
32
I use the term civil as a broad category, to include all non-criminal and non-quasi-criminal law. As I
discuss further below, others might use the term “regulation” or “regulatory” to describe many legislated
norms and regimes.
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For many legislated regimes, enforcement begins with an informal process that
involves making an application or claim to a state agency, with an option for subsequent
consideration, review or appeal by a more formal enforcement process.33 For other
legislated regimes, enforcement begins with an application or claim directly to a formal
tribunal processes.34 The rationale most often presented for enforcement by
administrative tribunals rather than by courts is to provide greater access to adjudication
by establishing processes that are less complex, less expensive, and more efficient.35
Administrative agency and tribunal enforcement processes also provide the state with a
significant level of involvement in enforcing legislated norms, by giving the state a role
in shaping how the legislated norms are applied to people’s lives.36 My dissertation
explores questions relating to the role of the state in enforcing legislated norms, and the
corresponding public and private dimensions of engaging with legislated norms.

Enforcing Legal Norms, Dispute Resolution, and Law in Context
Because, as noted earlier, the social impact of legal norms is seen primarily
through their application to concrete situations, there is a significant public dimension to
33

This is the typical structure for a wide range of programmes, including: government benefit programmes,
such as social assistance and employment insurance; hybrid benefits programmes such as workplace safety
and insurance benefits; employment standards claims; immigration and refugee determination; and the
human rights commission model.
34
For example “direct access” statutory human rights and criminal injuries compensation.
35
For an important critique of how the administrative tribunal regimes actually operate, see: Ron Ellis,
Unjust by Design: Canada’s Administrative Justice System (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013). For a
discussion of access to justice issues in relation to administrative law, see: Lorne Sossin, “Access to
Administrative Justice and Other Worries” in Colleen Flood and Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in
Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2013).
36
There are many different types of structure, which provide the state with varying degrees of involvement
and control. In some cases, the state is a party to the process and may also have some control over how the
process can be used. In other cases, the state is more indirectly involved through its control over how the
tribunal is structured, funded, and staffed.
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how legislated and common law legal norms are used and enforced. However, this public
dimension is in tension with the more private notion of enforcement as dispute resolution.
When processes for enforcing legal norms are characterized as dispute resolution, this
emphasizes the individuality of the case and de-emphasizes the public interest in knowing
how the legal norm was used and applied and what consequences, if any, resulted.
If legislated norms are public norms, any potential violation of a legislated norm
is both a “dispute” between the alleged violator and society as a whole, and a dispute
between the alleged violator and the persons more directly affected by the violation.
Within a dispute resolution framework however, the potential violation becomes a
dispute between two parties – the party claiming the violation and the party whose
conduct is in issue. Where the state is one of the parties to the dispute, it can be viewed
as the representative of society and, as such, asserting an interest in upholding the
legislated norm as well as an interest in resolving the particular situation. However,
even in cases where the state is a party, the dispute resolution framework creates a
tension between the interest in upholding the legislated norm and the institutional
pressure to resolve cases.
In the case of some legislated norms, it may also be possible to “enforce” them in
more than one formal legal process. Where there is potential for multiple enforcement
venues, this can lead to tension between engaging with the formal enforcement process
created for that legislated norm and engaging with the legal norm in other enforcement
venues, or even in the social context to which the legal norm applies. To borrow
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Galanter’s phrase, it may be possible to pursue “justice in many rooms” 37. Some of these
rooms may be public rooms, as with the adjudicative venues established and maintained
by the state, and for some legislated norms there may be competing public venues for
their enforcement. Other rooms may be more private rooms, in the social contexts to
which the legal norms apply and with more private enforcement processes: the
boardroom, the classroom, the community centre room, the hospital room, the
workrooms, etc. Being able to use and enforce legislated norms in a variety of places
may create opportunities for pursuing justice. At the same time, when multiple venues
are available, there may be questions about whether the legislated norms will be
considered in the same way in all these venues, as well as questions about the
interrelationships between these venues. My dissertation explores the tension between
enforcing legislated norms in their specific, public adjudicative venue and enforcing them
in other public and private venues, which is now an important question for the
enforcement of statutory human rights in some Canadian jurisdictions, including Ontario.

3

Responsibility at Law: Fault and Remedy
An important goal of seeking agency through law is to use the power of law to

hold people responsible or accountable for their conduct - past, present and future. This
goal can be masked by the language of rights, which has a strong hold on how legal
norms are talked about, understood, and expressed. Like many others, I am cautious

37

Marc Galanter, “Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law,” (1981), 19
Journal of Legal Pluralism 1. Galanter argued for recognizing not only private as well as public venues for
addressing legal norms but also private as well as public legal norms.
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about the utility and the effects of rights discourse. One of my concerns is that it
characterizes rights as things or possessions, that people “have” or “own”. This propertylike characterization also suggests that being a “rights holder” is a passive state or status,
which is by itself sufficient to produce results.
I am, however, attracted to Anthony Woodiwiss’s social relations formulation,
that “…the term ‘rights’ refers to a legally enforceable set of expectations as to how
others … should behave …”.38 This formulation emphasizes that rights are relational and
dynamic. They are relational because their concrete effect is determined by how people
treat each other. They are dynamic because they do not implement themselves and
require action through claims and responses to these claims: “ … law is an activity and
not a thing. Its ‘being’ is in the ‘doing’ of the participants within the practice.’”39
A social relations approach to engaging with the power of law entails the
recognition that legal rights have social impact only if there are corresponding
responsibilities, and methods to ensure that these corresponding responsibilities are
fulfilled: “The mix of entitlements and obligations we can legitimately claim depends on
the kinds of human relationships we can defend nothing more and nothing less.”40 In the
context of struggles against social inequalities, then, another goal of seeking agency
through law is to impose responsibilities to make changes. Sometimes the argument is
that legal responsibility should reflect and be commensurate with exiting social power, so
that individuals or groups who have more social power should have more legal
38

Anthony Woodiwiss, Human Rights (London and New York: Routledge, 2005) at xi.
Dennis Patterson, “Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative” (1990), 76 Virginia L R 937 at
941, quoted in Sheppard, Inclusive Equality at 74.
40
Nedelsky, Law’s Relations at fn 128, quoting Joseph Singer, Entitlement: The Paradox of Property (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) at 216.
39
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responsibility. Sometimes the argument is that legal responsibility should be a vehicle
for changing balances in social power, so that legal responsibility should not necessarily
reflect and be commensurate with existing power relations.41

Responsibility and Consequences
Legal norms address questions of responsibility by prescribing expectations for
conduct and prescribing, or providing guidance on, the consequences that should be
imposed when people fail to meet conduct expectations. Punitive consequences and
remedial consequences are the two types of material consequences that are generally
imposed.42 Punitive consequences are most common in criminal and quasi-criminal law
contexts. Their impact is directed primarily to the person found to have acted contrary to
law, who may be required to pay a monetary penalty, to engage in community service, to
serve time in prison, or to change their practices to avoid similar wrongdoing in the
future. Punitive consequences can also be imposed in civil law contexts, but are much
more rare and usually take the form of punitive damages and punitive costs orders.

41

Ideologies of responsibility and “responsibilization” have been used against socially disempowered
people, often as part of a larger move to diminish social responsibility for inequalities. For discussion of
the complexity of shared responsibility in the occupational health and safety context, see: Eric Tucker,
“Remapping Worker Citizenship in Contemporary Occupational Health and Safety Regimes” (2007), 37
Intl J Health Services 145, and Eric Tucker, “Diverging Trends in Worker Health and Safety Protection and
Participation in Canada, 1985-2000” (2003) 58 Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 395. For
discussion of responsibilization and disempowerment in the criminal law context, see, for example:
Elizabeth Comack, and Tracey Peter, “How the Criminal Justice System Responds to Sexual Assault
Survivors: The Slippage between Responsibilization and Blaming the Victim” (2005), 17 CJWL 283; and
Nicola Lacey, “In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social Sciences in Criminal
Law Theory” (2001), 64 Mod L Rev 350.
42
Declarations that a legal norm was violated do not have material consequences. For purposes of this
discussion and categorization, I would treat injunctions as remedial consequences.
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Remedial consequences are most common in civil law contexts, and their impact
is directed primarily to the applicant/claimant who initiated the legal claim. In courtbased civil actions, the remedy is usually monetary compensation. In administrative law
civil cases, remedies may also include a range of specific performance orders. Although
civil remedies are largely understood to be remedial, the person against whom a remedial
consequence is ordered may experience that consequence as punitive: for example, a
defendant /respondent who is ordered to pay a high damages award to an
applicant/claimant may feel that scope of the award also represents punishment for the
wrongdoing found by the adjudicator.
In criminal and quasi-criminal cases, the “wrongdoer” is the “recipient” of the
consequences, in the sense that the penalty or punishment is imposed directly on the
wrongdoer. In civil cases (court and administrative law), the applicant/claimant or
“victim” is the recipient of the remedial consequences. In both contexts, however, it is
the “wrongdoer” - the defendant/respondent – who is responsible for fulfilling the
consequences. It is the defendant /respondent who pays the fine, serves the prison
sentence, does the community service, changes practices, provides monetary
compensation, and carries out specific performance orders.
Legal responsibility is a central question in the processes for enforcing legal
norms. Both formal (adjudicative) and informal (ADR) enforcement processes are
concerned with holding people responsible for alleged failure to comply with legal
norms. However, these two legal processes take different approaches to the question of
legal responsibility.
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Responsibility, Fault and Formal Legal Process
Adjudication requires people to participate in a formal legal process that can
result in a judgment that legal norms were violated and in the imposition of consequences
for the violation. The adjudicator must pass judgment on the responsibility of the
individual(s) whose conduct is in question. In order to pass this judgment, the
adjudicator must first determine whether the individual(s)’s conduct was, is, or will be
contrary to legal norms (unless responsibility for acting contrary to legal norms is
admitted). If the adjudicator finds a past, present, or future violation of legal norms, the
adjudicator must then determine what consequence(s) should be imposed. The specific
issues the adjudicator will have to consider in addressing the question of responsibility
will vary in different legal areas. However, the ultimate question for the adjudicator is
whether they should impose legal responsibility on the person against whom a charge has
been brought or a claim has been made.
The question of responsibility or accountability is also often connected with
questions about the defendant/respondent’s intention in relation to the conduct, and their
control over the conduct. In order to hold a defendant/respondent responsible,
adjudicators usually need to be satisfied that the defendant/respondent knew or knows
about the conduct, and had or has at least some ability to control the conduct. This
connection between intention, control and responsibility is also linked to a connection
between fault and responsibility. Where an adjudicator determines that a
defendant/respondent is responsible for conduct contrary to legal norms, that
determination is also a determination that the defendant /respondent was in some way “at
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fault”.43 The concept of fault has generally negative connotations. The degree of
negativity or stigma associated with a finding of fault for illegal conduct, however,
depends on the degree of “badness” or wrongfulness associated with the conduct. As
noted earlier, social judgments about whether conduct should be considered bad or wrong
are often part of the process of establishing and changing legal norms.
In principle, questions of fault focus primarily on the person responsible for
wrongful conduct, the defendant/respondent, whereas questions of remedy focus more on
the applicant/claimant, who has been harmed in some way by the wrongful conduct.
However, because the applicant/claimant will receive a remedy only if the
defendant/respondent is found responsible for illegal conduct, the questions of
responsibility and fault remain dominant. In some cases, the degree of harm that an
applicant/claimant can establish may influence an adjudicator’s determination about the
defendant/respondent’s responsibility for that harm. Nevertheless, questions of
responsibility are separate from questions of remedy, even though in practice they may
have a synergistic influence on one another. In all civil (including administrative law)
adjudicative processes, then, a successful outcome for an applicant/claimant is possible
only where the adjudicator decides to impose responsibility on the defendant/respondent.
The legal claim asserted by an applicant/claimant is inextricably linked to whether or not
the adjudicator will hold the defendant/respondent accountable.
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Some legal norms purport to eliminate questions of fault by imposing absolute liability or to minimize
questions of fault by imposing strict liability. Most quasi-criminal legal norms impose strict liability,
which provides the defendant /respondent with a due diligence defence of their intention to avoid the illegal
conduct. See: Kent Roach, Criminal Law, 4d (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2009) at 15-17.
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In relation to anti-discrimination claims, Alan Freeman described this focus on the
defendant/respondent as the “perpetrator perspective” and argued that this perspective is
at least as important as the “victim perspective”: 44

The perpetrator perspective sees racial [or sex] discrimination as actions,
or series of actions, inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator. The focus is
more on what particular perpetrators have done or are doing to some
victims than it is on the overall life situation of the victim.45

The perpetrator perspective is dominant in criminal and quasi-criminal prosecution, since
the primary focus is on the conduct of the defendant. For the reasons discussed above, I
argue that the “perpetrator perspective” is also at least as important as the “victim
perspective” not only in relation to anti-discrimination claims, but in relation to all civil
(including administrative) adjudicative processes. This is because there will be no
remedial outcome for the “victim” unless the adjudicator is willing to impose
responsibility on the defendant /respondent.
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Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination” at 210-212.
Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination” at 211. In “Harm and Fault in Discrimination Law: The
Transition from Intentional to Adverse Effect Discrimination” (2001), Theor. Inq. L. 349, Denise Réaume
explored tort liability as a comparative model for tracing an expanding recognition of fault and liability in
discrimination law. Her goal was to ground an interest-based, non-distributive normative rationale for
recognizing unintentional discrimination. She argued that tort law liability standards evolved from malice
to intention to negligence, and that a similar progression can be seen in the case of discrimination law. She
also argued that the notion of denying a service or benefit simply for the sake of doing so, on the basis of
identity, is the unifying harm of discrimination, which she conceptualized as injury to dignity. Her work
since has focused on the role of dignity in equality rights claims. See, for example: Denise G. Réaume,
“Discrimination and Dignity” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, Making Equality
Rights Real: Seeking Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2006) 123, and
Denise Réaume, “Dignity, Equality and Comparison” in Deborah Hellman and Sophia Moreau, eds.,
Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 7.
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Responsibility, Remedy and Informal Legal Process
In practice, most legal disputes do not reach the formal, adjudicative process.
Their outcome is instead decided through more informal processes of alternative dispute
resolution. In more informal legal processes, the parties involved in the legal claim
mediate or negotiate and decide for themselves what the outcome should be, sometimes
with the assistance of legal representatives, a third-party mediator or a third-party
negotiator. The parties may agree to the same types of consequences that an adjudicator
can impose, but they may also agree to consequences that an adjudicative body could not,
or would not, impose. The settlement agreements that result from these processes are
private documents, which receive no publicity unless the parties agree to make them
public.
There is a range of different approaches to alternative dispute resolution in civil
and administrative law contexts, including rights-based approaches and interest-based
approaches.46 One feature that all informal enforcement approaches share, however, and
that differentiates them from adjudication, is that voluntary resolutions do not require an
admission of responsibility or liability in order for the parties to agree to remedial or
punitive consequences. Achieving such an admission may be a goal for some
applicants/claimants, and it is open to the defendant/respondent to agree to include an
admission of responsibility or liability as a term of the settlement agreement. Most
settlements agreements do not, however, include admissions of responsibility. Most
settlement agreements are also not available to the public. Therefore, even if a settlement
46

Andrew Pirie, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Skills, Science, and the Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2000) at
100-113.
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agreement did include an admission of responsibility, that admission would be known
only if the parties agreed to make the agreement available to the public.
A second feature that informal enforcement processes share, and that also
differentiates them from formal enforcement processes, is that their primary focus is on
the outcome: what result can the applicant/claimant and the defendant/respondent agree
to that will allow them to avoid formal legal process? In alternative dispute resolution
processes, then, consequence is the primary focus of responsibility. In criminal and
quasi-criminal contexts, what penalty or punishment will the defendant/respondent agree
to accept? In civil contexts (court and administrative law), which remedy or remedies
will the defendant/respondent agree to provide to the applicant/claimant? Within
alternative dispute resolution processes, the focus on the defendant/respondent is less
concerned with passing judgment on whether or not they are at fault and more concerned
with whether or not they will agree to accept a penalty or punishment, provide a remedy
or remedies, that will satisfy the applicant/claimant (or Crown in the criminal context).
Thus, whereas responsibility as fault is a central question in adjudication, it plays
little if any role in alternative dispute resolution processes. Conversely, whereas remedy
is an issue in adjudication only if fault is found, responsibility as remedy is the primary
focus in alternative dispute resolution processes.
Alternative dispute resolution is a subject of much debate and critique, from many
different perspectives, including issues of inequalities in bargaining power and unequal
access to legal representation. My dissertation does not engage specifically with these
debates, although my research resonates with some of the issues they address. I am,
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instead, interested in the ways in which formal and informal enforcement processes have
provided opportunities to impose responsibility for discrimination through law.

Responsibility and Responsive Regulation
The dynamic of informal dispute resolution processes at the level of individual
cases has conceptual parallels with the concept of responsive regulation at the societal
level, as argued first by Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick and then by Ian Ayres and
John Braithwaite. Nonet and Selznick proposed a framework of three “modalities” of
law, with varying degrees of coercion being one of the characteristics defining each type.
According to their typology, the most coercive laws are those which establish and
facilitate repressive power; the intermediately coercive laws are those which focus on
“taming” repression and protecting the integrity of law as an institution; and the least
coercive laws are those which are designed to respond to and facilitate “social needs and
aspirations”.47 They characterized this third and least coercive form of law as
“responsive law”, because it represents an effort to engage the power of the state in
response to people identifying what they wanted from law.48 They also argued that, “If
there is a paradigmatic function of responsive law, it is regulation, not adjudication.”49
Their rationale was that responsive law is concerned with substantive “legality” rather

47

Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (New York:
Harper & Row, 1978) at 14-15 [Nonet and Selzick, Law and Society in Transition].
48
Again, because the “public” is not homogenous, it is important to acknowledge that different people and
groups will reflect different social interests and will want state law to do different things.
49
Nonet and Selznick, Law and Society in Transition at 108.
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than with “legalization”, which they described as focusing on “the proliferation of rules
and procedural formalities.”50
Ayres and Braithwaite argued that their concept of “responsive regulation” shared
some of the key characteristics of Nonet and Selznick’s, in particular, “flexibility, a
purposive focus on competence, participatory citizenship, negotiation”.51 They also
emphasized that they were advocating “a method of regulation rather than of the ends of
regulation, a method that is negotiated and flexible”.52 In their model, the goal is the
voluntary assumption of responsibility through processes for negotiating how legal norms
will regulate social conduct. They also argued that voluntary compliance will be
achieved only as long as a state regulatory agency has coercive methods available and is
willing to use these methods.53 They described this enforcement model as the “Benign
Big Gun”: regulatory agencies that “will be more able to speak softly when they carry
big sticks” and in which “Paradoxically, the bigger and the more various are the sticks,
the greater the success regulators will achieve by speaking softly.”54
Tension between voluntary and coercive enforcement methods is a significant
theme in my dissertation. There are recurring arguments that voluntary persuasion is the
preferred enforcement method, but requires the option of coercive methods in the
background to be effective. To borrow the phrase coined by Mnookin and Kornhauser, it
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Nonet and Selznick, Law and Society in Transition at 107-108.
Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 5 [Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation].
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Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation at 18.
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Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation at 19 and Chapter 2, “The Benign Big Gun” at 19-57.
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Ayres and Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation at 19.
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is voluntarism “in the shadow of the law”.55 In the statutory human rights context,
however, there is a history of state reluctance to employ coercive methods, and this
history raises questions about the role of the coercive power of law in struggles against
social inequalities.

4

Anti-Discrimination Law as a Site of Inquiry
In Canada, the statutes that carry the label “human rights” are, in large measure,

anti-discrimination statutes.56 Anti-discrimination legislation explicitly aligns itself with
social equality goals by linking prohibitions against discrimination with legal rights to
equality.57 Most Canadian human rights statutes were first passed in the 1960s and
1970s, having evolved from earlier anti-discrimination and fair practices legislation that
was passed in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. These statutes apply to both the private and
public sectors, and to defined social areas that generally include employment, goods and
services, housing and vocational associations. In structure, they typically create
prohibitions against “discrimination” and against certain forms of conduct based on
prohibited grounds of discrimination. The prohibited grounds of discrimination in the
55

Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce” (1979), 88 Yale L.J. 950.
56
Two Canadian human rights statutes also include “civil or political rights” provisions: The
Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1 includes a Bill of Rights (ss. 4-8) and a right to
education (s. 13), and the Yukon Territory Human Rights Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 116, also includes a Bill of
Rights (ss. 3-6). The Quebec Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. , c.C-12 includes “economic,
social and cultural rights”: Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (ss. 1-9.1), Political Rights (ss. 21-22 ),
Judicial Rights (ss. 23-38), and Social and Economic Rights (ss. 39-48).
57
Since 1981 this link has been explicit in the language of Ontario’s Human Rights Code, which provides
for rights “to equal treatment without discrimination”. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, the equality rights provision, similarly links equality rights with protection against
discrimination. “Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection
and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race,
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.” [emphasis added]
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first provincial statutes were race, religion, and ethnicity. Additional prohibited grounds
of discrimination were added over the succeeding decades, beginning with age, sex and
marital status in the 1970s, disability and family status in the 1980s, sexual orientation in
the 1990s, and gender identity and gender expression in the 2000s.
The prohibited grounds of discrimination are central to Canadian human rights
legislation because they represent the social conditions and issues that anti-discrimination
legislation is designed to address. These prohibited grounds are intended to represent
particular social groups who have experienced and continue to experience discrimination
and discriminatory practices: racialized minorities; religious minorities; ethnic minorities;
women; persons with disabilities; families with children; single-parent families; lesbian,
gay, bisexual, trans and queer persons; and younger and older persons.58 The range of
discriminatory practices includes exclusion from, or low participation in, employment;
exclusion from housing; harassment and bullying; profiling; denial of services or inability
to get access to services.59
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Although the prohibited grounds of discrimination are central precisely because they are intended to
respond to social inequalities, there has also been criticism of this categorical approach, especially within
feminist legal theory. For just a very small sample of this literature, see: Nitya Iyer, “Categorical Denials:
Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity” (1993) 19 Queen’s LJ 179; Marlee Kline, “Race,
Racism and Feminist Legal Theory” (1989) 12 Harv Women’s LJ 115; Toni Williams, “Re-Forming
‘Women's’ Truth: A Critique of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada”
(1990) 22 Ottawa L Rev 725. I recognize the challenges posed by trying to fit complex social realities into
a categorical framework, and the need to recognize the multiple ways in which social groups experience
discrimination depending on the complexities of their social identities. However, I believe that a groundsbased approach continues to be an important way to maintain a focus on social groups and social inequality
in human rights law. See, for example: Dianne Pothier, “Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real
People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 13 CJWL 37, and Colleen Sheppard, “Grounds of Discrimination:
Towards an Inclusive and Contextual Approach” (2001) 80 Can Bar Rev 893.
59
There is much commentary on the meaning and role of anti-discrimination or human rights legal
doctrine. For a recent collection see: Deborah Hellman and Sophia Moreau, eds., Philosophical
Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). My dissertation does not
engage directly with these questions.
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Direct enforcement of human rights statutes has, until recently, been the
responsibility of human rights commissions and tribunals in most of Canada’s common
law jurisdictions.60 Human rights commissions have traditionally had a mandate to
receive and process complaints of statutory violations, to engage in research and policy
work, to provide educational services about human rights, and to play a role in the
administration of special programmes.61 In their complaint-processing enforcement role,
commissions have been generally required to investigate complaints, to assist the parties
in efforts to reach a voluntary resolution and, where the parties cannot reach a voluntary
resolution, to decide whether or not the complaint will be referred to a tribunal for a
formal hearing. When the commission decided to refer a complaint to a formal hearing,
it typically had carriage of the proceedings and was responsible for representing both the
complainant’s interests and the public interest dimension raised by the complaint.
Human rights statutes cannot be enforced directly either through civil actions in the
courts or by administrative tribunals. However, the legal protections that human rights
statutes establish can be raised in the social contexts where they apply and can be
addressed in civil and administrative adjudication.62
By the time the equality rights provision of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms came into effect in 1985, the human rights commission enforcement model had
60

British Columbia is the one Canadian jurisdiction that has operated both with and without a commissiontype institution. For a discussion of the “turbulent history” of human rights in British Columbia, see R.
Brian Howe and David Johnson, Restraining Equality: Human Rights Commissions in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2000) at 13-14 and 65-68 [Howe and Johnson, Restraining Equality].
61
Special programmes are also often known as affirmative action programmes.
62
Human rights legislation can be directly enforced only by using the statutory enforcement process.
However, people can attach human rights issues to other legal claims they advance through civil and
administrative legal processes (for example, breach of contract, tort, landlord tenant disputes, disputes over
government benefits, etc.) and receive additional remedies in relation to the human rights issue if the court
or tribunal finds a violation of human rights in addition to a violation of the other legal rights in dispute.
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produced several legal victories, some of which equality rights advocates relied on in
their arguments about how s. 15 of the Charter should be interpreted and applied.63
However, the human rights commission enforcement model was soon to become the
subject of significant criticism, both as a model and in relation to how the model was
functioning. Scholars and activists began to ask whether the equality rights provision of
the Charter offered the promise of a new avenue to pursue social equality through law.
However, after several decades of litigation experience with s. 15 of the Charter, equality
rights advocates have become increasingly disappointed with this legal tool,64 and there is
now renewed interest in reinvigorating human rights statutes as an avenue for pursuing
equality through law. In some jurisdictions, of which Ontario is one, this interest has
been accompanied by a major change in the process for enforcing human rights statutes.
This initiative for change in Ontario is the destination point of my dissertation.65

5

Dissertation Methodology and Overview
The dissertation is organized around three cases studies through which I examine

this tension between the promise and practice of law in struggles for social equality.
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See, for example: Beverley Baines, “Equality, Comparison, Discrimination, Status” in Fay Faraday,
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Each case study involves a pivotal contribution to the development of Canadian statutory
human rights law.
The first case study, which is Chapter One of the dissertation, explores how social
activists engaged with law as a tool for social equality in relation to the fair practices
statutes passed in Ontario in the 1950s. The first part of Chapter One examines the social
activists’ quest for fair practices legislation. The second part of Chapter One examines
the structure of the enforcement process and the social activists’ experiences with
enforcement of the legislation. The goal of the fair practices case study is to examine the
history of the social activism for fair practices legislation and the history of what
ultimately became the human rights commission enforcement model. When I began my
research, I learned that the story of the passage of Ontario’s fair practices statutes is a
subject of considerable academic interest, with a rich literature in a wide range of
academic disciplines. Some of this literature discusses questions about law and the role of
law, but these questions have not been a central focus in the literature and they are the
central focus of my interest. Therefore, I proceeded to conduct my own examination and
analysis of key primary source documents, looking at them specifically through the lens
of law as a tool for social equality.
My primary source research focused on the archival records of the two
organizations which led the social activism for Ontario’s fair practices statutes: (1) the
Jewish Labour Committee, including in particular the Ontario Labour Committee for
Human rights and the Toronto Joint Labour Committee for Human Rights, and (2) the
Joint Public Relations Committee of the B’nai Brith and the Canadian Jewish Congress
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My research on the Jewish Labour Committee and related fonds was conducted in
Library and Archives Canada in Ottawa and the Archives of Ontario. My research on the
Joint Public Relation Committee was conducted in the Ontario Jewish Archives in
Toronto, which houses the records of the Central Region of the Canadian Jewish
Congress, and in the national archives of the Canadian Jewish Congress, which are
housed in Montreal.
The second case study, which is Chapter Two of the dissertation, examines the
relationship between law and social relations through the Bell v. McKay litigation. The
first part of Chapter Two examines the history of human rights protection against
discrimination in rental housing and the continuing evolution of the human rights
commission enforcement model. The second part of Chapter Two examines the Bell v.
McKay litigation, the first statutory human rights case decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada, which raised questions both about the substance of anti-discrimination
legislation and the human rights commission enforcement model.
This second case study grew out of my participation in a symposium on the life
and work of Dr. Daniel Hill, organized by The Harriet Tubman Institute of York
University. My involvement in this symposium subsequently led to an opportunity to coauthor an article on the Bell v. McKay litigation for the Canadian Property Law Cases in
Context collection.66 I chose to include a Bell v. McKay case study in the dissertation
because doing so provided the opportunity to examine this history in more detail and
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Frank Luce and Karen Schucher, “‘The Right to Discriminate’: Kenneth Bell versus Carl McKay and the
Ontario Human Rights Commission” in Eric Tucker, Bruce Ziff and James Mujir, eds., Canadian Property
Law Cases in Context (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2012)
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more specifically through the lens of the tension between social goals and legal
processes. The research for this chapter included legislative history research, case law
research on decisions of boards of inquiry under the Ontario Human Rights Code, and
more archival research in records of the Ontario Labour and Human Rights Committee of
the Jewish Labour Committee.
The third case study, which is Chapter Three of the dissertation, examines the
tension between legal goals and social goals through the history of the demise of the
human rights commission enforcement process in Ontario. The first part of Chapter Three
provides contextual background for the Bill 107 debates, by examining key themes in the
development of human rights jurisprudence and in the functioning of the human rights
enforcement process after Bell v. McKay. In the second part of Chapter Three, I examine
and analyze the fiercely competing positions in the Bill 107 debates. In the third part of
Chapter Three, I review the preliminary assessments of the Bill 107 model in action.
As explained in the Preface, this third case study grew out of my interest in the
Bill 107 initiative. In February 2006, the Ontario government announced its intention to
eliminate the human rights commission enforcement process and substitute a process in
which people would file human rights claims with an adjudicative tribunal. This initiative
instigated a bitter debate within the Ontario human rights advocacy community. I was
interested in this debate and attended many of the public events at which the different
perspectives were debated. What interested me was not the personal acrimony, but the
fact that each side had such a deep commitment to the merits of its position. I wanted to
examine what values and interests were promoted by each side of the debate, as well as
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the potential implications of each side’s arguments. For this case study, I researched the
socio-legal and political context in which the initiative came forward and the Bill 107
legislative history, including the transcripts of the public hearings.
In the Concluding Reflections on the Promise and Practice of Law, I
reflect more generally on how the three case studies contribute to the four themes that
informed my research: the relationship between law and social power, the potential for
agency through law, the meaning of responsibility at law, and the tension between law as
a tool for determining concrete outcomes and law as a process through which to struggle
for concrete outcomes.
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Chapter One
Historical Roots of Ontario’s Human Rights Code and
Human Rights Commission Model:
Fair Practices Legislation and Enforcement, 1946-1961

Introduction to Chapter One
What led a diverse group of social activists in Ontario, in the 1940s and 1950s, to
seek the enactment and enforcement of legislation as a tool against racial, religious and
nationality discrimination in employment, housing, services, and public spaces? This
question is the primary focus of this first chapter, through which I explore questions
about the role of law and legal norms, questions about the meaning of social
responsibility, and questions about different approaches to legal process. The fair
practices legislation which resulted from the social activists’ campaigns established
prohibitions against discrimination and a state agency enforcement model which laid the
groundwork for Canadian human rights codes and the human rights commission
enforcement model.
In Part I of the chapter, I discuss the campaigns for fair practices legislation
through the lens of law, focusing on why and how the advocates for fair practices
legislation saw law as a tool to address direct discrimination in the fundamental social
areas of employment, services, and access to public spaces. The advocacy for fair
practices legislation involved arguments for state and citizen responsibility to change
social norms relating to direct discrimination, and arguments for an enforcement process
that gave preference to conciliation over adjudication. In Part II of the chapter, I explore
how the fair practices advocates used the new fair practices legislation as a tool against
39

direct discrimination. Both the structure of the enforcement model and its
implementation raised issues about the meaning of legal process and about access to the
coercive power of law, issues that continued to be experienced under human rights code
enforcement. In the Conclusion to the chapter, I identify four questions that emerge from
this early history and that I argue have particular relevance to the evolution of the
promise and practice of statutory human rights law in Ontario and in Canada. These four
questions continue as themes in the subsequent historical periods that I examine in
Chapter Two and Chapter Three.

Part I: The Quest for Fair Practices Legislation

I think it was a mistake to expect too much of the courts. After all, we do
not want judges to make law: we want law to be made by the elected
representatives of the people.67
… while within its own framework equity might perhaps develop new
remedies, the responsibility for the protection of new social forces must
hereafter be primarily the concern of the legislature and not of the courts.
… where social advance has outstripped legal theory and the gap between
the two must be closed, the legislature is better fitted than are the courts to
accomplish the result.68

Ontario was the first Canadian jurisdiction to pass fair practices legislation and
provided the lead for other Canadian jurisdictions, most of which followed suit to pass
similar legislation. In legal form, the fair practices statutes were closely modelled on
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legislation passed in several jurisdictions in the United States, beginning with New York
in 1945. This legal form was a partial departure from earlier Ontario anti-discrimination
legislation, discussed below, and also from a competing bill of rights model, as in The
Saskatchewan Bill of Rights Act, 1947.69 Ontario’s fair employment and fair
accommodation practices statutes, enacted in 1951 and 1954 respectively, targeted direct
discrimination based on race, religion and ethnic origin.

1 From Common Law to Legislation
The early history of Canadian efforts to establish anti-discrimination legal norms
through the courts illustrates the limitations of a court-based law reform strategy.70 With
the exception of the famous Re Drummond Wren71 case, the courts were not receptive to
claims that exclusionary conduct based on race and religion should be judged illegal.
According to James Walker, in 1916 a group of African Canadians asked the
federal government whether racially discriminatory practices were legal and were told by
the Deputy Minister of Justice that legislation was silent on this issue and that “The
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remedy is in the courts”.72 A number of court cases involving challenges to
discrimination were subsequently brought in the 1930s and 1940s. These cases focused
on discrimination in two social areas: provision of services and restrictive covenants in
relation to property. In some of these cases individuals asked the courts to rule on the
enforcement of legislation that was itself discriminatory and on discriminatory
enforcement of otherwise non-discriminatory laws. In other cases individuals asked the
courts to rule on discriminatory practices by non-state service providers and property
owners.73
The leading case on services was the Supreme Court of Canada’s now infamous
ruling in Christie v. York Corp., decided in 1941.74 The incident that led to the Christie
case occurred on July 11, 1936. Fred Christie went with friends to the York Tavern, in
Montreal. The waiter said to them: “Gentlemen, I am very sorry I cannot serve colored
people”.75 With the support of the Christie Defence Committee, Mr. Christie sued the
York Tavern for $200 in damages for the humiliation he suffered. The trial judge
awarded him $25 and costs of the action, on the grounds that the Tavern’s decision to
refuse to serve Black persons contravened ss.19 and 33 of the Quebec License Act.
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Section 33 of the statute stated that "No licensee for a restaurant may refuse, without
reasonable cause, to give food to travellers."76 The Quebec Court of Appeal overturned
the trial judgment and the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Quebec Court of
Appeal’s decision, with one judge dissenting.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s majority reasons opened by defining Mr. Christie
as a racialized person: “The appellant, who is a negro, entered a tavern …”.77 The
majority took a technical approach to the question before them in holding that the
Tavern’s conduct was legal because Mr. Christie “… was not a traveller asking for a meal
in a restaurant … he was only a person asking for a glass of beer in a tavern.”78 This
conclusion was informed by the Court’s application of the overriding principle that “Any
merchant is free to deal as he may choose with any individual member of the public” as
long as the merchant did not establish a rule “… contrary to good morals or public
order”.79 For the majority of the Court, then, a rule denying service to Black persons was
not contrary to “good morals or public order”. Bora Laskin published a brief comment
criticizing the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Christie, where he wrote: “The
principle of freedom of commerce enforced by the Court majority is itself merely the
reading of social and economic doctrine into law, and doctrine no longer possessing its
19th century validity.”80
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Justice Davis’s dissenting reasons opened with a different description of Mr.
Christie: “The appellant is a British subject residing in Verdun …”.81 Although this
description effectively erased the question of race, it emphasized Mr. Christie’s
commonality with the category of British subject - a category of person who would not,
as such, have been denied service in the tavern. In Justice Davis’s opinion, freedom of
contract did not apply to the Tavern’s conduct because the sale of alcohol was completely
regulated by the government.82 The government decided which merchants were
authorized to sell alcohol, and the government told citizens that they were allowed to
purchase alcohol only from merchants with government licences to sell alcohol.
According to Davis J., then, the Tavern was required to sell alcohol to all members of the
public unless the government gave the Tavern permission to refuse to sell to particular
individuals or classes of individuals. Section 43 of the statute prohibited the sale of
alcohol to various categories of persons, but none of these categories was based on race.
The scope of freedom of contract was also tested in cases challenging covenants
that prohibited the sale of property to Jews and other minority groups. The first case
involved Drummond Wren, the head of the Workers’ Educational Association, who
purchased a piece of land subject to a covenant prohibiting it from being “sold to Jews or
persons of objectionable nationality”. 83 Mr. Wren brought a court application seeking a
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declaration that the covenant was void.84 The case was heard by Justice Keiller MacKay,
and the published report of the reasons for decision indicates that no one appeared to
oppose the application.85 Justice MacKay concluded that the restrictive covenant was
illegal, primarily because it was contrary to public policy. A key source for the public
policy relied on by Justice MacKay was the founding Charter of the United Nations, the
San Francisco Charter, which was adopted in 1945 and contained declarations of
principle similar to those subsequently included in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted in 1948.86 Justice MacKay reasoned that the physical separation or
“segregation” of different peoples that could result from restrictive covenants was
harmful to the public good, because it could have the effect of deepening divisions
among “religious and ethnic groups”. In his view, the court had “... a moral duty, at
least, to lend aid to all forces of cohesion, and similarly to repel all fissiparous tendencies
which would imperil national unity.”87 Justice MacKay’s decision was not appealed, and
was hailed as a great victory by the groups that took the case forward.88
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In the subsequent Noble and Wolf case, the vendor, Mrs. Noble, and the
purchaser, Mr. Wolf, took joint legal action to void the restrictive covenant in the title to
a cottage that was part of the Beach O’ Pines summer resort on Lake Huron. They were
opposed by a group of cottagers, who defended against the application. Mrs. Noble and
Mr. Wolf’s claim was dismissed by Justice Schroeder of the Ontario High Court, whose
decision was the upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. Part of Justice Schroeder’s
stated rational for rejecting Justice MacKay’s reliance on public policy was that it was
not the role of the courts to create new legal norms based on public policy:

In my view it is within the province of the competent legislative
bodies to discuss and determine what is best for the public good and to
provide for it by the proper enactments. Such matters can with greater
propriety and safety be left to the duly elected representatives of the
people assembled in Parliament or in the Legislature.89

In the Court of Appeal decision upholding Justice Schroeder’s ruling, Chief Justice
Robertson went even further to state that law generally - without distinguishing between
law in the form of judicial rulings and law in the form of legislation - was not an
appropriate method of achieving “mutual goodwill and esteem” among people of
different races:

Doubtless, mutual goodwill and esteem among the people of the numerous
races that inhabit Canada is greatly to be desired, and the same goodwill
and esteem should extend abroad, but what is so desirable is not a mere
show of goodwill or a pretended esteem, such as might be assumed to
comply with a law made to enforce it. To be worth anything, either at
home or abroad, there is required the goodwill and esteem of a free
people, who genuinely feel, and sincerely act upon, the sentiments they
89
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express. A wise appreciation of the impotence of laws in the development
of such genuine sentiments, rather than mere formal observances, no doubt
restrains our legislators from enacting, and should restrain our Courts from
propounding, rules of law to enforce what can only be of natural growth, if
it is to be of any value to anyone.90

In the paragraph preceding this conclusion, Chief Justice Robertson had expressed the
view that the restrictive covenant was not criminal or immoral, and did not concern the
public interest:

The purpose of clause (f) here in question is obviously to assure, in some
degree, that the residents are of a class who will get along well together.
To magnify this innocent and modest effort to establish and maintain a
place suitable for a pleasant summer residence into an enterprise that
offends against some public policy, requires a stronger imagination than I
possess. … There is nothing criminal or immoral involved; the public
interest is in no way concerned.91

The fact that the property was a summer resort was also an important consideration for
Justice Schroeder and the Court of Appeal.
Noble and Wolf were ultimately successful in the Supreme Court of Canada, but for
reasons that did not attack the substance of the restrictive covenant, as did Justice
MacKay’s reasons in Drummond Wren.92 Two of the judges were of the view that the
covenant did not touch and concern the land because it did not deal with the use of the
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land. Four of the judges were of the view that the covenant was void for uncertainty.93
Justice Locke was the sole dissenting judge in the Supreme Court of Canada appeal. He
expressly agreed with the reasons of Chief Justice Robertson in the Ontario Court of
Appeal that law was not an appropriate method of achieving “mutual goodwill and
esteem” among people of different races. This argument, that the force of law cannot and
should not be used to address racial and religious discrimination, thus became an
important theme in the subsequent opposition to the social activism for fair practices
legislation.

2 Social Advocacy for Fair Practices Legislation
Ontario’s fair practices statutes were born of concerted social activism that is a
subject of enduring interest in Canadian scholarship.94 Stories about this social activism
have been told and re-told in a range of disciplines, including social work,95 political
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science,96 social history, 97 and legal history.98 As Patrias and Frager have argued, the
actions taken against prejudice and discrimination “. . . were not spontaneous reactions
against the horrific consequences of racism that had manifested themselves during the
war, but the result of campaigns that were carefully and painstakingly orchestrated by
small groups of Anglo-Canadian activists, and especially by key minority groups.”99
The accounts of the advocacy for fair practices legislation draw vibrant pictures of
highly-energetic and multi-faceted activities and campaigns: activists gathered empirical
data to prove the existence of the problems they were asking the government to address;
they commissioned opinion polls, magazine and newspaper articles, and radio
programmes; they organized lectures, workshops, forums, demonstrations and publicity
campaigns; they prepared briefs to governments and sent delegations to meet with elected
representatives to discuss their briefs; and they published pamphlets, newsletters, and
magazine articles. Many of the documents produced by the advocates provide the
primary sources for my discussion and analysis in this chapter.
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Key Players in the Ontario Advocacy for Fair Practices Legislation
The literature highlights ‘Jews’ and ‘Jewish’ organizations100 as playing a
significant leadership role in the initiatives for Canada’s first anti-discrimination
statutes.101 There were two main Jewish organizational participants: (1) the Joint Public
Relations Committee (JPRC) of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the B’nai B’rith,
formed in April 1947,102 and (2) the Jewish Labour Committee of Canada (JLC) and its
local Joint Labour Committees for Human Rights that local unions and labour councils
established in several urban centers, including Toronto.103 The JPRC tends to be
characterized as the more mainstream organization, whose members were mainly middleclass entrepreneurs and professionals, although Labour Progressive Party (“LLP”) MPP
Joseph Salsberg was also an active member of the JPRC.104 The third key organizational
player was the Association for Civil Liberties (“ACL”), which was formed in 1949 and
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based in Toronto.105 Many of the individuals who were involved in the JPRC and the
JLC also became involved with the ACL’s activities supporting the anti-discrimination
campaigns. Collectively, these organizations brought together a wide range of players,
including adult educators, labour activists, legal academics, politicians, practicing
lawyers, religious officials, and social activist groups representing racialized and
religious minorities.
A number of individuals emerge in the literature as playing key roles in the
campaigns. They include the following individuals: Ben Kayfetz, who became the
Executive Director of the JPRC in 1947;106 Kalman Kaplansky, who in 1946 became the
National Director of the JLC and held this position until 1957;107 Lesley Wismer, Vivien
Mahood, Donna Hill, Sid Blum and Alan Borovoy, named in the chronological order in
which they held the position of executive secretary of the Toronto Joint Labour
Committee for Human Rights;108 Irving Himel, who was employed for a time at the
Workers’ Educational Association and later formed the ACL; and Prof. Bora Laskin, at
that time a law professor at the University of Toronto, who was one of the chairpersons
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of the JPRC legal sub-committee.109 Although it is evident that men were dominant in
the organizational leadership roles, Vivien Mahood and Donna Hill made significant
contributions during their leadership tenures.110
Lawyers in practice and legal academics played key roles in the advocacy for fair
practices legislation and were also involved in preparing draft legislation and meeting
with members of cabinet.111 The JPRC established a special committee on law and legal
research to study the feasibility of introducing anti-discrimination legislation, the
membership of which was primarily lawyers and legal academics.112 The ACL was run
by lawyer Irving Himel, and its board of directors included lawyer Andrew Brewin and
Prof. Bora Laskin.113 Prof. Frank Scott, a law professor at McGill, was a leading thinker
about human rights issues as well as an activist in the Co-operative Commonwealth
Federation (“CCF”) and civil liberties organizations.114 Montreal lawyer Manfred
Saalheimer, who was on the staff of the Canadian Jewish Congress, was very involved
with anti-discrimination issues and wrote a number of important articles on issues raised
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in the advocacy for fair practices legislation.115 Although Saalheimer has not figured in
the literature on the history of Ontario’s fair practices legislation, I make reference to his
work in this chapter.
The account I provide in this chapter focuses on the role of law in the advocacy
for fair practices legislation. In telling this story, I refer specifically to the organizations
and individuals identified above, who led the campaigns.116 There appears to have been a
significant degree of coordination among the organizations and, as I mentioned above,
key individuals often participated in more than one organization. The organizations and
individuals appear to have generally agreed on the arguments for fair practices
legislation. Sometimes they presented these arguments collectively, such as in briefs and
delegations to government; other times they presented them independently, such as in
their own publications and speeches.

Social Solidarity and Universalism
Ideologies of social solidarity and universalism animated the campaigns against
racial and religious discrimination. For Jewish activists, in particular, there appear to
have been two aspects to their views of social solidarity and universalism. One involved
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Jews coming together from a range of social and political backgrounds to work on the
campaigns, and finding ways to work together despite differences in social class and
political allegiance.117 The second involved Jewish organizations broadening the scope
of the struggle and joining together with other groups to pursue common goals. Jewish
activists would have been affected by their own experiences of anti-semitism and
discrimination. However, Jewish groups began to conceptualize anti-semitism in more
general terms as a form of prejudice and discrimination, and began to make links between
anti-semitism and the prejudice and discrimination experienced by other racial and
religious groups.
One reason to conceptualize anti-semitism in the more generic language of
prejudice and discrimination was to prevent Jews being perceived as a special interest
group seeking special treatment.118 At the same time, the universalizing strategy also
seems to have reflected a general concern about the discrimination that other groups
faced, and a genuine interest in fighting all forms of discrimination and prejudice.119 In
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conducting their campaigns, Jewish organizations formed alliances with organizations
that represented other affected minority groups, and with other groups that wanted to
support the anti-discrimination campaigns.120 In fact, one of the key focal points of the
campaigns for fair accommodation practices legislation was the discrimination against
Blacks in Dresden, Ontario, which had originated as the end of the “underground
railroad” for fugitive slaves.121
The Ontario campaigns for fair practices legislation began in the mid-to-late
1940s. While ideologies of universality and common humanity appear to have unified
activists in relation to racial and religious discrimination, other social factors also likely
contributed to these unifying tendencies in relation to racial and religious
discrimination.122 Social factors of particular significance were the events of the second
world war, the emergence of the CCF as a significant political force in Ontario and
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elsewhere, the potential impact of discrimination on the immigration needed for
economic development, and a desire to assert the moral superiority of capitalism over
socialism.123
In addition, anti-discrimination legislation targeting racial, religious and ethnic
discrimination had been on the political agenda in Ontario since the early 1930s.124 In
1932, the Insurance Act was amended to prohibit licensed insurers from discriminating
unfairly between risks.125 Broader anti-discrimination legislation was initially proposed
by MPPs Joseph Salsberg and Alex MacLeod, who made it a campaign issue in the 1943
Ontario provincial election and proposed legislating against discrimination in
employment, housing, public accommodations and recreation.126 Instead, a much
narrower statute was passed in 1944: despite “the sweep of its title” - to borrow Arnold
Bruner’s words - The Racial Discrimination Act, 1944 contained only one prohibition, a
prohibition against discrimination in publications, signs or other representations.127 In
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1948, four years after the Racial Discrimination Act was passed, MPP Salsberg
introduced a fair employment practices bill as a private member.128 According to
Lambertson, this bill not only died but also had the negative effect on some people of
linking fair practices legislation with communism, which by this time had increasingly
negative associations.129
The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act was amended in 1950 to void
prospectively any covenant “running with the land” that restricted the sale, ownership,
occupation or use of land on the basis of race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry of place
of origin.130 The Labour Relations Act was also amended in 1950, to deem invalid a
collective agreement which discriminated on the basis of race or creed.131 This
amendment was part of a package of other amendments to the statute; however, it is
interesting to note that in May 1947 the JPRC discussed a plan to meet with MPP Leslie
Wismer to discuss adding a non-discrimination clause to collective agreements as a
strategy for “mobilizing labour and management” to act against discrimination:

… one technique for consideration by agencies is a non-discrimination
clause in collective bargaining agreements as a means of mobilizing
labour and management into concrete action against employment
discrimination. The consideration of this technique will be urged.132

This proposal was not taken up in the 1950 amendments to the Labour Relations Act.
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In addition to these legislative measures, several Ontario municipalities passed
regulations or ordinances in the 1940s to prohibit the exclusion of minority groups from
public places and access to services.133 Thus, the campaigns for fair practices legislation
did not raise a completely novel idea and there was some ground laid for persuading the
legislature to further expand the exercise of its legislative authority on issues of
discrimination.

3

Discrimination as a Social Issue Requiring Response
The fair practices statutes, like the earlier anti-discrimination legislative measures,

were sought in response to specific social conditions. The amendment to the Insurance
Act was initiated in response to negatively differential treatment of Jews. Ontario’s
Racial Discrimination Act was passed in response to signs, advertisements and
publications that read, for example: “Gentiles Only”, “No Jews Need Apply”, and “Jews
and Dogs Not Admitted”.134 The legislation prohibiting restrictive covenants was passed
in response to restrictive covenants of the type challenged in the Drummond Wren and
Noble v. Alley cases, discussed above.
The form of discrimination targeted by advocacy for fair practices legislation was
what we now call “direct discrimination”. Direct discrimination refers to conduct,
133
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policies and practices that expressly and intentionally cause negative, differential
treatment for particular social groups.135 The focus of campaigns was direct
discrimination against racialized, religious and ethnic minorities, in the social areas of
employment, services, and use of public spaces. Fair employment practices statutes were
sought in response to employers refusing to hire racialized and religious minorities. Fair
accommodation practices statutes were sought in response to the exclusion of racialized
and religious minority groups from public recreational facilities such as skating rinks,
movie theatres, and dance halls; and the refusal to provide services to racialized and
religious minorities in places such as restaurants, barbershops and hairdressers. Ben
Kayfetz (JPRC) offered the following description of the social conditions and practices
that were the focus of campaigns for fair practices statutes:

Those old enough to recall that era will remember that Jews were
barred, both formally and informally, from renting or buying houses in
certain parts of Toronto and Ontario, that very few Jews were employed in
the banks or in insurance (other than as salesmen) and that the large
downtown department stores rarely took on Jewish staff. Jewish high
school teachers were as rare as hen’s teeth: They would be considered for
Barrie, Sault Ste. Marie or Thunder Bay but teaching in the metropolis
was, if not barred, effectively restricted. One could go down the line
specifying many other professions, trades and occupations, and the story
would be the same. Discrimination was the norm.
As for Blacks – Negroes as they were known then – the situation was
an unhappy one. Young men with education and training were
condemned to portering jobs on the railway. Rarely, if ever, did one see
any black, brown or Oriental faces behind a wicket or counter in any
office, or shop, be it governmental or privately owned. Some firms
carried their bias further and never hired Catholics.136
135

See, for example: Russell Zinn, The Law of Human Rights in Canada: Practice and Procedure
(Toronto: Canada Law Book Inc., 2013) at 1:20.1-1:20.2.
136
Kayfetz, “Community Relations” at 57-58. For other descriptions of the discrimination experienced by
racialized and religious minority groups, see: Backhouse, Colour-Coded at 1-17; Lambertson, Repression

59

Thus, the prohibitions ultimately legislated in the fair practices statutes were a direct
response to the concrete social conditions that were the focus of the campaigns for this
legislation.
Significantly, although there were also efforts to include sex as a prohibited
ground of discrimination in some of the early anti-discrimination statutes, these efforts
were not successful. Efforts to draw on a universalizing ideology appear to have worked
against women social activists who sought to conceptualize and raise issues about sex
discrimination. In the labour context, for example, efforts to distinguish women’s
experiences from men’s were seen as undermining the broader struggles of labour.137
Similarly, in the political context, efforts to distinguish women’s experiences could be
seen as undermining broader political struggles. Carmela Patrias and Joan Sangster have
argued that although the first draft of Saskatchewan’s Bill of Rights Act, 1947 included
sex as a prohibited ground of discrimination, sex was probably removed from the bill out
of a desire to maintain protective labour legislation for women, together with generally
paternalistic attitudes towards women.138 Dean Beeby writes that CCF women in Ontario
tried to include sex as a prohibited ground in their proposed bill of rights, and that these
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efforts were undermined by the exclusion of sex from Saskatchewan’s Bill of Rights.139
However, Ontario did pass legislation to address disparities in wages paid to women and
men workers who were performing the same work at the same time as it passed its fair
employment practices statute.140
To the extent that the discriminatory practices targeted by the fair practices
campaigns were socially acceptable, they were also in some sense “legal” – implicitly, if
not explicitly. Ben Kayfetz characterized these discriminatory practices as “the norm”
during that period.141 Therefore, advocates for fair practices legislation had to advance
arguments that discriminatory conduct, policies and practices should no longer be
considered socially acceptable and should be legally prohibited.
The advocates for fair practices legislation presented two angles to the argument
for changing the social norms relating to this discrimination: the “anti-discrimination”
angle and the “fairness” or “equality of opportunity” angle.142 The anti-discrimination
angle was reflected in the subsequent statutory provisions, which were generally
structured as prohibitions against discrimination. It was also reflected in language
describing the early committees, which were established “to combat racial intolerance”.
This more negative side focused on the reasons why discrimination was harmful conduct
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that should be prohibited. The anti-discrimination side also linked more directly to the
persons who engaged in discriminatory conduct and practices, since it was their
behaviour that would need to change in order to reduce or eliminate discrimination.
The equality of opportunity side, on the other hand, was reflected in the name of
the statutes, calling for fairness in practices relating to employment, services, public
spaces, and housing. It was also reflected in the language of “human rights”, which
ultimately became the dominant characterization. This more positive angle called
attention to the benefits to be gained by eliminating discrimination and to the protective
nature of the legislative provisions. The social activists also referenced the recentlyadopted Universal Declaration of Human Rights,143 which called for all persons to be
treated with equal dignity and equal rights. The equality of opportunity or fairness angle
linked more directly to the persons who would benefit from an end to discriminatory
conduct and practices.
Kalmen Kaplansky (JLC) described the fair practices advocates as facing the
dilemma of whether to emphasize the positive or the negative angle:

… [Les] Wismer touches on the subject which had bedevilled the human
rights constituency for many years and is still a problem, namely that of
presentation of material. Should it concentrate on the negative, the cases
of discrimination, and the hardship and misery caused by it, or should it
emphasize the positive, the promotion of unity, of nation-building?144
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From the very beginning we realized that we should be working for
something, rather than against; that we should start on a positive note,
rather than a negative one.145

He also commented on the semantic differences between the language of racial
discrimination and the language of human relations, stating that “improved human
relations” was a “euphemism for work against religious and racial tension”; 146 as he
stated, committees “should assume a name, which would indicate the positive nature of
their work.”147 In practice, the fair practices advocates relied on both angles in their
arguments for changing social norms relating to racial and religious discrimination.
However, in their arguments for outlawing discrimination, they tended to emphasize the
anti-discrimination angle rather than on the equality of opportunity aspect, consistent
with the fact that fair practices could be achieved only if discriminatory conduct was
eliminated or reduced.
The advocates for fair practices legislation presented two rationales for
prohibiting discrimination, one focused on the negative impact of discrimination and the
other on the negative character of discrimination. On the question of negative impact,
they argued that the discriminatory conduct and practices were harmful both to the
individuals and groups directly affected, and to society as a whole. In relation to the
affected individuals and groups, discrimination caused harm by excluding them from
access to fundamental social goods – employment, services, and public spaces and by
treating them as second-class citizens:
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It is also widely recognized that discrimination in employment is harmful
because:
1. It threatens the individual’s basic right to earn a living and improve
his lot.
2. It bars many people with talent who would be real assets to the
community if given a chance. Able workers are kept at the bottom
of the economic ladder, when they might otherwise advance to
better paying jobs, increase their buying power, and thus bring
greater prosperity to the whole community.
3. It produces discontent and resentment among those who are forced
in the role of “second-class citizens.”148
The effect on the morale and mental health of those to whom we
allow merely “second class” citizenship is harmful in the extreme. … The
economic conditions alone of groups which are discriminated against and
which because of this discrimination cannot find jobs, result in poor
housing conditions where ill health, crime and family difficulties are
bred.149

In relation to society overall, discrimination caused harm by assaulting democracy:
discrimination undermined social unity, freedom, and equal rights.150 As stated in a
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research paper prepared by the JPRC, the community dimension of the harm of
discrimination was an important element of the arguments about the appropriateness of
legislative action:

It is the duty of the state to ensure for each of its members the rights,
freedoms and privileges that are his by virtue of his citizenship.
Unfortunately, there is confusion in the minds of some of our legislators as
to the righteousness of this course. They reason that laws of this nature are
resorting to coercion and force which is contrary to democratic principles.
It is strange reasoning indeed which condones restriction and denial of
basic rights on the one hand, yet fears to prohibit this evil on grounds of
‘force.’ To discourage crimes against society, we pass laws which fine
and penalize. Violations of civil rights are crimes against the community
and as such can only be restrained and prevented by appropriate legal
action. If the state will not recognize the principle at stake and act
appropriately, it is small wonder indeed that the race bigots go on with
their evil routine.151

Labour activists similarly invoked the values of unity and solidarity in the workplace
context, appealing to the importance of workers standing together and not allowing
discrimination to become a vehicle for division within the bargaining unit. As Kaplansky
(JLC) commented:

We in the labour movement are particularly concerned to see
discrimination on the grounds of race or religion minimized. Our strength
lies in solidarity. We have no room for racial and religious antagonisms
within our ranks.152
religion, remembering always that economic and social discrimination seriously jeopardize our national
unity.”
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The arguments based on harmful impact were usually stated in morally neutral language,
and compared the proposed anti-discrimination statutory measures to other examples of
civil legal provisions. For example, a pamphlet published by The Committee on Group
Relations in Canada noted that: “There are scores of laws to safeguard property and other
rights of business. Human rights are no less important than property rights and equally
deserve the protection of the law.”153
Although harm is arguably not morally neutral, the language of harm is less
inflammatory than the language the fair practices advocates used when their arguments
were addressed more directly to the question of discrimination as immoral conduct. In
these arguments, they described discriminatory practices, and the persons responsible for
these practices, as “evil”, “anti-social”, and “diseased”. For example, a 1947 brief to the
Ontario Premier stated:

Every additional case of discrimination in employment is a further and
ever more dangerous threat to our way of life. But discrimination is an evil
that will not disappear if only we are willing to ignore it. It requires
serious consideration and decisive action.154
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A document prepared in connection with a 1949 ballot on racial segregation in
Dresden, Ontario Canada described “white supremacy” as “one of the most
virulent plagues on earth’, a disease, the importation of which needed to be
prevented in the same way that Canada maintained “rigid import restrictions on
plants and animals from the United States to prevent the spread of disease and
germs.”155 When discrimination was described as a matter of morality, the
proposed anti-discrimination provisions were compared with criminal laws that
similarly prohibited unacceptable social conduct. As one report stated, “The idea
is growing that laws to protect citizens against assault on their human rights and
dignity are as necessary as laws to prohibit reckless driving and criminal physical
assault.156 A 1950 brief to the Ontario Premier presented a similar argument, as
follows:

… experience has demonstrated the need to apply legal sanctions to
protect society and the individual from conduct which violates their
principles. That is why we have laws which make it an offence to kill, to

155

OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Reel 6, 1949, Document on ballot on race discrimination in
Dresden, December 6, 1949. This document was prepared in the context of a proposition to hold a vote in
Dresden to determine whether or not service providers should be permitted to continue to deny services to
racial and religious minorities. The authors of the document compare voting on discrimination to voting on
theft. See also the comparison between racial discrimination and disease from 1960 submissions on racial
discrimination in housing: “Racial discrimination is one of the most crippling diseases to a free society. We
submit our sincere hope that this Council will adopt and apply the medicinal antidote that we have
prescribed here today. OJA, Fonds 17, Box 11, 1960, File 6, Submissions re: Racial Discrimination in
Multiple Housing Accommodations at 4.
156
LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, vol. 24. Trades and Labor Congress of
Canada - Convention Report Relating to Work for Improved Human Relations 1949, Report on the 64th
Convention of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, September 1949 at 7. Cf. CJC Nat. Charities
Comm. Archives, CJC Org. Records, Series ZB, Saalheimer, Manfred, Human Rights, Manfred
Saalheimer, “Laws Also Educate” in Food for Thought: Group Relations in Canada, Toronto, October
1949 at 40; OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg, “A Fair Employment
Practices Law Why It Is Necessary and Feasible” at 3; OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, A Brief to
the Premier of Ontario, January 24, 1950 at 3.

67

steal, to bear false witness, to physically assault your neighbour. It is to
prevent anti-social forms of conduct. …
The same is true of anti-social conduct in the form of discrimination
practices. Does it not seem strange that we provide protection for the
individual and society from physical assault, and yet when the same
person is assaulted in a somewhat different way, by the force of
discrimination, with possibly much more injurious consequences to him
and the members of his race or religion, psychologically, economically
and spiritually, we provide no protection at all.157

According to Walker, psychologists and social scientists in the 1930s had begun to
challenge the widely-held view that some races were by nature inferior to others. They
contended that there was no biological or other material basis for the ideology of racial
inferiority, and that this ideology should be regarded as a psychological disorder or
disease and as a social evil.158 “Prejudice” was the term that came to be associated with
the view that racism was a sickness and an evil attitude; “discrimination” was the term
that came to mean the exclusionary social practices that resulted from prejudice. It was
discrimination that was the focus of the campaigns for legislation and, as we will see in
the next section of this chapter, the fair practices advocates relied upon this distinction
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between prejudice and discrimination to support their argument that legislation was an
appropriate and necessary measure to address discrimination.
The philosophy of universality and inclusion that underpinned the campaigns for
fair practices legislation was an understandable response to ideas and practices which
treated racialized and religious minority groups as inferior or second class human beings.
The campaigns for anti-discrimination laws in the 1940s and 1950s did not challenge the
social structures and social relations through which these practices were constituted and
maintained. Walker described the approach to discrimination in these campaigns as
reflecting an understanding of prejudice as “… an individual pathology in a democratic
society that was fundamentally fair”;159 thus, the anti-discrimination legislation that was
passed did not include corrective features to address structural problems in the economy
or society which tended to reinforce or support discriminatory practices. This approach to
discrimination ideology later came to be characterized as a “formal” response approach to
social inequality, because it focused exclusively on responding to overt practices of
restriction and exclusion.160

This approach to discrimination also came to be

understood, as Girard writes, “… a mostly unthreatening ‘colour-blind’ philosophy of
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equal treatment rather than proposing more radical measures such as quotas for particular
minority groups.”161
There were more substantive perspectives on social inequality, but these were not
the ones which shaped and informed the anti-discrimination statutes. Stuart Svonkin,
writing about the U.S. context, argued that some activists had earlier connected antidiscrimination goals with social and economic equality during the New Deal period.
According to Svonkin, these activists:

. . . argued that fair employment depended upon full employment, that fair
education depended upon full education, and that fair housing depended
upon full housing. This analysis suggested that prejudice and
discrimination might be eliminated, or at least lessened, by extending the
social safety net … 162

However, by the late 1940s and early 1950s, arguments in favour of expanding the New
Deal welfare state were under attack and these activists retreated to the view that
prejudice and discrimination could be addressed within existing political and economic
relations.163 According to minutes of the December 1947 meeting of the Non-Violent
Action Committee, Ben Kayfetz (JPRC) reported on his participation in drafting a “race
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relations” news sheet, expressing the view that the suggested title - “Towards Equality” was too idealistic, and should be changed to “Equal Opportunity”.164
Equal opportunity has come to be characterized, and sometimes denigrated, as
being only a formal approach to inequality. It is certainly true that equality of
opportunity does not address all aspects of social inequality. However, it is useful to
remember that practices of formal inequality contribute to social inequalities and that
struggles against formal inequalities were and are an important component of struggles
against social inequalities.165

4

Why Law?
The campaigns for anti-discrimination statutes in the 1940s and 1950s were

campaigns for state protection and for public action against discriminatory conduct
practiced by “private” social actors. The three significant themes in these campaigns
were: (a) the normative role of law, (b) public (both state and citizen) responsibility to
address discrimination, and (c) the coercive power of law. Many of the arguments
advanced by the Canadian fair practices advocates drew on similar arguments made by
fair practices advocates in the United States. Both Ben Kayfetz, Executive Director of
the JPRC, and Kalmen Kaplansky, National Director of the JLC, were sent to New York
164
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shortly after they were hired to learn about that state’s experience with fair practices
legislation.166 Walker argued that Kalmen Kaplanksy (JLC) was not initially as keen on
legal avenues as either the JPRC or some of his JLC colleagues, with reference to the
following exchange between Kaplansky and Vivien Mahood:

On 21 April 1949 Vivien Mahood appeared on a panel discussing fair
employment legislation, and was quoted on page 1 of the Toronto
Telegram as saying "Education is a catch-all phrase that usually means
absolutely nothing. When you get a fair employment law you have
something concrete." Kaplansky wrote admonishingly: "Your statement...
caught me by surprise. If you are correctly quoted, I doubt whether I can
agree with you.... I recognize the value of laws, but I wouldn't dismiss
education in such sweeping terms. The Canadian Jewish Congress people
are all for laws and I think that their interest is greatly influenced by
developments in the United States. I hope to discuss this matter with you
fully. . .”.167

Despite Kaplansky’s initial reluctance, the JLC became an active participant in the
campaigns for legislation, and he himself was soon heard using the metaphor of law as a
“weapon”.168
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The fair practices campaigns were campaigns for law in the form of legislation.
The call for legislation evolved, in part, from the experience with law in the form of
litigation in the adjudication of the Noble v. Alley case. Leslie Wismer (JLC-Toronto), in
his report on Justice Schroeder’s decision in Noble v. Alley wrote:

By placing the responsibility for protective legislation and implementation
squarely at the door of the legislators, Justice Schroeder contributed to an
invigorated public campaign in this area. What's more he helped an
informed public opinion to concentrate on social action and legislation,
rather than to rely exclusively on 'good will' approaches and so-called
educational devices.169

Claude Jodin, President of the Trades and Labor Congress of Canada, similarly wrote in
his 1948 report on the Activities of the Standing Committee on Racial Discrimination,
that Schroeder J.’s decision “… established the need for legislation, both federal and
provincial, which would make it illegal in Canada to discriminate against people because
of their religious affiliations or racial origin.”170 As he argued:

We urge all our affiliated Trades and Labor Councils and Provincial
Federations of Labor to press for the enactment of the necessary
legislation protecting the various racial and religious groups of our country
in the exercise of their rights as citizens of a free and democratic
Canada.171
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In much of the advocacy, however, the arguments were framed in general terms as
campaigns for “law”, and did not distinguishing between law as legislation and law in the
form of adjudicative decisions. However, “law” in the context of these campaigns meant
legislation and the enforcement of legislation. And since the authority to establish law in
the form of legislation rested with the government, the campaigns were directed at
enlisting the government’s legislative authority.

The Normative Role of Law
The fair practices advocates argued that legislation was an appropriate and
necessary response to discrimination because of the important role law plays in defining
social norms. They described social norms as being “legal” in two ways. First, a social
norm was legal if its legality was not challenged. This is a particularly interesting
argument, because it rests on a view that legality is a characteristic that automatically or
necessarily attaches to conduct, and that conduct is understood to be legal unless its
legality has been successfully challenged. In other words, where there was no law
against particular conduct, that conduct was presumed to be acceptable and “legal”.
Therefore, the fact that there was no law against discrimination meant that discrimination
was legal:

An important element in the argument is that suggested in the article by
Will Maslow reprinted from Congress Weekly. Namely, that the law by its
very neutrality encourages discriminatory practices since it leaves it
entirely up to the personal goodwill or ill-will of the individual to deprive
other citizens of their basic rights. It unconsciously serves in the creation
of patterns of discrimination which are self-prolonging and which tend to
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fix themselves in the popular mind as part of the accepted social mores
and standards of society.172
A case in point is the absence so far -- with the exception of the
Province of Saskatchewan -- of legislation outlawing racial and religious
discrimination in rental housing. Until Fair Accommodation Practices
laws covering this field exist in the various provinces, landlords have no
official pronouncement of public policy to guide them in this respect.173

A second way in which social norms obtained legal status was when their legality
was challenged unsuccessfully. Thus, a failure to obtain legislative change or an
adjudicative ruling that a social norm was legal reinforced its legitimacy and its authority:

A restrictive covenant would be useless if the law did not recognize it and
give it force.174
… the insertion of such a [restrictive covenant] clause in a legal document
gives sanction of Law to racial discrimination in the sale of land. It will
give comfort to bigots and race haters and will encourage them to insert
such covenants at every opportunity. We cannot over-estimate the
‘security’ that legality gives to these malpractices.
…
To have such a ban upheld by the courts is to give it an authority that it
could not possibly obtain otherwise.175

Conversely, a judgment of illegality would enhance other efforts to change conduct and
prescribe new norms of acceptable conduct. A law prohibiting discrimination would
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mean that discrimination was now considered illegal and would, therefore, establish a
new social norm against discriminatory actions:

The enactment of anti-discrimination legislation is a basic sign that
labour’s community relations work and educational programs are
successful. The existence of an anti-discrimination law signifies public
acceptance and agreement in the principle that bigotry and intolerance
have no place in Canadian life.176

From the labour perspective, a law against discrimination would also enable trade unions
to assist people in aspects of the employment relationship, or would-be relationship, over
which they did not otherwise have the authority to provide assistance, such as the hiring
process and for employees in non-unionized workplaces: “Only the law is all pervading.
It alone can reach out to and beyond the hiring gate. It alone can reach into the
unorganized shop, store or office….”.177
The fair practices advocates also pointed to the fact that illegality can generate
social stigma and argued that it was appropriate to employ the power of legislation to
create this stigmazing effect in relation to discrimination. In a 1956 article on the fair
accommodation practices legislation, Alan Borovoy wrote: “To do anything which has
the stigma of illegality usually involves a certain loss of social prestige and respectability
…”.178 According to Brian Howe, Conservative MPP Allan Grossman supported antidiscrimination legislation in part because “... law would put ‘the stigma of indecency on
176
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discrimination.’” According to Howe, Grossman believed that law would not end
discrimination, but would “… create moral pressure against practices restricting
opportunities and freedom.”179
The common standards that could be established by legislation were also
expressions of certain moral values. Walker wrote that the offence created by the 1932
Ontario Insurance Act amendment to prohibit discrimination in insurance contracts “…
suggested intriguing notions about public policy and the legislative reflection of common
moral values.”180 In the context of discrimination, moral values were concerned with
both preventing harm and promoting good. As noted earlier, when the comparison was
between anti-discrimination law and criminal law, the focus was on the role of law in
defining the boundaries of moral conduct. Prof. F.R. Scott wrote that “The law can
buttress moral principles, and make the path of the wicked more difficult.”181; and
D.A.L. Smout wrote that restrictive covenants should be treated as illegal and thus
unenforceable for reasons of moral impropriety, in the same way that law was used
against the wagering contract on the basis of the moral impropriety of gambling.182
There were also positive moral values, associated with the social good, that were
connected to prohibiting discrimination. From this perspective, the argument was that the
power of law could be employed productively and beneficially to shape positive values
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and positive actions.183 George Egerton wrote that Prof. Scott offered a “. . . secular
jurisprudence centred on human-rights protection by governments and courts”, which
incorporated a view of the power of law as a productive social force, and quotes the
following statement from a brief authored by him:

We think of law now in terms of ‘social engineering,’ where law is ‘a
force itself,’ a ‘constructive and creative influence in society.’184

Lambertson referenced a Toronto Star editorial on discriminatory convenants, where the
argument was made that “… tolerance could also be the result of ‘cultivated growth’ and
that ‘the law can be made a powerful implement in its cultivation.’”185
The fair practices campaigners thus advocated a view of a society in which law
had a prominent role in shaping social attitudes and norms of behaviour. And within this
framework, the government, as the legislator, had a central role and responsibility.

Public Responsibility to Address Discrimination
The fair practices advocates also argued that the responsibility to take action
against discrimination was a public one in the sense that rested with citizens as well as
with the state:
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Where lies the solution to this vexing problem [of discrimination]? It
would seem that remedial action leads in two directions. One path
encompasses the individual and his duty as a citizen of a democratic state;
the other path leads to parliament and the protection through legislation of
our basic rights and privileges.186
The state, as the representative of the public, had a responsibility to pass legislation to
protect people from harm and to ensure that people fulfilled their responsibilities to one
another. This required the state to take a position that was not neutral on issues about
which there could be differing positions among citizens:

Looking back at it from the vantage point of 1959, I think it can be said
that this Act [Racial Discrimination, 1944], modest though it was [sic]
historic in its importance because it established the principle that
government is not neutral in these matters and that it is a matter of public
policy that citizens do not suffer discrimination because of their birth,
ancestry or belief. In practice the act had certain concrete and tangible
effects. The unsightly signs such as ‘Gentiles Only’ that had been defacing
the landscape of our province became a collector’s item, obsolete – in fact
extinct. It was the elimination of these signs that helped clear the air, in
my view, and make for a better atmosphere that helped prepare the way
for future measures.187
... ‘the very fact that there was a law added an entirely new dimension, for
it put the state on the victim’s side and made clear that discrimination was
wrong.’188

Brian Howe argued that the late 1940s and early 1950s saw a shift toward accepting the
state as having a positive role to play through law and administration.189 This changing
186

OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Reel 2 of 1947, Sydney Lawrence Wax, “Civil Rights for All
Citizens” (July 1947) at 3.
187
OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 10 (1959-1960), 1959 File #6: AntiDiscrimination Material, “Document on Establishing anti-discrimination laws” dated February
1959 at 1.
188
Tillotson, “Human Rights Law as Prism” at 545 quoting William Kaplan, The State and Salvation: The
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Their Fight for Civil Rights (Toronto: 1989) at 260.

79

view of the role of the state was reflected in the following passage from a 1947 JPRC
document on civil liberties:

… since the time when Dicey so authoritatively enunciated the principle
of the rule of law, there has been a marked shift in the emphasis of the
constitution from its interest in preserving civil liberties, to the present
absorption of the state with the task of services for the general good.
The abandonment of the principle of laissez-faire has altered the
nature of much of our law. A system of law, which like the common law
is based on the protection of individual rights, is not readily comparable
with legislation which has, for its object, the welfare of the public, or a
large section of it, as a whole. The common law rests upon an individual
conception of society and lacks the means of enforcing public rights as
such. The socialization of the activities of the people has meant
restrictions of individual rights by the conferment of powers of a novel
character upon Government organs .... So far as the provision of the state
social services and the regulation of economic conditions have become
part of the accepted philosophy of government, the rule of law still means
the supremacy of parliament.190

Philip Girard argued that during this period, society was becoming more accepting of
state intervention in areas of life that were previously considered out of bounds because
they were “private”.191 He commented that this approach to legislation marked a shift
away from British examples and towards American legal models which, he says, was
evident in many areas of Canadian law in the period after World War II. I would also
argue that the legitimacy of fair practices legislation rested significantly on whether or
not the regulated conduct was understood to have a “public” dimension.192 In the case of
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services regulated by the government -- for example, places of business such as taverns,
which required a government licence -- fair practices advocates argued that the state had
a responsibility to ensure equal access to services that came under its regulatory
authority:

When a person comes to the state for a license to serve the public, it
should be on the understanding they serve all the public and not just who
they want to serve. It is not a license to do what they like.193

More generally, there were arguments about the social context and the need for law to
proscribe discrimination in the interests of democracy:

The welfare state concept rests upon the proposition that every member of
a democratic community must have an equal opportunity to participate in
and reap the benefits of all forms of public intercourse. The differential
among men should relate to merit rather than privilege. The welfare state
concept also seeks to guarantee to everyone a minimum standard of living.
i.e. the acquisition of the fundamental material conditions of a selfrespecting and dignified life.
There is little difficulty in relating these principles to antidiscrimination legislation. The objective of anti-discrimination legislation
is then seen as the promotion of equal opportunity to participate in and
reap the benefits of public activity regardless of race, colour, creed, origin,
nationality or place of birth….
The government can properly impose this standard upon all people who
exercise any control on the streets of public intercourse. Businessmen put
their products on the public market in the hope of a profit. As a condition
of the right to participate in the public market, the government would be
within the bounds of propriety to require compliance with certain
standards of fair play which are designed to promote equality of
opportunity for its citizens.
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… The rights of the business are qualified because of the public nature
of this activity and so that the opportunities of public participation may be
equalized throughout the community without unfair discrimination.194

This argument echoed the dissenting reasons of Justice Davis in Christie v. York about
state-regulated activities, and went one step further to maintain that the mere act of
entering into the public market place as a seller, whether state-regulated or not, imported
an obligation not to engage in discriminatory practices while engaged with the market.
Walker characterized this shift during the 1940s and 1950s as the second phase of
the movement for racial equality in Canada after the Second World War. He described
the first phase as a campaign for “‘Equal Citizenship’”, in which the struggles focused on
government conduct that imposed restrictions based on race and ethnicity; he described
the second as the “‘Protective Shield’” phase, during which the government was regarded
as an ally and was called upon to pass legislation to protect citizens from the
discriminatory behaviour of other citizens.195 At the same time, Walker observed that
these two phases were not entirely chronologically discrete, in that the state could and did
discriminate at the same time as it was legislating against discriminatory conduct by
private actors.196 Prof. Scott captured this dual nature of the state in a 1949 article,
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where he argued that there is no contradiction in recognizing the state as both a potential
source of protection and a potential source of oppression; and that there is no
contradiction in both calling upon the state to protect the needs of citizens and
challenging illegitimate uses of state power:197

Preventing the state from taking away liberties does not help the man
whose freedom is attacked by a fellow citizen, or whose liberty is
destroyed by poverty. Defence against the state and protection by the state
are two correlative functions, not contradictory but complementary.” 198

In the context of the fair practices campaigns, the focus was on the harmful conduct of
citizens rather than on harmful conduct by government. In that context, it was argued
that the state had a responsibility to protect citizens from one another and that legislation
was a vehicle through which the state could define people’s duties to one another.
Bora Laskin raised the question of people’s obligations to one another when he
began his 1938 article, “The Protection of Interests by Statute and the Problem of
‘Contracting Out’”, by asking “… whether law is to be regarded primarily as a system of
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rights or of duties”.199 According to Laskin, this argument was central because legal
rights tend to be associated with guarantees of individual freedom, whereas legal duties
tend to be associated with restrictions on that freedom. Duties were paramount, for
Laskin, because restrictions on liberty were necessary to enhance liberty:

Law exists for the sake of enlarging the liberty of men, and as a
consequence there must be restrictions on the liberty of man; based on this
premise, law is to be regarded primarily as a system of duties, involving
the proper recognition of the interests of others as a necessary limitation
upon self-interest. Hardly anyone to-day is disposed to challenge the
assertion that law cannot fulfil the function assigned to it unless it ceases
to accentuate the recognition of rights and devotes itself to the protection
of interests.200

Through legislation, law could recognize and protect social interests, identify who was
responsible for ensuring that these social interests were recognized and protected, and
prescribe the duties required to achieve these goals.
On the role and responsibility of citizens as citizens, the fair practices advocates
argued that citizens had a responsibility both to influence the government to fulfill its
responsibilities and to address discrimination themselves. Citizens had the ability and the
responsibility to press government to pass legislation. Citizens also had the ability and
responsibility to speak out against discrimination and take their own action against it. A
1947 brief on the need for fair employment practices legislation emphasized the
responsibility of citizens to know about discrimination, to care about discrimination even
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if they were not personally affected, and to participate in efforts to eliminate
discrimination:

Discrimination in employment is not the concern of only those who are
most directly affected. If this were the case, we might be able to turn our
heads, pretend it does not exist and minimize its extent and injurious
consequences. In a democracy, however, it is everyone’s problem and
everyone’s responsibility because it prevents the fullest and most efficient
utilization of our manpower and makes a mockery of our democratic
principles and strivings. Every additional case of discrimination in
employment is a further and ever more dangerous threat to our way of life.
But discrimination is an evil that will not disappear if only we are willing
to ignore it. It requires serious consideration and decisive action.201

In a 1949 article, Vivien Mahood, executive secretary of the Toronto Joint Labour
Committee to Combat Racial Intolerance, emphasized the myriad ways in which citizens
could and should act to address discrimination. As she argued: “It is the responsibility of
every citizen to learn, and it is the responsibility of every agency of propaganda—
meaning the newspapers, radio, school, magazines, movies, books, organizations, to
spread the facts, to adopt honesty and justice as their guide, so that knowledge will
permeat [sic] the whole structure of our society and make the world a better place for all
of us.”202 In the union context, union members were encouraged to become “fire
fighters” to spot and speak out against racism.203 And last, but not least, citizens had an
obligation not to engage in discriminatory practices:
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… All the law really does is prevent the employer from running his
business in a way that is contrary to the welfare of the country. It simply
attempts to make sure that he cannot shirk his public responsibility. After
all, free enterprise does not mean unlimited license. The basis of English
jurisprudence is the realization that every man owns and operates his
property and business subject to the requirements of the public welfare.204

The first step, then, was to establish the common standards. The second step was to
ensure that those common standards were respected and followed.

The Coercive Power of Law
The ability to harness the “force” or power of law was a major reason why the fair
practices advocates fought for law as a tool. They argued that both education and law
were required, and that law was a tool for education as well as a necessary adjunct to
education:

One hears repeatedly that ‘we must educate, not legislate’ for tolerance. That
argument will not be proposed by anyone engaged in educating for tolerance. Our
teaching would be much more effective if it were backed by the force and prestige
of law. The one needs the other.205
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LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Volume 13, FEP General, Special
Bulletin of the Joint Labor Committee to Combat Racial Intolerance, dated March 10, 1951.
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LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, Vol. 24, File: Toronto Licensing By-law
Letter dated May 1950, from the Joint Labor Committee to Combat Racial Tolerance in Toronto to Mayor
of Toronto regarding the proposed Toronto Licensing By-Law. See also Rabbi Feinberg argument: “If the
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because they cannot ‘cure’ dishonesty; laws about gambling are then superfluous because law cannot ‘cure’
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urging people not to kill and steal since the Ten Commandments 30 centuries ago—but laws must still be
passed against murder and theft, after generations of preaching and teaching.” OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont.
Region, JCRC, Abraham L. Feinberg, “A Fair Employment Practices Law Why It Is Necessary and
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B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation League discarded to a great extent the
notion that good will can be sold and promoted as soap is and that a
sufficient quantity and mass distribution would eventually win over the
mass of American people to good citizenship and brotherliness as they
have been won over to jello, coca cola or Rinso.206

For the fair practices advocates, education was distinguished from coercion. They appear
to have understood education as non-coercive because it was a process which encouraged
people to act differently but could not force them to act differently. Law, on the other
hand, could force people to act differently. However, they advocated for an enforcement
that would be primarily non-coercive. Why did they take this position?
The minutes of the first meeting of the JPRC legal sub-committee, established in
1946, record that Prof. Laskin raised the issue of enforcement for discussion and that
copies of the legislation in force in New York and Massachusetts were circulated, as well
as an American Jewish Congress model bill and a proposed version of the Saskatchewan
Bill of Rights, which would be passed the following year.207 At what may have been the
second meeting,208 the sub-committee members endorsed their preference for legislation
“armed with teeth” over legislation that simply established a code of conduct:

The meeting opened with a discussion of policy as to whether the
proposed legislation be armed with teeth, or whether it should merely
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Speech drafted for Jacob Finkelman for Windsor Meeting Spring 1951 at 2, Canadian Jewish Congress,
Ontario Region fonds, Fonds 17, Joint Community Relations Committee, Box 2, File 53, Ontario Jewish
Archives.
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Minutes of Meeting of the Legal Sub-Committee of the Research Division of the CJC held July 23,
1946, Canadian Jewish Congress, Ontario Region fonds, Fonds 17, Joint Community Relations Committee,
Central Region Legal Committee Minutes Jul. 1946-Nov. 1957, Ontario Jewish Archives.
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Unfortunately, there was no way to confirm that the archival records included minutes of all the
meetings of the JPRC sub-committee. It is possible, therefore, that there were minutes of other meetings
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establish the principle that employment discrimination is without the law,
thereby discouraging discrimination by moral persuasion.
It was felt that the first alternative was necessary to make the bill effective
in outlawing unemployment caused by discrimination, and to allow to all
groups the exercise of those capacities which could fit the individual to
any profession or occupation, no matter what his ethnic or national origin
or ancestry, race, color, religion, or creed. The question of specific
methods of enforcement was left for later discussion.209

Metaphors of “weaponry” and “teeth” were often used to connote the coercive power of
law achieved through legislation and its enforcement.
This potential for access to the coercive power of law through enforcement was a
key element in the opposition to fair practices legislation.210 The opponents of fair
practices legislation argued that it was not appropriate to use force because, as Robertson
CJA expressed in the passages from Noble and Wolf quoted earlier, it was neither
appropriate nor effective to legislate “morality”, i.e. to try to use force to change
attitudes, beliefs and feelings. This argument often appeared in Globe and Mail editorials
as, for example, in the following 1944 editorial on the Racial Discrimination Act:

Bigotry is an affliction which does not respond to repressive treatment.
More to the point, we think, was the Premier’s expressed hope for
reform through education. It is in education that the cure to intolerance
and discrimination must be sought. … It is in the schools rather than by
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OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, CJC Central Region Legal Committee Minutes Jul. 1946Nov. 1957, Minutes of the Meeting of the Legal Committee, Economic and Social Research Division held
August 6, 1946.
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The fair practices advocates of course faced opposition to anti-discrimination legislation on a number of
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interests; minority rights should not be protected in majoritarian democracy; free speech was a more
important value than equality; and the state has no business in bedrooms and boardrooms. See Lambertson,
Repression and Resistance at 199, 228.
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laws that the Government can best further the ideal of full equality in the
enjoyment of man’s rights.211

A similar position was stated in a 1950 editorial in the Toronto Telegram:

Respect for human rights is not to be advanced by restrictive laws which
invade the principles of individual liberty, nor is bigotry to be cured by
coercion. It is in the schools, rather than in the Legislature, that the right
against intolerance and discrimination is to be fought with greatest hope of
achieving worthwhile results. Tolerance will come through development
of the individual’s awareness of the full meaning of freedom and his
consciousness of his responsibilities under the rights and privileges of that
freedom. It is a state of mind which cannot be created merely by
legislation nor by the multiplication of legislative restrictions.212

Even a supporter of anti-discrimination legislation expressed the view that the biblical
injunction to love thy neighbour “loses its beauty if legally enforceable”.213
The fair practices advocates had three responses to this opposition: (1) law was
directed to changing conduct, not changing beliefs; (2) the power of law enhanced its
value as a tool for education; and (3) the proposed fair practices enforcement model
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Globe and Mail, November 13, 1944 at 6. The editorial on the Court of Appeal for Ontario decision in
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89

would rely primarily on persuasion through education, rather than on coercion through
adjudication.
The first argument, that law was aimed at changing conduct not changing beliefs,
relied on the distinction between “discrimination” and “prejudice” discussed earlier.
Prejudice was the mental attitude or belief that often led to discrimination; discrimination
was the conduct that resulted from prejudice. The fair practices advocates agreed that it
was not appropriate to try to use coercion to change attitudes and argued that the purpose
of fair practices legislation was not to change people’s minds. Education was the remedy
for prejudice. Law, however, was an appropriate tool to address discriminatory conduct.
A JPRC brief in 1947 expressed the distinction in the following way:

Education is the solution frequently proposed for such problems as
discrimination in employment. With this view no one can have any
quarrel. The removal of prejudice is, in the final analysis, an educational
problem – in the broadest sense and going far beyond actual schooling.
But the elimination of those of its manifestations which, like
discriminatory employment practices, are seriously injurious to all persons
and groups in our midst, is a matter for legislation.214

An article focused on fair practices legislation, prepared by The Canadian Association for
Adult Education to accompany a radio program broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting
Association on March 17, 1948, explained the distinction as follows:

Many people of goodwill do not give their support to fair employment
laws because they are convinced that it is impossible to legislate against
prejudice. Prejudice directed toward members of minority racial or
religious groups has been with us since the beginning of time. …
214

OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Reel 1 of 1947, Brief for Fair Employment Practices
Legislation at 3.
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Education in all its aspects, and not the passing of another law, must
remain our hope of bringing about fundamental changes in outlook. …
Advocates of legislation have a reply to this argument. A Fair
Employment Practices law is not aimed at prejudice. Its objective is to
eliminate discrimination-the action which springs from prejudice.
Admittedly no law can force an anti-semite to be friendly, sympathetic,
understanding and fair-minded in his approach to the Jew. But a law can
prevent the anti-semitic employer from making the Jew suffer
economically as a result of his attitude. There is no claim that legislation
will suppress intolerance and bigotry.215

Thus, the arguments confirmed that people were free to hold onto prejudiced beliefs, but
were not permitted to engage in discriminatory conduct based on those beliefs. 216
Nevertheless, the fair practices activists also expressed the hope that changing people’s
conduct would, over time, also change their attitudes and thus reduce or eliminate
prejudice as well as discrimination:

These legislative measures have had a profound educational effect on the
attitude of the people of Ontario toward discrimination. They have
215

OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, The Canadian Association for Adult Education, “Should We
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Fair Employment Practices Law Why It Is Necessary and Feasible” at 3. Alan Borovoy similarly wrote, in
1956: “Besides the usual opposition to such a statute from the racists and bigots, some people contended
that ‘you just can’t legislate brotherhood’. But these opponents of the Fair Accommodation Practices Act
overlook the fact that the Act does not by itself purport to ‘legislate brotherhood’. No one asserts that such
legislation can by itself change people’s feelings. But it can change their outward behaviour.” He also
argued that this type of legislation can have an educational effect as well. Borovoy, “Fair
Accommodation” at 15. [emphasis in original] Many years later, Borovoy repeated this argument in the
following way: “. . . in the real world, most people who do the right thing do so for the wrong reasons.
Since I am concerned more with the improvement of behavior than with the purification of souls, that’s
good enough for me.” - Alan Borovoy, When Freedoms Collide: The Case for our Civil Liberties (Toronto:
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promoted both the idea of adherence to the law, and the conviction that
discrimination is wrong. They have developed new habits and
expectations and have provided effective support to educational work for
better group relations in Ontario.217

The argument that changes in conduct could also lead to changes in attitude was
conceptually linked to their second response to the opposition to using coercion against
discrimination. This second response was that the power of law was not only useful as a
tool of force but also a useful tool in the educational process:

Such legislation would, in addition, act as a powerful educational force by
putting the stamp of public disapproval on acts of intolerance and
discrimination and by placing beyond the pale of the law those who
commit such acts.218
It is also a case of education through legislation. Public discussions on
appropriate Government control by which evil practices can be ended,
parliamentary debate, and finally administrative and judicial enforcement
practices will all in themselves be effective educational processes.219

The fair practices advocates’ third response to the opposition to coercive
measures against discrimination was that the proposed fair practices enforcement model
was based primarily on conciliation and would employ coercion rarely, if ever.
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Conciliation was understood to be a non-coercive, or at least a less coercive enforcement
method, and adjudication represented the coercive power of law enforcement. Thus,
conciliation was linked more with “education” than with law, and adjudication was
linked more with “law” than with education. In an article published in the Globe and
Mail, responding to an editorial opposing the use of compulsion against discrimination,
Gordon Milling, (JLC-Toronto) wrote that conciliation was an educative rather than a
coercive process:

The conciliation procedure adopted is in itself educational in theory and
practice. Its purpose is to obtain voluntary compliance with the law by
demonstrating that ‘employment on merit’ is based on sound business
principles; and conversely, that discrimination because of race, religion or
ancestry is equally unsound whether from the viewpoint of the firm, the
individual or the community.220

In a 1967 article on the history of American fair employment practices legislation, Arthur
Bonfield argued that the state agency enforcement model was preferred in large measure
on the theory that “the expense of the investigation and proceeding would be borne by the
government” and that the commission’s powers to issue flexible remedies would better
position it to achieve “the legislation’s real objective”, which was to eliminate
discrimination.221 He also wrote, however, that many of the statutes actually passed
“were not as imaginative or ambitious” as had been proposed for them and were “wholey
inadequate and ineffective because the agencies they created had no enforcement powers
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Gordon Milling, “FEP Education v. Compulsion”, Globe and Mail, April 23, 1953, responding to
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…”.222 In a 2011 article on this same history, David Freeman Engstrom has argued that
not all the fair practices advocates in the United States supported an administrative
agency enforcement model, and that some would have preferred litigation in the courts.223
There does not appear to have been a similar difference in points of view in Ontario. In
the Ontario context, it was the opponents of fair practices legislation who were opposed
to the government agency enforcement model. They argued that if there was going to be
anti-discrimination legislation, such legislation should be enforced by the courts.224
The fair practices advocates promoted conciliation both as the preferred
enforcement method, and as the enforcement method that would be used most often in
practice. They relied heavily on the United States model and experience to support these
arguments:

It is generally agreed by most informed people on the subject, and this
is borne out by experience, that the best method of administering
legislation of this kind is through the establishment of a provincial board
against discrimination. We would therefore urge that such a board be set
up, and like the New York State Commission Against Discrimination, its
function should include:
1. Investigation of complaints of discrimination; where the complaint
is well-founded, to attempt to conciliate. Failing this, to be in a
position to take more effective methods to remove the
discrimination. It is interesting to point out that the New York
State Commission Against Discrimination has rarely found it
necessary to go beyond the stage of conciliation. Even though it
has handled many thousands of cases since it was established, the
Commission has only found it necessary to prosecute in one case
to date.
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2. To conduct a continuous program of education of the public as to
the purpose and nature of the law with a view to creating an area of
co-operation and climate of public opinion favourable to the
administration of the law, and a broad educational programme to
promote understanding and harmony between all members of the
community.”225

In addition, Will Maslow, general counsel to the American Jewish Congress, wrote that
penal statutes were not effective because “District Attorneys are loathe to prosecute and
juries to convict.” He also explained that the administrative agency enforcement model,
“backed up always by the threat of public exposure and judicially enforced orders” was
considered the preferable method for fair practices enforcement because it put the burden
of enforcing the community norm on the state rather than on the individual who raised a
discrimination claim:

Statutes allowing private individuals to sue are probably the least effective
type of measure because the entire burden of litigation is imposed upon
the individual and the state assumes the role of referee, not that of one
condemning racism.226

Conciliation, as a dispute resolution process, was first developed in the labour
relations context around the same time as the first fair practices statutes were passed in
the United States.227 In theory, a conciliation process could “voluntarily” persuade the
respondent to accept that their conduct was contrary to law, and “voluntarily” persuade
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them to agree to an appropriate resolution - there is, after all, a coercive aspect to having
to engage with the legal process at all, when one would otherwise choose not to do so.
The fair practices advocates also argued that discrimination would be easy to “prove” in a
conciliation process because it would be easy to persuade the respondent to understand
why their conduct was wrong:

Experience with the operations of FEP laws in the United States shows
that, actually, discrimination is easy to prove. Most often employers admit
it. Discrimination, where practiced, is usually a well established policy,
openly acknowledged and recorded in newspaper advertisements, orders
to employment agencies, payroll records, and so on. It also often happens
that the members of a minority group are never even given an opportunity
to interview the employer or his representative.228

The JPRC gave a similar account in a report on a meeting with Ontario Premier Kennedy
in 1949. In response to the Premier’s questions about how discrimination would be
proved if an employer refused to admit to discrimination, the answer given was:

It was pointed out to him that the experience of such statutes in New York
and other States proved that a direct personal interview between the state
agent and the employer soon got to the root of the matter and that the very
fact that the Government showed its interest in fairness of employment
was enough to convince employers of the need of such equality.229

The fair practices advocates also argued that respondents’ willingness to accept
responsibility in the conciliation process was a significant reason for the relatively small
number of cases requiring formal hearings in the United States experience:
228

LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, volume 13, FEP General, F.E.P., a
pamphlet published by The Committee on Group Relations in Canada, at #16.
229
OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Reel 6, 1949, Report on JPRC meeting with Premier Kennedy
on March 12, 1949.

96

The large-scale programme of education carried on by the Commission,
through the radio, the movies, the press, and the public platform, has
greatly contributed to this result [few formal hearings]. But basically the
explanation appears to be that the ordinary citizen, if given a chance, will
respond intelligently to policies of tolerance and understanding.230

Although “sharp teeth” was an essential element of the enforcement process
sought by fair practices advocates, they consistently emphasized that recourse to the
coercive power of adjudication would be rare. In a 1947-48 Citizens’ Forum document,
the authors observed that the fair practices law in New York had sharp teeth but
emphasized persuasion and conciliation: “Thus, while the law has sharp teeth, it is most
important to note the great stress that is laid upon conciliation and persuasion.”231
Similarly, a radio broadcast which aired in January 1951 (and for which Pierre Berton
wrote the script) presented the argument as follows:

We want to emphasize this, however – these court orders are a last resort.
Only a very few cases ever reach the hearing stage. The job of FEPC is not
to seek revenge through the law. It is to show people that discrimination in
jobs is a silly, wasteful and unnecessary business.232

They also argued that the emphasis on conciliation reflected the fact that the purpose of
the legislation, and its enforcement process, was not to punish people for engaging in
illegal conduct but to eliminate discriminatory conduct and practices.233
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In the end, the government passed fair practices legislation and provided for
enforcement of this legislation through a state agency, using a process that began with
conciliation but also created the potential for adjudication.

5

The Fair Practices Statutes
Ontario’s fair practices statutes, like the earlier anti-discrimination statutory

provisions, were structured as prohibitions against discrimination on the prohibited
grounds of discrimination. The prohibited grounds of discrimination in these first
statutes were: race, creed, nationality, ancestry or place of origin (“race, religion or
ethnicity”). The Fair Employment Practices Act, 1951 contained three prohibitions: (1) a
prohibition against employers refusing to employ, refusing to continue to employ, or
discriminating in regard to employment or to any term or condition of employment, on
the basis of race, religion or ethnicity; (2) a prohibition against trade unions excluding,
expelling or suspending from membership, or discriminating against a person, on the
basis of race, religion or ethnicity; and (3) a prohibition against employment applications
or advertisements which expressed any limitation, specification or preference as to race,
religion or ethnicity.234 The statute did not apply to all workers: domestic workers,
employees of charitable, philanthropic or religious organizations, and persons employed

discussion, conciliation and persuasion. The approach used is to try and make the employer understand that
discrimination is economically and socially wasteful, morally and religiously wrong; to convince the
employer that it is bad for business to hire people for their race or religion rather than for their ability and
experience. It is interesting to note that out of 5,200 reported cases in the United States, in only six was it
found impossible to settle complaints by conciliation.” LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights,19451972, Irving Himel, “The Canada Fair Practices Act” at 2.
234
SO 1951, c 24, ss. 3 4, 5 [FEPA].
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by employers with fewer than five employees were all excluded from its protection.235
The Fair Accommodation Practices Act, 1954 contained two prohibitions236: (1) a
prohibition against denying accommodation, services or facilities customarily available to
the public, on the basis of race, religion or nationality, and (2) a prohibition against
publishing or displaying signs indicating discrimination or an intention to discriminate,
on the basis of race, religion or ethnicity.237 The Female Employees Fair Remuneration
Act, 1951 prohibited employers from discriminating between female and male employees
by paying female employees at a rate of pay less than the rate paid to male employees
doing the same work, or substantially the same work, in the same establishment.238
What distinguished the fair practices statutes from the earlier anti-discrimination
provisions was the enforcement process and the range of consequences that could apply
to a failure to comply with the prohibition. In Ontario’s early anti-discrimination
legislative measures, the failure to comply with the prohibition was a quasi-criminal
offence, with punitive sanctions.239 The fair practices statutes also constituted the failure
to comply as a quasi-criminal offence, but also established a civil process which was the
primary enforcement method.
The Fair Employment Practices Act provided for the creation of a new branch of
the Department of Labour, called the Fair Employment Practices Branch (FEPB), which
235
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became responsible for enforcing all of Ontario’s fair practices statutes. The process
began with a person submitting a complaint in writing to the FEPB.240 This complaint
could then be referred to a conciliation process for inquiry and resolution, at the
discretion of the Minister of Labour acting on the recommendation of the FEPB
Director.241 If the complaint could not be resolved, the Minister, on the recommendation
of the FEPB Director, would decide whether or not to refer the complaint to a formal
hearing before an administrative tribunal called a commission.242 If a complaint was
referred to a hearing and the tribunal found that the complaint was supported, the
tribunal’s authority was limited to providing remedial recommendations to the FEPB
Director; the FEPB Director would then make recommendations to the Minister of
Labour, who had the sole authority to make remedial orders.243 Violations of the statute
and violations of orders made under the statute were separate quasi-criminal offences,
punishable by modest monetary penalties.244 However, prosecutions could be instituted
only with the Minister’s consent and the Minister could give consent only on the
recommendation of the FEPB Director.245 The fines were a maximum of $50 for an
individual and maximum of $100 for a corporation or trade union.246
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Part II: Fair Practices Enforcement
The concept of a Bill of Rights is the static one of protection, not the
dynamic one of positive assistance by governments. … the mere
enunciation of rights, important though it is, has little practical value
unless it is backed up by adequate enforcement machinery.247
While I like the phraseology a great deal, my chief concern in Bills of this
sort is the method of enforcement which is provided with them. This I
think, is the weakest link in the chain of our demands and while it is a
problem not readily solved, I think we should give more and more
consideration to the problem of enforcement as opposed to the substantive
provisions in such Bills.248

With the passage of the fair practices statutes, their advocates had an additional
tool to employ in their struggles against direct racial and religious discrimination in
employment, services, and public spaces. As Kalmen Kaplansky (JLC) argued, their job
now was to make sure that law “on the books” did not just stay on the books, but also
became law “in action”:

The vital problem today is whether this protective legislation will remain
law on the books only or whether it will be turned into law in action. If
the former prevails, then of course, these laws will be worthless. If they
can be turned into important instruments for social change then they will
ameliorate the living conditions of thousands of Canadian citizens.
…
As Roscoe Pound stated: ‘Law can make habits instead of waiting for
them to grow.’ It is incumbent upon all men of goodwill to aid the law in
this noble purpose of minimizing the effects of bigotry and discrimination
and to make human and decent behaviour a lasting habit.249
247
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The legislation represented a new community standard for conduct, but fair practices
advocates recognized but this standard would become real only if there was compliance
with it: “The legislation is of course, some help to us insofar as it admits that
discrimination is practiced. On the other hand, if it is not used, the legislation loses even
this limited usefulness.250
For the fair practices advocates, legislation was a tool for everyone to use, and
citizens had a role in both formal and informal enforcement. Indeed, consistent with
their argument that both the state and citizens had a responsibility to take action against
discrimination, they argued that both the state and citizens had responsibilities in relation
to enforcing the new legislation The enforcement structure made the government
responsible for investigating and conciliating complaints, for referring complaints to
adjudication by a commission, and for prosecuting violations of the statute or of orders
made under the statute. Citizens had a responsibility to encourage people to seek formal
enforcement, to ensure that the state fulfilled its formal enforcement mandate, and to seek
improvements to the formal enforcement process when they were needed. As Kaplansky
(JLC) noted: “Even the Financial Times said, ‘The anti-discrimination bill is a worthy
piece of legislation’, although it still insisted that the Government could not enforce such

Party): “In pressing for fair practices legislation, labor has demonstrated that the principles of brotherhood
and equality are not merely ‘lip service’ principles but rules of conduct to be applied and protected in all
areas of life. Labor has also stressed the necessity for policing this legislation, publicizing cases that arise
and assisting victims of discrimination so that human rights laws live and do not remain still-born on the
statute books of the land.” LAC, Ont. Labour Comm. for Human Rights, 1945-1972, File: Ontario
Federation of Labour, Fair Employment Practices Conference 1956, Address of Reg Gisborn on Fair
Practices.
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a law. It was up to us to prove that the Government could enforce the Act. This was the
next phase of our activities in this area.”251 Thus, the fair practices advocates pressed the
government to be robust in fulfilling its enforcement responsibilities so that the formal
structure would have concrete impact on discrimination. They also encouraged citizens,
including those directly affected by discrimination, to engage with the legislation in the
context of the daily situations where it might apply. For example, Kaplansky (JLC)
urged:

… there is a definite need to induce those whose rights are at stake to take
advantage of the provisions under the law. There is a tendency on the part
of members of so-called minority groups to look with scepticism, nay even
cynicism, upon all efforts to pen new opportunities. Then there is also the
reluctance on the part of such people to be pioneers, to become only one
representative of a minority group in a plant or establishment, where the
majority is suspected of being prejudiced. …
It is necessary for organizations concerned with this problem to
encourage and support such individuals. Pioneers are needed to blaze new
trails. We should, however, also try to devise ways and means to help not
only pioneers, but also ordinary people to do likewise.252

The legislation and its enforcement process provided a tool to challenge expressly
discriminatory conduct by employers, service providers and those in charge of public
spaces and facilities. They could also be used to challenge conduct suspected to be
discriminatory using a method for “testing” conduct by employers, service providers and
those in charge of public spaces and facilities. The testing method was used when a
251
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racialized or religious or ethnic minority was told, for example, that a job had been filled,
that a service was not available or that access to a public facility was not available. Fair
practices advocates would test these denials by having a White or Christian or Canadian
individual apply for the job or request the service or try to enjoy the public space or
facility. If the White or Christian or Canadian person’s application or request was
accepted, this was considered some evidence that the previous denial was discriminatory.
Fair practices advocates had used the testing method during the campaigns for fair
practices legislation to garner support for their campaigns by gathering evidence of
discriminatory conduct.253 Once the legislation was passed, they continued to employ
testing to look for evidence of discrimination, but now with a new tool with which to
fight back when they suspected discriminatory conduct. The same three organizations
which had led the campaigns for fair practices legislation also led the advocacy around
enforcement issues, although the labour organizations may have been slightly more active
on these issues.

1

Aspiration Meets Practice in State Enforcement of Fair Practices Legislation
At the same time as the Ontario campaigns for fair practices legislation and

enforcement were in full gear, advocacy groups in the United States were beginning to
express concerns about how their enforcement model was working. Once the Ontario

253

See Pierre Berton, "No Jews Need Apply", MacLean's, Nov. 1, 1948, where Pierre Berton reported on
potential evidence of discrimination gathered using the testing method. Berton wrote a follow-up piece 12
years later, in which he claimed that the Fair Employment Practices Act had resulted in fewer job
applicants between rejected over the phone based on a name that was identifiably Jewish (Weinberg) as
compared to a name that was identifiably non-Jewish (Craig): Pierre Berton, “Jew and Gentile: An
Experiment in Job Hunting”, Toronto Daily Star, 11 August 1960.

104

legislation was in place, fair practices advocates in Ontario began to raise similar
concerns. The record on enforcement of Ontario’s fair practices statutes is not a lengthy
one, given that they were operational for less than a decade before the Human Rights
Code replaced them in 1962. Although the same three organizational players were
actively involved in issues of enforcement, they appear to have worked more
independently of one another and sometimes to have had different views about some
enforcement issues.

The United States Experience with Commission Enforcement
In December 1948, a letter circulated by the American Jewish Congress’s
Commission on Law and Social Action opened with the following sharp criticism of the
first three years of enforcement of the New York fair practices statute:

The New York State Committee Against Discrimination has been in
existence since July 1, 1945, more than three years. Yet it has failed to
issue a single complaint against a single employer, labor union or
employment agency. It states that there has been no occasion to do so
since all the complaints made to it have been either adjusted or dismissed
for lack of merit. Except for one disturbing fact, this would be a happy
state of affairs, unparalleled in the history of regulatory legislation. No one
knows what cases have been settled, what cases have been dismissed, or
upon what basis or grounds the action has been taken. In other words, the
public must accept at full face value SCAD’s claim that it has not yet
encountered a stubborn employer who has resisted its efforts.
We suspect, from our own experience before SCAD, that there are
other reasons for the refusal to issue a complaint. SCAD operates on the
one premise that it must not antagonize the business community.
Accordingly it appeases them in every way. It will take for settlement a
mere promise to post notices and to behave in the future. It will not insist
that a particular complainant be hired, even though SCAD has found that
discrimination has been practiced against him, as long as a promise is
effected from the employer that henceforth he will not discriminate.
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Second, before SCAD is convinced of discrimination, it insists upon a
degree of proof which is generally beyond the ability of the complainant to
produce.
It is true that no other state FEPC—Massachusetts, Connecticut, or
New Jersey—has issued a complaint but here again, without possessing
the same information about their affairs as we do about SCAD, we suspect
that they are merely following SCAD’s major strategic lines.254

The list of concerns with the commission-based enforcement model was long and grew
quickly. The primary concerns were the following:
• Fewer complaints came forward than had been expected;
• The enforcement agency relied too much on individual complaints coming
forward and did not exercise the jurisdiction it had to initiate its own
investigations and more systemic investigations;
• There was too much delay in the process;255
• Relatively few cases were “substantiated” and resolved through conciliation;
• There was very little information available about the resolutions that were
achieved during conciliation; and
• Very few cases were referred to a formal hearing.256
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Fair practices advocates did not think that the surprisingly low number of complaints
reflected a corresponding low incidence of discriminatory practices. On the contrary,
they believed that there were a number of barriers to individuals coming forward with
complaints. These barriers included lack of knowledge about the legislation and about
the option for complaint, fear of repercussions for coming forward with a complaint, and
lack of confidence in the enforcement process. Fair practices advocates also observed that
private pressure on the state agency was required: “Action on the part of a Jewish agency
is needed even where a state agency dealing with fair employment practices exists.
Experience has shown that the private agency serves as a necessary stimulus for action.257
A 1951 Joint Memorandum of the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish
Congress discussed the negative impact of weak enforcement and suggested that there
may have been a brief period when at least some commissions were willing to be more
forceful in enforcing the legislation:

It is noteworthy that several state agencies charged with enforcement of such
laws have recently shown an increasing willingness to press cases through to
public hearing, and to issue cease-and-desist orders requiring abandonment of
practices of discrimination found to exist.
…
At first, all complaints filed with these agencies were disposed of by
conciliation and mediation. Some of the settlements attained by this method
might not have been the best possible, but the agencies seemed to feel it
important not to exercise their powers of compulsion and publicity in the initial
stages of their operations. This attitude may have encouraged recalcitrance in
some respondents who apparently felt that the agencies would rather reach an
amicable settlement than be compelled to hold public hearings and issue cease
and desist orders. Such recalcitrance in turn, probably led the administrative
257
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agencies to realize that, in the long run, an anti-discrimination law can be
effective only if the enforcing agency shows a willingness to use in appropriate
cases all of the enforcement powers spelled out in the law.
A second effect of a willingness on the part of a state agency to
compromise complaints is to weaken the confidence of precisely those groups
who most need the safeguards created by the laws…
The increased willingness of the administrative agencies to use their
ultimate weapons, public hearings and cease and desist orders, is a major
advance in the enforcement of state laws against discrimination. The state
agencies enforcing such laws have apparently become aware of the value of
open hearings in appropriate cases as an educational measure. Few newspaper
readers find the summaries of commission reports interesting reading. On the
other hand, a press report of a public hearing, with its drama of questioning and
cross-examination, involving as it frequently must, respondents who are known
in the local community, makes interesting reading matter and serves to inform
the public of the existence and operations of the law and the state agency
enforcing it. Hearings also serve to encourage persons feeling themselves
discriminated against in violation of the law to invoke the provisions of the
law.258

However, as will be discussed, if there was any shift to greater use of formal enforcement
procedures, it seems to have been short-lived.

The Ontario Experience With Commission Enforcement
Ontario’s fair practices advocates had similar experiences and concerns with the
commission enforcement to those raised by their counterparts in the United States. They
were concerned with the low number of complaints that came forward, with the
investigation and conciliation process, and with the low number of complaints referred to
adjudication.
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In relation to the lower-than-expected number of complaints, Ontario fair
practices advocates echoed their American colleagues in rejecting the conclusion that a
small number of complaints reflected a low incidence of discrimination. They similarly
preferred to explain the low number of complaints by pointing to factors such as lack of
knowledge about the right to bring a complaint and reluctance on the part of individuals
to bring complaints.259 The fair practices advocates argued that the government had a
responsibility to educate the public about the new legislation, and they argued that there
should be less reliance on individual complaints by providing for complaints by third
parties and by enabling the state agency to initiate its own investigations.
The question of public education was a major issue in the advocacy for fair
practices enforcement. The minutes of the August 1946 meeting of the JPRC Legal
Committee record the view that “Educational work is not necessarily tied up with the
Act, though it has been incorporated in the New York and Massachusetts legislation.”260
There is evidence that labour and CCF activists, at least, believed that Ontario’s
legislation should have included provisions requiring education about the new law:

During debate on the bill in the legislature, CCF members expressed grave
doubt that the proposed law would prove effective without the
establishment of a full-time Fair Employment Practices Commission.
They pointed out that bills presented by the opposition had been defeated
by the argument that “discrimination could be only eliminated by
education”. Now the government was completely neglecting the need for
education.261
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When Ontario’s fair practices statutes were enacted, they did not expressly require the
government to conduct education campaigns about the new legislation, and the
government did not independently undertake education campaigns for either statute. By
contrast, the federal fair employment practices statute, passed in 1953, included a
provision for undertaking educational programmes, and the federal government did carry
out educational programs that included written materials and an eight-part radio series.262
Labour fair practices activists believed that the Ontario government had a similar
obligation to provide public education, even if this obligation was not specifically
required in the legislation, and pointed to the federal model as a good example to follow:

The provincial FEP and other anti-discrimination laws lack any
substantive provisions for educational work. Thus far the Provincial
governments concerned have failed in their duty to make the provisions of
these laws widely known to the public at large and to the potential and
actual victims of discrimination;... There is no need to elaborate on this
point - a law which is not popularized becomes a dead law. It is therefore
the duty of the governments concerned to institute, without any further
delay, a proper educational campaign which would make the intent of the
legislation and the provisions of the Acts known to as many people as
possible.263
262
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The call for public education about the legislation also provided another opportunity for
fair practices advocates to emphasize the complementary relationship between law and
education, and the role of legislation as a tool for achieving compliance through
education:

Out of this experience [anti-discrimination education], organized labour
has learned the great value of education as a part of the legislative process
as well. It has also learned the great value of legislation as part of the
educational process. That is why organized labour has consistently urged
governments to not only pass fair employment practices laws but also to
provide for broad educational programs to parallel their administration.”264

Although lack of knowledge about the legislation may well have been a barrier to
individual complaints, Ontario fair practices advocates - like those in the United States believed that there were other barriers as well, in particular, fear of repercussions and
difficulty in managing the process alone. They emphasized the role of advocacy
organizations in supporting individuals to bring complaints forward and their position
was confirmed by the commissions themselves. At a 1956 Canadian Conference of
Commissions Against Discrimination, it was even suggested that it was more important
in Canada than in the United States for private agencies to support fair practices
complainants:

The role of the private agency in the field of FEP in Canada assumes
greater importance than in the States because of the weaknesses in budget
264
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and staff of the public agencies. Some of the private agencies’ functions
are self-evident: (1) public support and public pressure for more effective
FEP Departments; (2) maintaining close personal liaison with the
government persons responsible for administering FEP laws; (3)
publicizing fair practices laws and doing practical educational work, e.g.
Conferences, reports to labour councils, etc.; (4) channeling complaints
and advising complainants. The State Commissions mentioned that they
had not received too high a proportion of complaints by referrals from
private agencies. This may have been due, in part, to the agency settling
the complaint themselves – but this was doubted. In Canada, perhaps the
great majority of legitimate complaints reach the government through
referral from private agencies.265

It is not necessary to try to decide whether or not private organizations had to play a
greater role in Canada than in the United States. The relevant point is that the state
enforcement process needed not only individuals coming forward with complaints but
also private support for these individuals.
One study reported that 51% of the 311 complaints that were submitted under
Ontario’s fair employment and fair accommodation practices statutes in the period
between 1951 and 1959 came as referrals, and that these referrals were mostly made by
trade unions, the JLC, and the JPRC.266 In a 1955 report, Frank Hall, Chair[man] of the
Canadian Labour Congress’s Human Rights Committee, claimed that labour
organizations were responsible for processing and bringing forward 75%-90% of
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complaints and stated that individuals needed assistance to ensure that their complaint
was properly handled.267
The labour activists argued for enforcement by way of third-party complaints and
state-initiated investigations, to supplement individual complaints. Both of these options
reflected the view that there was a public interest in obtaining compliance through
enforcement and a corresponding public responsibility to ensure that there were multiple
ways for the discrimination to come to the enforcement agency’s attention:

While it is essential to provide a procedure for the settlement of individual
complaints, we question whether it is wise to restrict the operation of the
administrative agency to this single avenue of approach. After all it is to
be recognized that a violation of the law is not merely an offence against
an individual but an offence against the people of Canada. It becomes
therefore the duty of the administration to obtain compliance with the law
whether or not the initiative has come from an aggrieved individual.268

There is some evidence that Prof. Jacob Finkelman did not support allowing third parties
to bring complaints: “While I am not entirely happy about the limitation as it now exists,
nevertheless I feel it is unwise under present conditions to open the door to certain groups
who may exploit alleged cases of violation for improper purposes.”269 However, other
fair practices advocates continued to argue for this change and when Ontario’s Fair
267
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Accommodations Practices Act was passed, it authorized inquiries into “the complaint of
any person that a contravention of this Act has taken place”,270 which is to be
distinguished from a complaint made by an individual alleging that they had been the
subject of discriminatory conduct.
State-initiated investigations were also seen as having the advantage of
approaching issues in a more systemic way.271 For example, the historical record
suggests that the Fair Employment Practices Branch achieved success in eliminating
discriminatory questions from applications for employment and employment
questionnaires, by taking a proactive and systemic approach to addressing this problem:
they required employers to submit these documents for review, advised employers of any
changes required, and could follow-up to ensure that the changes were in fact made:

From 16,000 to 18,000 letters had gone out to employers throughout
Ontario asking them to submit their employment application forms to have
the Department scrutinize them for their propriety under the new
regulations. Mr. Fine said that 98% of the firms reached had replied. The
interpretation of the regulations on application form wording had been
very strongly applied. Photographs of applicants were among those things
forbidden. 272

The agency’s work on application forms was described by Ben Kayfetz (JPRC) as
“probably the biggest job achieved by the FEP Act”.273

270

FEPA, s. 4(1).
CJC Nat. Charities Comm. Archives, CJC Org. Records, Series CA, Box 49, File 452, Fair Employment
Practice 1952, Letter dated November 26, 1952 from B.G. Kayfetz to E.Z. Palteil.
272
OJA, Fonds 17, CJC, Ont. Region, JCRC, Box 4, File: Minutes (JCRC Only) 1951 2, Minutes of
Meeting of the JCRC held on November 27, 1951.
273
CJC Nat. Charities Comm. Archives, CJC Org. Records, Series CA, Box 49, FEP Jan.-Apr. 1953 452,
Letter dated January 19, 1953 from B.G. Kayfetz to Saul Hayes at 2.
271

114

Increasing the number of complaints was, however, only part of the strategy to
improve enforcement. The labour activists also had concerns about how complaints were
handled when they did come forward. They claimed that the state did not take its
enforcement responsibilities seriously when complaints did come forward and that this
sent a message that fair practices legislation did not need to be taken seriously:

While the labour movement accepted the introduction of the Fair
Employment Practices Act as a step in the right direction, we are not
satisfied with the Act in operation. Very little has been done along
educational lines to acquaint the people of Ontario with the purposes of
the legislation, and investigations under the Act have been half-hearted
and slow. It seems to us that no effort is being made by the government
either by education or law enforcement, to inform the people of Ontario as
to the evils of discriminatory practices.274

The labour activists and ACL also had concerns both about the structure and the
implementation of the enforcement process. Their structural concerns were that there
was not a separate agency entrusted with fair practices enforcement, and that the Fair
Employment Practices Branch of the Department of Labour, which was responsible for
enforcing all of the fair practices statutes, was under-resourced. Early on, the JPRC
Legal Committee had expressed the view that the expense of establishing a separate
274
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commission made this an unrealistic option, and suggested responsibility for enforcement
could be given either to the Attorney General’s office or to an existing agency, such as
the Industry and Labor Board.275 Although during their campaigns for the legislation the
fair practices advocates requested a separate agency, there is some evidence that, after
both fair practices statutes were in place, the JPRC may not have believed that a single
and separate enforcement agency was necessary.276 However, the labour and ACL
activists were strongly of this view and repeatedly included this in their requests for
improvements to the enforcement process.
On the issue of resources, the Fair Employment Practices Branch was staffed on a
part-time basis; only the Director’s position was full-time. Fair practices advocates
argued that this level of resources did not provide the new branch with adequate staffing
to function effectively, and that inadequate staffing levels contributed to delays in the
process.
On the question of implementation, the fair practices advocates had concerns
about delays in the enforcement process, about the quality of investigations conducted,
and about the reluctance to refer complaints for adjudication.277 There is little detail
about the precise extent of the delays experienced, but it is reasonable to surmise that
staffing levels would have had an impact on how quickly the process functioned.
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Expressed concerns about the quality of investigations seem to have reflected a broad
concern about the outcome of complaints in the conciliation process, even though the fair
practices advocates do not appear to have specifically framed their concerns in relation to
the outcomes of conciliations. In a 1961 study, Herbert Sohn reported that 156
complaints were filed under the Fair Employment Practices Act, of which 105 involved
allegations that the employer asked questions that violated the statute, or used advertising
or an application form that violated the statute. Of the remaining 51 complaints, Sohn
provided information on the outcomes for 45 of the cases, as follows:
- four complaints were found to be valid;
- three complaints were found to be outside the protection of the statute;
- three complaints could not be interpreted, established or denied; and
- 35 complaints were found to be invalid.278
It appears that in the four cases where the complaints were found to be valid, a resolution
was achieved by voluntary settlement. As with the United States data, there is no
information about the substance of the complaints and no explanation for why over 75%
of the complaints were found to be invalid. In the absence of such information, there is no
way to assess whether more than four cases could or should have been found to be valid.
Nevertheless, these complaint resolution data raise questions about whether the low rates
of substantiated complaints were primarily due to lack of merit or whether, in some cases
at least, the government agency was not able to gather sufficient evidence to establish a
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prima facie case of discrimination, or whether those dealing with the complaints lacked
the requisite understanding or expertise to deal with them properly. In his retrospective
reflections on this period, Kalmen Kaplansky (JLC) commented that the emphasis on
conciliation had the pragmatic objective of seeking to minimize opposition to fair
practices legislation, but was not easy in practice:

It is characteristic of our defensive and cautious attitude during these
days that Wismer underlined the work [sic] "conciliation", totally ignoring
the punitive aspects of the proposed legislation. This was our main selling
point - that legislation would provide for investigation and conciliation,
based on the notion that most offenders in this area were people of good
will and that once their discriminatory actions were revealed, and brought
to their attention and explained, they would cease being discriminatory
and there would be no need for any punitive action. It was a good
approach to minimize opposition to legislation, but experience proved that
it wasn't that easy.279

On the issue of referrals to adjudication, there is no record of any fair employment
practices or equal pay cases being referred to either of the two adjudication options,
namely, civil hearing before a commission or quasi-criminal prosecution in court. The
few cases that did find their way to adjudication were fair accommodation practices
cases, and these were only referred as a result of pressure from fair practices activists. As
Claude Jodin stated, for example:

While we have no quarrel with the conciliation processes used in the
handling of the complaints, it seems to us that when decisive action has to
be taken by the Department of Labor in approving court action, there
seems to be very little willingness to go through with this necessary
process on the part of the Department of Labor. Generally we have a
feeling that the Department of Labor has to be forced in actuality by
279
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public opinion to take the necessary action. We look forward for a much
more sympathetic approach on the part of the Government to enforce its
own legislation.280

Two infamous cases in 1955 highlighted this tension between rigorous enforcement and
caving to prevailing community views. They involved two Dresden restaurant owners
who openly refused to comply with the fair accommodation practices legislation after it
was passed. At the commission hearing, the restaurant owners admitted that they had not
complied with the law and that they had no intention of doing so. Alan Borovoy wrote
that the government initially refused to make the commission’s report public or to
prosecute, and released the report only in response to public pressure. The government
also agreed to prosecute only after more public pressure and controversy. The magistrate
convicted the restaurant owners, but this conviction was overturned on appeal. In one of
the appeal cases, the appeal judge held that there was no express intention to deny service
because the complainant was not specifically told that she would not be served but was
only left unserved. In the other case, the judge held that there was no denial of service
because the server said they were “too busy” to provide service. The judge also held that
the restaurant owner could not be held responsible for the actions of the servers and that
there was not enough evidence to show that the conduct was because of race or color.281
One of the hotel owners was prosecuted again the following year, this time
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successfully.282 However, in 1958, the government withdrew a prosecution against a
Chatham hotel owner that was initiated after a waiter in the hotel restaurant had refused
to serve three black customers on the grounds that the hotel had a policy against serving
“Negroes”. The government’s stated reason for withdrawing the prosecutions was that it
did not have evidence to establish that the hotel owner was responsible for the refusal to
serve.283
The Ontario government’s approach to enforcing the fair employment and fair
accommodation statutes was similarly experienced in relation to the equal pay legislation.
Labour activists reported that they were disappointed with how equal pay legislation was
enforced by the government and that most issues were being addressed under collective
agreements:

Experience under this legislation has been unsatisfactory. Labour leaders
who have processed the one or two complaints filed under the act in
Ontario felt that the complainants did not receive redress and were
inadequately protected. Most equal pay complaints are processed under
equal pay provisions in collective bargaining agreements.
However it is felt that the laws have had beneficial effects in
educating the employer and the public to the injustice of different scales of
pay for women doing the same work as men.”284

Shirley Tillotson has written that no commissions were appointed on any of the 12 equal
pay cases in which complaints were brought, and that the only cases which resulted in
any improvements in women’s wages were cases in which the employer voluntarily
282
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agreed to the improvement. She also wrote that Louis Fine, who was appointed director
of the Fair Employment Practices Branch in 1951, took a very narrow approach to
interpreting the statute and displayed hostility to initiatives to enforce it.285 Her overall
conclusion was that the statute had some limited educational benefits and achieved some
minimal improvements in women’s wages, but that the potentially coercive enforcement
methods were not available when employers or bureaucrats were hostile to women’s
claims.286
According to Morris Schumiachter, the Saskatchewan government was similarly
reluctant to apply formal enforcement of the Saskatchewan Bill of Rights, 1947, under
which quasi-criminal enforcement was the only adjudicative option. In a 1949 letter to
Heinz Frank at the Canadian Jewish Congress, Shumiatcher recorded that there had been
no prosecutions, that discriminatory advertisements were dealt with by warnings, and that
proving discrimination in employment would be almost impossible and reached the
conclusion that there was little opportunity for coercive enforcement.287
Ontario labour activists argued for two changes to address their enforcement
concerns. One request was that the government establish a separate agency, appropriately
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staffed in terms of numbers and expertise.288 Their second request was that the
government establish a Citizens’ Advisory Committee to work with the agency. The role
of the Citizens’ Advisory Committee would be to lend community expertise to the
government’s anti-discrimination education and enforcement activities.289 The call for a
Citizens’ Advisory Committee reflected the position that there was a subject-matter
expertise in discrimination that was different from legal expertise and that was relevant to
the implementation and enforcement of anti-discrimination legislation. A Citizens’
Advisory Committee would also provide an opportunity for citizens to be directly
involved in the work of the agency responsible for enforcing the fair practices legislation.
Establishing a separate fair practices enforcement agency, with appropriate
staffing, might in principle reduce delays and improve the conciliation process. It was
less likely, however, that a separate fair practices enforcement agency would change how
the state approached the role of adjudication in the fair practices enforcement process.
288
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The Ontario government’s reluctance to employ the coercive power of law was consistent
with its stated policy that the purpose of the legislation was to eliminate discrimination
through persuasion, not prosecution:

The Minister of Labour has stated, when the Act was introduced, it was
not considered as a means of prosecuting and obtaining convictions for
breaches of it but designed to encourage the people of this province to
eliminate discrimination because it is undesirable in human society.290

This policy was, of course, entirely consistent with the arguments about enforcement that
the fair practices advocates made during their campaigns for the legislation. However,
although the fair practices advocates may have argued – and even expected – that there
would be little need for recourse to adjudication through commission hearings or
prosecution, it is equally clear that they sought access to the coercive power of law for
those situations where it was needed.
The fair practices enforcement model placed the state in the middle of disputes to
which it was not directly a party. Referring cases to adjudication, whether to a
commission hearing or to a prosecution, effectively required the state to align itself with
the complainant. These facts, alone, may have made some government officials reluctant
to engage the coercive power of law. However, there was another potential barrier to
dealing with discrimination cases through adjudication. Direct discrimination, the
conduct targeted by fair practices legislation, has an “intent” or mental component as well
as a conduct component. Where a claim of direct discrimination can be established, the
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nature of the wrong is that people are treated in a negative way because of their race,
religion or national origin. Therefore, establishing a claim of discrimination required
evidence of both a respondent choosing to engage in differential treatment based on
prohibited grounds of discrimination and the conduct that flowed from this intent.
Direct discrimination claims are relatively straightforward where a respondent
admits to intentional differentiation or where there is publicly available evidence of
intentionally differential treatment. Examples of publically available evidence included
signs, advertisements, and written policies that explicitly contemplate or require
differential treatment based on prohibited grounds of discrimination.291 However, where
intent to differentiate was not openly expressed and the respondent did not admit to the
intent, it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to prove direct discrimination.
A 1949 article captured the fundamental challenge associated with proving individual
claims of direct discrimination in the absence of clear evidence or an admission:

… discrimination may exist independently of malice or intention to
discriminate.
Nevertheless, the essential element of discrimination in its legal
context is the mental process of the alleged discriminator. An employer
who has decided to hire a white rather than a Negro stenographer has
made a choice adversely affecting the Negro. But the choice is in itself
not discriminatory unless race is a consideration in the formulation of that
choice. It is in identifying these mental processes in individual cases that
legal proof of discrimination can be distinguished from its sociological
counterpart. The sociologist, whose primary interest is group behavior, is
not concerned with whether single actions within a total behavior pattern
are themselves acts of discrimination. He looks primarily to the social
effects of the general pattern to determine whether the pattern is
discriminatory. In dealing with the unequal treatment of Negroes and
291
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whites in a particular region, community, or industry, the sociologist has a
collection of single instances of unequal treatment from which he may
detect race as the single element always accompanying the unequal
treatment. Thus by an inductive process he may conclude that race, the
common element in one group as well as the distinguishing element
between the groups, is the cause of the unequal treatment. The lawyer, on
the other hand, because he is, in many cases, forced to deal merely with a
single instance of unequal treatment is deprived of other instances with
which he can make a comparison. As a result he must look directly to the
mental processes of the alleged discriminator in order to determine
whether there has been discrimination. 292

When fair practices advocates argued in the campaigns for legislation that discrimination
would be “easy” to prove, their claims depended on the respondent admitting to
differential treatment based on a prohibited ground of discrimination, or the availability
of other evidence of differential treatment based on a prohibited ground of
discrimination. As has been noted, the cases under the fair practices statutes involved
individual complaints of direct discrimination. With these cases, if there was no publicly
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available evidence of intentional differentiation and if the respondent took the position
that the conduct was not linked to a prohibited ground of discrimination, discrimination
could be proved only if the adjudicator was prepared to decide that the respondent’s
explanation for their conduct was not a reasonable alternative to an inference or a
presumption of intentional differentiation. The difficulty of proving discrimination was
undoubtedly at least one factor that affected both the conciliation outcomes and decisions
about taking unresolved cases to adjudication.

2

Fair Practices Advocates’ and Citizens’ Enforcement Role and Responsibilities
The fair practices advocates believed that they, and all citizens, had a

responsibility to ensure that the fair practices goals were fulfilled and that attention was
brought to bear on situations where the goals were being contravened. Labour activists
argued that they had a responsibility to step into the public education breach created by
the government’s failure to provide education about the legislation:

Lack of information about the Act is seen as one reason for the small
number of formal complaints, according to a recent editorial in the
Toronto Star. The Ontario Federation of Labor, in this year's brief to the
Ontario government, asked that the Department of Labor undertake a
program of public education along the lines followed by the New York
State Commission Against Discrimination. In the meantime, it has been
the policy of the Toronto Committee to carry on educational activities in
the local unions, and to provide as much information about the FEP Act as
is possible within the limitations of our resources. ..."293
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Labour activists also saw themselves, as well as their memberships, as having
responsibilities to ensure that violations were noticed and that appropriate responsive
measures were taken:

It is the duty of our national and local officers, committeemen and
shop stewards to explain the provisions of these laws to the members at
large and to be on the look-out continually for infractions of these laws
and regulations. Only when there is a sufficient number of people
constantly on the alert, ready to help in case of need, prepared to approach
the proper authorities for the purpose of enforcing these laws, only then
can we hope to translate these acts into living instruments for the
improvement of the lot of our people. This is where education and social
action have such an important part to play in eradicating intolerance and
injustice.294

Labour activists held annual fair practices conferences and established or maintained
existing committees to continue anti-discrimination education and advocacy.295 They
argued that fair practices statutes “belonged” primarily to the people for whose benefit
they were enacted. They urged racial and religious minority workers to understand that
fair practices provisions were their rights, and they emphasized that workers needed to
assert these rights in order for them to be effective:

Complete protection is not yet available, but Canada has gone a long way
towards establishing the basic rights of workers to fair employment
practices. These are your rights; the laws were passed for your protection
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– it is up to you to safeguard these rights and keep them from falling into
disuse.296

In a 1952 address to the Ontario Federation of Labor Convention, Eamon Park, who was
at that time the Legislation Representative for the United Steelworkers of America and
co-chair of the Toronto Joint Labour Committee to Combat Racial Intolerance, described
unions as having a responsibility to work directly with their memberships as well as to
assist with seeking enforcement of the new legislation.297
The JPRC also saw itself and citizens at large as having responsibilities relating to
enforcement, but they focused more on responsibilities relating to enforcement as such
than responsibilities for education. Ben Kayfetz described the JPRC and all citizens as
having a responsibility to ensure that statutes, once enacted, were then implemented:

I feel we would be more than derelict in our duty if we sat back and were
satisfied with the existence of these statutes on the books. We must as
B’nai B’rith members, as Jews and as citizens consolidate the advances
and gains that have been made and only through a more intense follow-up
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and personal implementation can we help make these statutes an effective
instrument for better citizenship.298

Saul Hayes described the JPRC as focusing its resources on law rather than on
education.299 In 1956, Prof. Albert Rose, a professor of social work at the University of
Toronto, expressed the view that there was an over-representation of lawyers on the
JPRC, that the JPRC had become disconnected from the community, and that the work of
the JPRC had become too focused on individual cases and did not give enough attention
to bigger questions, including job discrimination.300 In his response, Ben Kayfetz
(JPRC) acknowledged that lawyers, including legal academics, constituted 40% of the
JPRC’s membership, but disagreed with that the JPRC’s work had shifted away from
important issues, including job discrimination, and maintained that lawyer members had
not skewed the Committee’s work.301
The high proportion of lawyers involved with the JPRC is interesting and
noteworthy. It is not surprising that these lawyer members, and the MPP representatives,
would have been interested in pursuing legislation and its enforcement as tools in the
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struggle against discrimination. However, I see no evidence in the historical record that
they were interested in law for its own sake. In my view, the JPRC lawyer members
were early “cause lawyers”, interested in the potential of law as a tool for social action
and for achieving concrete social improvement.
In 1958, the Ontario legislature passed The Ontario Anti-Discrimination
Commission Act, 1958. This statute provided for the creation of a new agency, the
Ontario Anti-Discrimination Commission, which would have authority to advise the
Minister of Labour on the administration of the fair practices statutes, to make
recommendations designed to improve this administration, and to develop and conduct an
educational programme to give the public knowledge about the statutes and to promote
the elimination of discriminatory practices.302 The effect of this change was to create
some government “educational” responsibilities, but also to separate these from the
“enforcement responsibilities”, which remained with the FEPB of the Department of
Labour.
In 1961, the government passed legislation to rename the new commission the
Ontario Human Rights Commission, but without changing its role or responsibilities.303
In his statement to the legislature introducing this proposed change, Premier Frost
emphasized the more positive and universal connotation of the different nomenclature:

Arising out of our people’s basic belief in justice for men and women of
all races and creeds, various laws have been enacted to give formal
expression to our concept of human rights, to strengthen the fabric of our
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freedom and guarantee of equality of opportunity for all, regardless of race
or religion.
…
In order to strengthen the educational arm of our program, the Ontario
Anti-Discrimination Commission will be re-named the Ontario Human
Rights Commission. This will be in line with the positive approach to
human rights which encompasses all of the people of Ontario.304

The fair practices statutes were absorbed into the Ontario Human Rights Code in 1962, as
the first Canadian anti-discrimination human rights statute.

Conclusion to Chapter One
Advocates for fair practices statutes sought this legislation as a tool to redefine
particular social norms and to provide a legal process for addressing conduct that failed to
comply with the redefined norms. In form, the fair practices statutes were also part of a
developing new approach to civil law, where the state was responsible for administering
and enforcing legal norms rather than the courts. The brief history of Ontario’s fair
practices raises several questions about the promise and practice of this new form of law
as a tool in struggles against social inequalities.
Four questions stand out for me in relation to the subsequent evolution of human
rights law and practice in Ontario. One question concerns the extent to which the fair
practices statutes moved beyond the quasi-criminal roots of their predecessor antidiscrimination legislation. The second question concerns the equivocal role of the
coercive power of law in the enforcement model and implementation. The third question
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concerns the tensions between public and private roles and responsibilities in using law to
address social inequalities. The fourth and final question concerns the extent to which
individual claims reflected the social experiences of discrimination and could provide
meaningful redress for this discrimination.
On the question of the relationship between fair practices statutes and their antidiscrimination predecessors, Walter Tarnopolsky characterized Ontario’s Racial
Discrimination Act and other early anti-discrimination legislation as quasi-criminal
statutes.305 He argued that the quasi-criminal enforcement process was not very effective
for a number of reasons: victims of discrimination could not initiate criminal actions; it
was difficult to meet the evidentiary test of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
prohibited conduct had occurred; judges were reluctant to convict; and the sanction was a
fine, which did not provide a remedy for the victim of discrimination.306 In
Tarnopolsky’s view, the fair practices legislation and the enforcement model they
established were a significant improvement over the earlier anti-discrimination legislation
because they were civil statutes which shifted the focus away from determining fault on
the part of the alleged perpetrator and instead towards providing remedies for the
victim.307
It is also interesting that in one of the few prosecutions under the Fair
Accommodation Practices Act, the defendant challenged the constitutional validity of the
legislation on the ground that it was ultra vires the provincial legislature because it was in
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fact criminal legislation. County Court Justice Lang dismissed the argument, and in the
course of doing so expressed the view that the statute did not deal with the promotion of
public morals or the prevention of public wrongs but, rather, that it “create[d] a new civil
right”.308
When we assess the historical record, though, we may ask whether the fair
practices statutes did, in fact, move that far away from their quasi-criminal roots. It is
true that in legal form the primary enforcement process under the fair practices was a
civil process. The ultimate goal of this process may also have been to provide a remedy
for the “victim” of discrimination rather than to punish a “perpetrator” of discrimination.
However, if the respondent to a complaint did not agree in conciliation to provide a
remedy, a remedy could be provided only if there was a judgment that the respondent
engaged in discrimination, and the focus of this judgment was the person whose conduct
was under legal scrutiny. Moreover, since the form of discrimination targeted by the fair
practices legislation was direct discrimination, an intentional element was necessary to
establish a violation of the legal norm. Therefore, it was more complicated in the
enforcement context to maintain the distinction between discriminatory conduct and
prejudicial attitudes that had been central to the argument for using law against
discrimination. This intentional component also bore some resemblance to the mens rea
component of discrimination as a quasi-criminal offence.
On the question of the equivocal role of coercion in the fair practices enforcement
process, this equivocation was embedded in the advocacy for legislation, in the
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enforcement model adopted, and in the implementation of the model. The underlying
premise of the advocacy and the model was that access to coercive power was a
necessary element of the scheme but an element that would have effect more in principle
than in practice. The fair practices enforcement model also placed access to coercion
exclusively in the hands of the state, putting the state in the middle of the dispute between
complainant and respondent. The short history of fair practices implementation
demonstrated significant reluctance on the part of the state to use the coercive power of
legal process, raising questions about whether there really was access to coercive power
and, if there was not, what might be the impact of lack of access to coercive power on the
enforcement process as a whole.
On the question of the tensions between public and private roles and
responsibilities in using law to address social inequalities, the campaigns for fair
practices legislation and enforcement illustrate a rich approach to the public and social
responsibility, including the state, community and social organizations. The role of the
state in the enforcement processes was also important in relation to this question, as it
was in relation to the question of access to the coercive power of law.
On the question of the relationship between individual claims and systemic
discrimination, the historical record shows that this tension was recognized as soon as the
legislation and enforcement model were in place, along with tension between the
competing roles of legal process and other methods of working to address the systemic
dimensions of discrimination.
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Some of these tensions remained after the enactment of the statute creating the
Ontario Human Rights Commission. In Chapter Two, I examine the interaction between
social relations, legal norms, and legal process in the context of the effort to extend fair
practices protection to include discrimination in rental housing, and the resulting
litigation that challenged the legitimacy of both the promise and the practice of human
rights legislation in Ontario. This second case study focuses in particular on questions
relating to the on-going connection between human rights law and criminal law, and
tensions between public and private dimensions of law and legal processes.
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Chapter Two
Social Relations, Legal Norms and Legal Process:
Ontario’s Human Rights Code, Human Rights Commission and
Bell v. McKay, 1956-1972

Introduction to Chapter Two

[T]he case analysis demonstrates the opportunity for choice in legal
method: choice as to which precedents are relevant and which approach to
statutory interpretation is preferred; and choice as to whether the ideas of
the mainstream or those of the margins are appropriate. …. Thus, the
opportunity for choice of outcome, positive as it appears, will not
automatically lead to legal results which successfully challenge “vested
interests” or the “status quo,” especially in relation to the law itself.309

Examining legal norms through the lens of social relations invites us to examine
how the requirements of legal norms are designed to shape social relations, and to give
effect to particular social values. Examining how legal processes respond to claims based
on these legal norms invites us to consider how legal process can either support or
undermine the effect of legal norms.
For example, fair accommodation practices legislation drew upon the common
law obligation on innkeepers to serve all travelers, unless the innkeeper could
demonstrate a justifiable reason for refusing service. This common law obligation
developed in the context of a constituting “innkeeper” and traveler” as social roles, and
constituted a corresponding social relation between “innkeeper” and “traveler”. The
rationale for the legal obligation was grounded in the material realities of being a traveler
309
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in medieval England.310 It did not develop from the particular circumstances of an
individual innkeeper or an individual traveler. However, the fact that a legal obligation
was grounded in the constitution of a social relation did not mean the obligation would
always be accepted, or that its enforcement would be straightforward or uncomplicated.
Once legal process became involved, there were a plethora of avenues to resist and
challenge the requirements that the legal obligation sought to impose.311 In his 1968
article, Henry Molot examined how individuals sought to avoid enforcement of the
obligation by arguing that they were not innkeepers within the meaning of the legal
definition of an innkeeper, or that the person making the claim was not a traveler within
the meaning of the legal definition of a traveler.312
Ontario’s fair practices legislation established new legal and social norms for
important social relations – social relations between employers, employees, and trade
unions; social relations between services providers and service recipients; and social
relations between citizens and those responsible for access to public spaces and facilities.
In Chapter One, we saw that the advocates for fair practices legislation experienced
frustration and disappointment over how the legislation was implemented and enforced.
In this chapter, I examine how the themes of criminal law and public responsibility
310
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played out in the struggle to extend fair practices legislation to rental housing and then to
enforce this new protection. This history culminated in the Bell v. McKay313 litigation
which challenged both the substantive protection and the method by which it was
enforced. In Part I of the chapter, I discuss the litigation which tested the scope of the
Fair Accommodation Practices Act and the subsequent legislative history by which
protection against discrimination in rental housing was incrementally added to the statute.
In Part II, I examine how Ontario’s first Human Rights Code incorporated the substantive
protections and enforcement process from the fair practices statutes. In Part III, I review
the three human rights tribunal decisions that interpreted and applied the Code’s rental
housing protection prior to the Bell v. McKay litigation. In Part IV, I examine the Bell v.
McKay litigation, with a particular focus on analyzing the tribunal and court decisions in
the case.314 In Part V, I examine the legislative responses to the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Bell v. McKay. In the Conclusion to this chapter, I reflect on the ways
in which questions about public responsibility, the Code’s dual civil and criminal
dimensions, and the vagaries of legal process, continued to shape the promise and
practice of human rights law in Ontario.
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Part I: Achieving Legislative Protection for Rental Housing
Ontario’s Fair Accommodation Practices Act prohibited “… the denial of
accommodation, services or facilities customarily available to the public” on the basis of
the prohibited grounds of discrimination – race, religion and ethnic origin.
Discrimination in rental housing had been on the fair practices advocates’ radar from the
beginning and it was one of the social issues they targeted for fair practices legislation.
Once the Fair Accommodation Practices Act was passed, fair practices advocates hoped
it would be available as a tool to challenge discrimination in rental housing. However, it
was not clear whether the statutory language would be interpreted to apply to the social
relation between landlord and tenant. In this part of the chapter, I review the commission
decision which held that rental housing was not accommodation, services or facilities
customarily available to the public and the subsequent efforts to change the legislation to
achieve this protection.

1 Forbes v. Shields, 1956: Early Interpretation of Fair Accommodation and Rental
Housing
The only way for labour human rights activists to formally test whether they
could use the Fair Accommodation Practices Act against rental housing discrimination
was by way of a complaint under the statute. It is not clear on the historical record
whether or not the case which answered this question was set up simply to test the
landlord, or whether an individual seeking the tenancy subsequently obtained support
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from the labour human rights activists. What is clear is that the individual affected did
receive this support.
District Court Judge Douglas C. Thomas was appointed as a commission to hear
and decide the complaint of Sidney Forbes against S.L. Shields.315 In his July, 1956
decision, Justice Thomas described the complainant, Forbes, as a “Canadian citizen”, a
“negro”, and an “educated man”, who held “a responsible position as a sales
organizer.”316 He was looking for new housing accommodation for himself, his wife, and
their two children. Forbes responded to an advertisement in the Toronto Daily Star by
making an application at Edi-Lou Apartments, which managed several large apartment
buildings in Toronto, on Bathurst St., between Wilson and Sheppard. A representative
acting on behalf of the owner showed Forbes a three and one-half room apartment that
was for rent and available. Forbes returned two days to see the apartment with his wife
and two children. Shortly afterwards, he completed an “application and agreement to
lease” form and gave the owner’s representative a cheque for $25. Forbes was to lease
the apartment for one year beginning June 1, 1956 and was given colour charts to help
him and his family choose re-decorating colours.
Later that week, Shields telephoned Forbes to advise him that the apartment was
not available as it had been previously rented. Forbes went in person to speak again with
the owner’s representative and to speak with Shields, both of who told him the apartment
had already been rented. When Forbes offered to rent a more expensive apartment that
315
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he was given to understand was available, he was told that this apartment too had already
been rented. Forbes refused to accept the return of his cheque from Shields, who later
sent it by mail to Forbes. During the investigation of Forbes’ complaint under the Fair
Accommodation Practices Act, Shields “denied any intention of discriminating … and
excused his actions on the ground that the Complainant has two children and that he …
was trying to ‘cut down on’ the number of children in the apartment building.”317
The Commission hearing was held in July 1956, at which Forbes was supported
by the Toronto Joint Labour Committee for Human Rights and represented by lawyer
Andrew Brewin; lawyer G.R. Dryden represented the respondent. After reviewing the
facts set out above, the Commissioner pointed out that it was “… significant to note the
words ‘children welcome’ in the advertisement …”.318 He wrote that he had “no
hesitation … in drawing from the facts, as I found them, the logical and irresistible
inference that the Complainant was denied accommodation by the Respondent because of
his colour.”319 In Justice Thomas’ view, the evidence was “inconsistent with any other
conclusion”.320 However, at the beginning of the hearing, counsel for the respondent had
brought a motion objecting to the application of the statute to his client’s apartment unit.
Many of the arguments Forbes’ counsel relied on to oppose the respondent’s
motion echoed those advanced by the fair practices advocates in their campaigns for antidiscrimination legislation. As recorded in the decision, these arguments were:
•

the purpose of the statute;
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•

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

•

the “broad outlook of emphasizing public policy rather than mere private morals
and behaviour”;

•

the legislation against restrictive covenants and other anti-discrimination
legislation “illustrating the intention of the Legislature to furnish the weapons to
strike at discrimination whenever and where it becomes apparent”; and

•

“… when the owner of accommodation opens it to the public … [it] is far
removed from the case where the principle of privacy can keep out the operation
of the Statute.”321
Justice Thomas rejected these arguments, granted the respondent’s motion, and

dismissed Forbes’s complaint on the grounds that it was not covered by the legislation.
His “duty” was to “find what the law is with respect to the facts of the instant case and
not what it should be and to report accordingly”; his report did not “… concern itself with
fundamental human rights and public policy.”322 He summarized Forbes’s position as
“… amount[ing] to the proposition that any owner who, for profit, opens up
accommodation to the public comes under the Statute”323 and then rejected it, stating: “I
fail to see how the common type of apartment house, such as that owned by the
respondent” could “possibly be considered” as open to the public or as a place to which
the public is customarily admitted.324 For Justice Thomas, apartment units and
apartment buildings were the essence of privacy since “the whole scheme of operation of
321
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such places is designed to ensure maximum privacy to those persons who have their
lodgings in them.”325 He could not accept that an apartment building owner would
“throw his buildings open to the public” simply because he “uses the medium of the press
or places a sign on his lawn to advertise a vacancy”.326 On the contrary, Justice Thomas
endorsed the view that an apartment building owner “reserves the right to scrutinize a
prospective tenant and to reject him if, for any reason (and there many be many reasons
having nothing to do with race, creed or colour), he deems it advisable to do so.”327
For Justice Thomas, the “plain meaning” of the statutory language required the
conclusion that the legislation did not apply to the apartment unit, and he had not
received any extrinsic aid that would have permitted him to reach any other
conclusion.328 An extrinsic aid to statutory interpretation is any information that goes
beyond the text of the statute and can include legislative history, similar legislation from
other jurisdictions, international legal instruments, and jurisprudence.329 Both Forbes
and Shields presented extrinsic aids to support their arguments, but Justice Thomas did
not rely on any of them. Instead, he relied on his own interpretation of the statutory
language. Given his pronouncement that the “plain meaning” of the statute did not
include Forbes’ complaint, it seems unlikely that any extrinsic aid would have persuaded
him to reach a different conclusion.330

325

Forbes v. Shields at 3.
Forbes v. Shields at 3.
327
Forbes v. Shields at 4. (emphasis added)
328
Forbes v. Shields at 4.
329
Ruth Sullivan, Statutory Interpretation 2d (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2007) at 279-280.
330
Forbes v. Shields at 4.
326

143

The fundamental difference between Justice Thomas’s analysis and the labour
human rights activists’ analysis lay in how they characterized the space to which access
was sought. Justice Thomas focused on apartment units as spaces that were already
occupied by tenants, even though Forbes was not seeking access to a rented unit where
people lived; he was seeking access to an empty unit that was available for rent. The
labour human rights advocates argued that there should be public access to vacant units
available for rent in the sense that all members of the public should be prospective
tenants and, in particular, that it should be illegal to deny racialized and religious
minorities access to these vacancies.
Looked at another way, the effect of Justice Thomas’s analysis was to treat the
entire apartment building and all its rental units as the landlord’s home, so that the
landlord should be able to have absolute control over the persons with whom the landlord
“shared” their home. This approach disregarded two social realities. First, landlords who
owned apartment buildings typically did not live in these buildings. Second, tenants were
not guests of the landlord, but persons with whom the landlord entered into a commercial
social relation, similar to the commercial social relations between a grocery store owner
and their customers, a movie theatre owner and their customers, and a restaurant owner
and their customers, for example. The social relation between landlord and tenant may
have been more on-going than these other commercial social relations, but it was a
commercial social relation nonetheless. The landlord ran a business of providing places
to live in exchange of payment for rent. Justice Thomas’s analysis completely ignored
this key factor, in favour of supporting a position that a landlord should be free to pick
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and choose tenants on whatever basis they wished, including rejecting tenants from racial
and religious minority groups.
Justice Thomas’s decision in Forbes v. Shields sparked a campaign to extend the
reach of fair practices legislation to include protection against discrimination in rental
housing. Legislative protection came incrementally, through a succession of four
amendments over a period of six years, beginning in 1961 and ending in 1967.

2 Legislative Amendment to the Fair Practices Accommodation Act
To support their campaigns for legislative protection against discrimination in
rental housing, the Toronto Labour Committee for Human Rights conducted several
surveys of discrimination in housing, the overall results of which were that approximately
50% of Toronto landlords or their representatives admitted to having discriminatory
rental policies and practices.331 In written submissions urging the government to extend
legislative protection to rental housing, a group of organizations, including the Toronto
Labour Committee, emphasized both the need to ensure that all people were able to enjoy
“the fruits of their employment”, such as housing, and the need to ensure unity and
democracy by making sure that no people were “unwanted as a householder” because of
their race, religion, or ethnicity.332
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The first provision prohibiting discrimination in rental housing was enacted in
1961 as an amendment to the Fair Accommodation Practices Act. This provision
prohibited discrimination in the occupancy of “any dwelling unit in any building that
contains more than six self-contained dwelling units”.333 When Premier Leslie Frost
introduced the amending Bill for first reading, he drew a connection between the
proposed rental housing protection amendment and legislation previously enacted to
prohibit restrictive covenants, both of which have a connection with where people are
able to live and make their homes. Premier Frost also emphasized the need to achieve the
right balance between people’s personal lives and public policy.334 On the public policy
side of the equation was the concern to address discrimination, and in his remarks
Premier Frost also made reference to apartheid in South Africa as a “cause of deep
concern” and noted that 1961 was the 100th anniversary of the beginning of the civil war
in the United States.335 On the people’s personal lives side of the equation, Premier Frost
noted that the government should “not interfere with the rights of people to choose their
own friends and to operate their own homes as they see fit.”336 Thus, Premier Frost
explained, the government chose to extend legislative protection to buildings with six
dwelling units because such buildings were “public” rather than “private”
accommodation:
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Submission to Premier of Ontario re Accommodation dated Jan. 21, 1958.
333
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Accordingly, we have confined this legislation, insofar as apartments are
concerned, to the type of accommodation which can really be termed
public accommodation. … This involves no interference with the life of
an individual in his own home which is, after all, his castle. It involves no
interference with the little person who rents rooms or flats in his own
home.
This legislation is directed, instead, toward the broad area of commerce
and public accommodation. This general public policy is in line with the
thinking which has been accepted so widely in the evolution of our human
rights code to date.337

Interestingly, Premier Frost’s underlying rationale aligned with the arguments made by
the fair practices advocates, namely, that activities taking place in the marketplace were
public activities and properly subject to regulation. During the second reading debate, he
described the proposed amendment as extending “a prohibition of discrimination to
apartment buildings which can be fairly described as being in the business of providing
public accommodation”.338
What became the main issue in the debate on this first provision and subsequent
amendments to it, was whether or not all rental housing accommodation should be
covered by anti-discrimination legislation regardless of the number of units being rented.
The debate on the 1961 amendment focused on the government’s decision to draw the
line at six units rather than some lower number.339 Progressive Conservative MPP
Grossman urged his colleagues to reach unanimous agreement instead of muddying the
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waters by haggling over the minimum number of units required for legislative protection
to apply:

This suggestion of 3, someone thinks it should be 4, someone thinks it
should be 5, and someone thinks it should be two units – the danger is, of
course, it is going to be thrown into the arena of politics, and the bill will
be found unacceptable. And if the hon. member thinks I am wrong, let me
be quote from the London Free Press on this legislation:
Prime Minister Frost has introduced legislation which may put
Ontario in the forefront of North America in the matter of
eliminating discrimination from public accommodation because of
race, creed or colour. The proposed amendments to The Fair
Accommodation Practices Act will prohibit such discrimination in
rentals for apartment buildings of more than 6 units. The bill has
been supported by all parties in the Legislature, despite the fact it
might have been questioned on the ground that this comes close to
an infringement on private rights.340

The CCF brought an unsuccessful motion to draw the line at two units rather than six and
the amendment passed with the line drawn at more than six self-contained dwelling units.

3

Human Rights Code Protection Against Discrimination in Rental Housing
When the Human Rights Code was enacted the following year, in 1962, it

included the new protection against discrimination in rental housing but with slightly
revised wording.341 The line was still drawn at more than six units, but the protection
applied to “any apartment” rather than to “any dwelling unit”. Three years later, in 1965,
a further amendment was passed to expand the legislative protection by reducing the
340
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minimum number of units required from more than six, to more than three.342 Again, the
debate focused on the minimum number of units required to attract statutory
protection.343 This time the CCF sought to eliminate any minimum number units and
draw the line simply at all “self-contained dwelling units”. Just as Premier Frost had
referred to South African apartheid and the civil rights movement in the United States in
1961 when the first proposed rental housing protection was introduced, CCF leader MPP
Donald MacDonald introduced his motion by referring to an 1852 anti-slavery speech
given by George Brown and to the civil rights march from Selma to Montgomery,
Alabama. In discussing his motion, MPP Donald MacDonald also proposed the following
analysis of “self-contained”:

We concede that if a dwelling is not self-contained – in other words, if it is
without separate entrance and without separate facilities – an owner has
the right to decide, in effect, with whom he is going to share his home.
That is his basic right. But if there is a separate entrance and if there are
separate facilities, then he does not have the right to discriminate against
those who may seek to rent that property because he does not happen to
like their race or their colour or their creed.344

At that time, the CCF considered the defining features of a “self-contained” dwelling unit
to be a “separate entrance” and “separate facilities”. (As will be discussed, this definition
would have precluded the statute’s application to the rental unit at issue in Bell v. McKay,
because it did not have a separate entrance.)
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Although the CCF did not succeed in 1965 to eliminate the three-apartment
requirement, this requirement was subsequently removed by a further amendment in
1967. This amendment was introduced as following through on a commitment made in
the Speech from the Throne and was passed without debate.345 It was the final
amendment to the rental housing discrimination provisions prior to the Bell v. McKay
litigation. With this last amendment, the protection was extended to “any self-contained
dwelling unit”, thus also returning to the phrase “dwelling unit” instead of the term
“apartment”. As we will see, the meaning of “self-contained dwelling unit” was one of
the two central questions at issue in the Bell v. McKay proceeding.

Part II: Human Rights Code Enforcement Tensions –
Civil or Criminal, Conciliation or Adjudication, Public or Private

Ontario’s first Human Rights Code (“Human Rights Code” or “Code”) was passed
in 1962, bringing together in one statute the Fair Employment Practices Act, the Fair
Accommodation Practices Act, the Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act, the
Ontario Anti-Discrimination Commission Amendment Act and the Ontario Human Rights
Commission Act. As with the fair practices legislation, Ontario was again the first
jurisdiction to pass this type of human rights legislation. The Code largely re-enacted the
substantive provisions of the fair practices legislation on the basis of the same prohibited
grounds of discrimination.
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The enforcement process under the Code also retained the same general structure
as the fair practices enforcement process. As under the fair practices statutes, the Code’s
enforcement model provided for a civil process and a quasi-criminal process, but with a
clear preference for the civil process. Despite this clear preference for civil process
signaled in the legislation and implemented in practice, there was on-going tension
between the civil and criminal dimensions of Code liability and enforcement. Within the
Code’s civil process, there was provision for conciliation and adjudication but, as under
the fair practices statutes, with a clear preference for conciliation over adjudication. The
relationship between conciliation and adjudication also created tensions between the
competing goals of these two enforcement processes. In this part of the chapter, I
provide an overview of the Code enforcement process and then examine in more detail
issues relating to the tension between civil and criminal dimensions and the tension
between conciliation and adjudication processes.

1 Overview of Code Enforcement
Under the Code, the Ontario Human Rights Commission (“OHRC” or
“Commission”) was responsible both for the complaint-processing functions that had
previously been carried out by the Fair Employment Practices Branch of the Ministry of
Labour and for the educational and policy functions it had received when it was
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established in 1958 as the Anti-Discrimination Commission.346 Dr. Daniel Hill was the
OHRC’s first director and a champion of the Code’s enforcement model.
The civil enforcement process began with a written complaint filed with the
Commission. In principle, the Commission had discretion to decide whether or not to
investigate the complaint; but if it decided to investigate, the Code imposed a mandatory
requirement that it “endeavour to effect a settlement”, i.e. the Code required
conciliation.347 In practice, it appears that the OHRC investigated all cases, including
cases that were not within its jurisdiction in the hope that they might be able to facilitate a
resolution nonetheless.348 Hill provided the following as examples of the types of
settlements investigators tried to achieve during conciliation: to offer the complainant a
rental unit where the complaint involved discrimination in rental housing; to offer the
complainant immediate or forthcoming employment where the complaint involved
discrimination in employment hiring; to provide the complainant with a haircut where the
complaint involved denial of haircutting services; to offer the complainant
accommodation in the current or following season where the complaint involved denial
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of resort accommodation.349 Hill also argued that the Commission’s responsibilities for
conciliation, enforcement and education were inter-related and could not be placed into
self-contained silos. For example, he noted that in order for investigators to be effective,
they had to be “prepared to discuss stereotypes, argue against irrational views regarding
races and nationalities, and in general know something about the vast literature that is
now developing in community and race relations.”350
The board of inquiry took the place of the “commission” under the fair practices
statute.351 The decision to appoint a board of inquiry was made by the Minister of
Labour on the recommendation of the Commission, where a settlement could not be
reached. Both the Commission’s recommendation and the Minister’s decision were
discretionary decisions. The board’s role was to “investigate the matter” and make
recommendations to the Commission if it found that the complaint was supported by the
evidence. The Commission would then make recommendations to the Minister of
Labour, who had the authority to “issue any order he deems necessary to carry the
recommendations of the board into effect”. Similarly to the commission under the fair
practices legislation, the board was required to “give the parties full opportunity to
present evidence and to make submissions”, and had the same powers as a conciliation
board under the Labour Relations Act. These powers were to summon witnesses and
compel them to give evidence, to accept whatever evidence it deemed appropriate
whether or not such evidence was admissible in a court of law, and to enter and inspect
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premises.352 At a board of inquiry proceeding, the case for the complainant was
presented by the Commission, who was represented by a Commission employee or by a
lawyer retained and paid for by the Commission.
The persons appointed to act as board of inquiries were typically County Court
judges and law professors. Judge D.C Thomas, who decided the Sidney Forbes case, was
the first board of inquiry appointee under the Code. The Code did not provide any
recourse for challenging a board of inquiry decision; however, it also did not cloak the
board of inquiry with any privative clause language, which the fair practices legislation
had provided for the commission.353
Finally, quasi-criminal prosecution was available as the other adjudicative option.
Similarly to the fair practices statutes, it was an offence to contravene the Code and it
was an offence to contravene an order made by the Minister. As under the fair practices
statute, prosecution required the Minister’s consent.

2 Conciliation: The Velvet Glove
The features of the Code’s enforcement model, both in structure and in
implementation, were very similar to the model advocated by the fair practices advocates.
Hill endorsed and advocated the primary role of the civil enforcement process, and of
conciliation and settlement within that enforcement process, stating that the OHRC
352

Labour Relations Act, RSO 1960, s 202, s. 28.
The fair practices statutes included the following protective language for commissions: “… and no
order shall be made or process entered or proceeding taken in any court, whether by way of injunction,
declaratory judgment, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto or otherwise to question the
appointment of the commission, or to review, prohibit or restrain any of its proceedings.” The Fair
Employment Practices Act, 1951, SO 1951, c 24, s. 71; The Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act,
1951, SO 1951, c 26, s. 4(1); The Fair Accommodation Practices Act, 1954, SO 1954, c 28, s. 5(1).

353

154

“place[d] a distinct priority on persuasion and conciliation”.354 He used the metaphors of
the “velvet glove” and the “iron fist” to characterize conciliation and adjudication,
respectively.355 The velvet glove of conciliation was a form of legal process because it
was a component of the formal enforcement process. However, similarly to the fair
practices advocates, Hill characterized conciliation as being more in the nature of an
educational process and associated “law” more clearly with the Code’s adjudicative
processes. In his description of conciliation, Hill maintained that its goal was to provide
an opportunity for respondents to recognize, acknowledge and then change their
prejudicial attitudes.
Hill described the interrelationship between conciliation and adjudication – or
education and law – as a “judicious blending of the ‘velvet glove’ and ‘iron hand’”:

Modern day human rights legislation is predicated on the theory that the
actions of prejudiced people and their attitudes can be changed and
influenced by the process of re-education, discussion, and the presentation
of socio-scientific materials that are used to challenge popular myths and
stereotypes about people. … Human rights on this continent is a skillful
blending of educational and legal techniques in the pursuit of social
justice.356

Tarnopolsky added his own commentary on this passage, arguing that discrimination was
practiced not only by “bigots” but also by “fine ‘upright, gentlemanly’ members of
society” whose actions were driven “not so much out of hatred as out of discomfort or
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inconvenience, or out of the fear of loss of business”.357 The goal of conciliation was to
provide people who engaged in discrimination with “an opportunity to re-assess their
attitudes, and to reform themselves, after being given the opportunity of seeing how
much more severe is the injury to the dignity and economic well-being of others, than
their own loss of comfort or convenience.”358 Tarnopolsky also borrowed Hill’s
metaphors to coin the phrase the “the iron hand in the velvet glove”, substituting the word
“hand” for “fist”.359
Hill wrote that “the Commission’s policy [was] to keep formal correspondence to
a minimum and to place strong reliance upon personal contact and discussion.”360 He
emphasized that the investigation procedures were intended to be neither rigidly formal
nor “loose and unprofessional”. He further emphasized that it was the Commission’s
policy that the investigator “concentrates rather less on the issue of legal guilt than on the
issue of effectuating a satisfactory settlement.”361 On this point, Hill endorsed and
quoted with approval the Ontario Federation of Labour’s (“OFL”) position that deemphasizing a respondent’s liability was critical to the success of conciliation, as set out
in a 1962 brief on “Standards for Proper Enforcement of the Ontario Human Rights
Code” authored by Sid Blum:

[Accordingly, we submit that the conciliation process should concentrate
less on the issue of legal guilt and more on the issue of a satisfactory
357
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settlement.] If a respondent is asked whether he has committed a
discriminatory act, almost invariably he will deny it. Once having denied
it, his very self-respect will impel him to resist conciliation overtures. A
settlement would be perceived as an admission of guilt.362

Blum also wrote that the conciliation officer should begin by “furnish[ing] respondent
with face-saving devices.” Such devices could include telling the respondent that
“discrimination occurs subconsciously without evil intent”, or that “these situations result
more from accidental tradition than from malicious design”, or that “Someone in his
organization has made an inadvertent mistake”, and that the Commission was consulting
the respondent because they believe the respondent will “want to rectify the difficulty”.363
This strategy would allow the respondent to “maintain and demonstrate his innocence
without any loss of face to the officer or the Department.”364
This OFL brief would have been submitted when the OHRC was first beginning
to implement its new, complaint-processing role under the Code. In the brief, Blum
referred to an article by Albert Rose reporting on research about how employers viewed
fair practices legislation.365 According to Blum, Rose’s research supported the
conclusion that prejudice had increased rather than decreased, and that employers were

362

S. Blum, Executive Director, Human Rights Committee, C.L.C., Submission of the Committee on
Human Rights of the Ontario Federation of Labor, C.L.C., to the Ontario Human Rights Commission:
Standards for Proper Enforcement of the Ontario Human Rights Code, June 13, 1962, quoted in Eberlee
and Hill, “Human Rights Code” at 449-450.
363
Library and Archives Canada, Jewish Labour Committee of Canada 1925-1978 fonds, R3286-0-8-E
(formerly MG28-V75), File 26-25,“Submission of the Committee on Human Rights of the Ontario
Federation of Labour, C.L.C. to the Ontario Human Rights Commission – ‘Standards for Proper
Enforcement of the Ontario Human Rights Code’” June 13th, 1962 at 6-7 [LAC, JLC 1925-1978].
364
LAC, JLC 1925-1978, File 26-25,“Submission of the Committee on Human Rights of the Ontario
Federation of Labour, C.L.C. to the Ontario Human Rights Commission – ‘Standards for Proper
Enforcement of the Ontario Human Rights Code’” June 13th, 1962 at 7.
365
This appears to have been the same Prof. Albert Rose who several years earlier had raised concerns
about the over-representation of lawyers on the JPRC – see Chapter One at 134.

157

finding ways to circumvent the legal requirements.366 Blum continued by emphasizing
the difficulties associated with being able to prove discrimination in the employment
context, given the many variables involved in selecting an employee.
This conciliation-heavy framework placed the focus on providing remedies for
discrimination and simultaneously reduced, or even eliminated, the focus on establishing
legal responsibility. One question the framework did not answer was what factual basis a
conciliation officer would need before they could present “face-saving” proposals to a
respondent. Would it be sufficient for a conciliation officer to rely on a complainant’s
perception that their race or religion or nationality was a factor in how they were treated?
It may be reasonable to suggest that a complainant’s perception of how they were treated
should have been sufficient to require a respondent to explain their conduct. However,
requiring a respondent to explain their conduct would not have fit well within the
conciliation process as it was described. Requiring a respondent to explain their conduct
was more in the nature of determining whether to assign legal responsibility and, if legal
responsibility was assigned, to determine what consequences should attach to that legal
responsibility. The description of the conciliation process, on the other hand, suggested
that the goal of conciliation was to bypass the legal responsibility step and go directly to
consequences.
It is also reasonable to suggest that “face-saving” strategies would serve a “facesaving” purpose only if the respondent believed they could bear legal responsibility for
366
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their conduct. If a respondent denied legal responsibility and was not open to discussing
the matter, it is not clear how face-saving strategies would encourage them to be
interested in discussing remedies. Some respondents might agree to discuss resolution
for practical reasons, but that is not the same as agreeing to discuss and resolve in order
to save face.
According to a 1977 study by Philip Stenning, approximately 44% of the
complaints processed by the Commission between 1962 and 1970 were voluntarily
resolved, approximately 40% were dismissed, and approximately 5% involved boards of
inquiry.367 As with the fair practices enforcement data, there is no information about the
content of the settlements for the cases that settled. Stenning’s comment was that “we
may with good reason be somewhat surprised (and even perhaps a little suspicious) at the
very high percentage of formal complaints which have been resolved in this way by the
Commission.”368

3 Board of Inquiry Adjudication: The Iron Fist or Hand
Despite the efforts devoted to conciliation, not all complaints did reach a
voluntarily resolution. When the Commission could not facilitate a voluntary resolution,
it then had to decide whether or not to proceed to adjudication – the “iron” hand or fist of
law – or to dismiss the complaint. Although in principle both the civil board of inquiry
hearing and the quasi-criminal court prosecution could provide this “iron” hand or fist, it
367
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is clear that when Hill and Tarnopolsky used the iron hand or iron fist metaphor, they
were referring to the board of inquiry hearing.
The role of board of inquiry adjudication within this framework was not entirely
clear. It is clear that both the civil and criminal adjudicative processes were considered
the options of last resort, but there was no clear discussion of why that was the case. The
OHRC could have implemented a policy and practice of preferring conciliation and
devoting significant efforts to conciliation, but also making equal use of adjudication
when best efforts at voluntary resolution did not succeed; however, that does not seem to
be what they did.
Tarnopolsky emphasized that the option of access to the iron hand was a
necessary component of the Code’s enforcement model where conciliation could not
produce a result:

However, if persuasion and conciliation fails, then the law must be
upheld, and the law requires equality of access and equality of
opportunity. This is the “iron hand in the velvet glove”.369

Dan Hill, in his 1963-64 publication describing the OHRC enforcement process, wrote
that the threat of a board of inquiry public hearing, which would generally be attended by
the press, could be effective in persuading some otherwise unwilling respondents to
settle; these would typically be respondents who wished to avoid negative public
exposure because they operated businesses that relied on public goodwill.370 However,
this argument did not appear in subsequent versions of this article. As with the fair
369
370
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practices advocacy, the focus appears to have been on the fact that there was in practice
little recourse to adjudication. In his 1967 article on the Code’s enforcement process, Hill
wrote that the OHRC used “sanctions only when the expressed wishes of the public
[were] purposely being thwarted.”371 Hill did not explain what he meant by the
“expressed wishes of the public” or what he meant by these express wishes “purposely
being thwarted”. However, the statement suggests that the primary purpose of
adjudication was a public purpose, and thus connected with enforcing legal norms, rather
than the more “private” purpose of resolving an individual complaint. The threat of
recourse to a public airing of the complaint either in a board of inquiry hearing or a
prosecution, together with the associated financial and other burdens of being required to
participate in litigation, could have enhanced the persuasive impact of face-saving
strategies for some respondents.
However, it is not clear how often the threat of public adjudication was used as an
aid to resolution through conciliation. In his 1967 article explaining the Code’s
enforcement model, Hill wrote that only 15 of the approximately 1000 formal complaints
investigated were referred to a board of inquiry, and that nine of these 15 cases were
settled either before or during the board of inquiry hearing.372 According to Stenning, as
noted earlier, only 5% of the complaints processed by the Commission between 1962 and
1973 involved boards of inquiry.373 As with the fair practices enforcement data, there is
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no information about the reasons why cases were dismissed. And since we do not know
why cases were dismissed, we cannot know whether any of the cases that were dismissed
could instead have been referred to a board of inquiry or to prosecution. However, there
is a clear implication that this was in fact the case, i.e. not every case that could have
been referred to adjudication was referred to adjudication.
Difficulties associated with proving discrimination may also have been a factor in
decisions about whether to refer a complaint to a board of inquiry. In a 1972 article, John
Sopinka wrote that discrimination was “seldom susceptible of direct proof”.374 The
article was clearly focused on direct discrimination and highlighted two key challenges.
First, in most cases discrimination could be established only by circumstantial evidence,
which required the board of inquiry to make a choice between drawing or not drawing an
inference that discrimination was involved:

A judge trying a divorce case once said that people do not commit
adultery on a street corner. Neither do they openly admit discrimination by
advising the prospective purchaser, tenant, employee, customer or guest
that he is being refused because of race, creed, etc.
Discrimination must, therefore, be proved by circumstantial evidence,
that is, it must be inferred from a series of circumstances from which the
Board is asked to conclude that discrimination exists.375

Sopinka also wrote that proving direct discrimination often required successful crossexamination of the respondent:
of inquiry appointments between 1962 and 1966, more appointments from 1967 through 1969, and then
few again from 1970 on. Stenning also reported that approximately 1% of the cases that were decided by a
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Due to the availability of explanations, the task of the cross-examiner is to
demonstrate that the explanation has been manufactured.376

Having to rely on evidence obtained through cross-examination is obviously not an ideal
situation for a legal representative. Thus, it is possible that in at least some cases the
Commission decided to not to refer to adjudication because the case would be difficult to
prove.

4 Civil and Criminal Dimensions
In his 1968 “Iron Hand in the Velvet Glove” article, Tarnopolsky argued that
discrimination should not be an offence under the Code. He wrote that making
discrimination an offence undermined the primary goals of conciliation and voluntary,
remedial resolutions:

… the primary object of human rights legislation is to obtain compliance
through an agreed settlement. This requires negotiation and conciliation.
This process is foreign to criminal law. When the act of discrimination is
made a crime, the whole process of negotiation, conciliation, and
settlement could be likened to compounding a criminal offence.377

Hill, on the other hand, argued that the fact of separate civil and quasi-criminal
adjudicative options “doubly insulates the respondent from any bureaucratic evil by
giving him the opportunity of making answer and defence to the allegations at two
separate and distinct stages and before two separate and unrelated independent
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tribunals.”378 It is not clear that a respondent would have perceived as “opportunities”
the prospect of defending themselves twice against allegations of discrimination. For
reasons that I discuss further below, it is also not clear whether a respondent would, in
fact, have had two opportunities to defend themselves.
Stenning argued that, although a “rigid distinction” between criminal law and
civil law is “neither self-evident nor inevitable”, criminal courts tend to give priority to
the more public purpose of enforcing legal norms and “control of deviance” whereas civil
courts tend to give priority to the more private purpose of “the settlement of private
disputes”.379 Stenning did not explore why criminal law enforcement may be regarded as
focusing more on public goals than on private concerns; one reason that may be
suggested, however, is the central role of the state in the criminal enforcement process.
Stenning also argued that the Commission’s enforcement role led to human rights
complaints having both a public aspect, relating to upholding legal norms, and a private
aspect, relating to the resolution of the individual situation:

Every complaint which comes before a Board of Inquiry under the Code
is, to some extent, really two complaints, or at least one complaint with
two distinguishable aspects – a public allegation of deviance, and a private
dispute between the complainant and the respondent. This situation is one
which inevitably arises from the intervention of any third party (in this
case the Commission) in what was, ‘prior to such intervention’, a purely
private dispute between two parties.380
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By characterizing a human rights complaint’s public dimension as a “public allegation of
deviance”, Stenning appears to have defined the anti-discrimination legal norm as a
criminal legal norm. This characterization suggests that even though the Code’s
prohibition of discrimination was both civil and criminal, the criminal dimension
subordinated or even eliminated the civil aspect of the prohibition.
The other public dimension of the Code’s enforcement was the central role of the
OHRC at both conciliation and the board of inquiry hearing. This public dimension also
had a parallel with criminal law enforcement, in that the state was directly involved in the
enforcement process. Tarnopolsky emphasized this public dimension when he wrote that
community vindication was achieved through the fact that a public agency was
responsible for facilitating the provision of remedies for individual complainants:

The consolidation of human rights legislation into a code to be
administratively enforced by an independent commission insures
community vindication of the person discriminated against. This is
important to the community itself because of the broad educational value
of equal treatment. However, it is important to the people who have
suffered from discrimination, because without such active community
involvement, the mere proclamation of human rights tends to soothe the
conscience of the majority, without producing tangible changes.381

According to this view, even though conciliation was a private process which did not
result in a public judgment about the legal norm in question, it had a public dimension
because of the state’s direct involvement in facilitating this process.
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Part III: Board of Inquiry Decisions on “Self-Contained Dwelling Unit” and
Civil Remedies for Discrimination

By the time the complaint in Bell v McKay reached the Commission, three board
of inquiry decisions had addressed the question of whether a rental unit in a house was a
“self-contained dwelling unit” and thus covered by the Code. In all three decisions, the
boards of inquiry had no difficulty, or no significant difficulty, concluding that race was
the reason for the denial of accommodation. The significant issues were whether the
units in question were covered by the Code and, if so, what consequential
recommendations should be made to the Minister.

1 “Self-Contained Dwelling Unit”
In all three cases, the boards of inquiry concluded that the rental units were selfcontained and therefore covered by the Code and two of the decisions provided detailed
analyses for their conclusion on this issue.
The first case, Mitchell v. O’Brien, was decided by Dean Walter Tarnopolsky as
the board of inquiry.382 The complainant, Miss Mitchell, was a black woman. The rental
unit was located on the third-floor of a house in Ottawa, and consisted of one bedroom,
one kitchen, and a shared bathroom on the second floor. In addition to sharing a
bathroom, the unit shared a common entrance, common stairs and common hallways.
Miss Mitchell’s application for the tenancy was refused by the family living on the
second floor, who appears to have been acting as an agent for the landlord; Miss Mitchell
382
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had no interaction with the landlord and the complaint was brought against the landlord’s
“agents”.
The reasons for decision record that the board and the parties took a view of the
premises as part of the proceeding.383 In describing what he observed, Dean Tarnopolsky
noted that there were doors to the living room, dining room and kitchen on the groundfloor unit, although he did not say whether there were locks on these doors. The agents
lived in the second-floor unit. Dean Tarnopolsky noted that the third-floor rental unit
could be “lived in” without entering any of the agents’ second-floor “living quarters”.
For Dean Tarnopolsky, “living” meant preparing food, sleeping, and eating. Using a
common stairway and common bathroom were not part of living, in Dean Tarnopolsky’s
opinion, because:

Neither a hallway, nor a staircase, nor a bathroom can be described as
living quarters in the sense of either eating, sleeping, or sitting and
relaxing for the purposes of extended conversation or some form of
diversion like a radio or television.384

After reviewing the legislative history, Dean Tarnopolsky concluded that first the
inclusion and then the removal of the words “apartment” and “building” demonstrated a
legislative intention to “expand its application so that now the provision applies to any
building, including a private home.”385 On his reading of the legislative history, the
government would have expressly excluded “private homes” if it had not intended s. 3 of
the Code to apply to them.
383
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Dean Tarnopolsky then turned to interpret the key phrase - “self-contained” - to
determine which types of private home rental accommodation the legislature intended to
include and to exclude. He offered the following legal “test”, that in his view captured
the legislative intention about which type of rental unit was to be excluded from the
scope of the legislation: “accommodation consisting of a room or rooms wherein the
tenants live as part of the landlord’s family”.386 He then identified the following
concrete situations as possible examples of units where the tenant would be living “as
part of the landlord’s family”: where the tenant shared meals with the landlord; where
the tenant had access to the landlord’s living room; where the tenant had one or more
rooms “in the midst of rooms occupied by the landlord and his family.” On the other
hand, in Tarnopolsky’s view, sharing an entrance hall, stairway or bathroom did not
constitute living as part of the landlord’s family and, thus, did not remove a unit from the
category of self-contained. He noted that there were common hallways and stairways in
most apartment buildings, and that there were shared bathrooms in many older homes
converted into multiple dwelling units, as well as in some older apartment buildings.
Legal “tests” are typically statements that rationalize a conclusion about legal
liability and responsibility. Even where the test offers “factors” to consider, application
of the “test” and the “factors” always (or almost always) involves some discretionary
judgment on the part of the adjudicator. Those familiar with legal method and process
can easily speculate about how Dean Tarnopolsky could have reached the opposite
conclusion. On the question of the shared bathroom, Dean Tarnopolsky could have
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reasoned that use of a bathroom is very much a part of daily “living”; he might also have
added that a bathroom is a quintessentially private space which loses that character if it
has to be shared. On the question of common entrances, stairways and hallways, he
could have reasoned that a person’s living quarters include how they obtain access to
their living quarters. Dean Tarnopolsky may also have noted that this type of rental unit
required people to live in much closer proximity to one another than did rental units in
apartment buildings. Moreover, where a tenant lived in part of a house with no internal
locks on the doors that tenant could, in principle, enter any of the other living quarter
rooms in that building. Thus, Dean Tarnopolsky’s conclusion was as much a conclusion
about whether or not a landlord or their agent should be able to exclude a racialized or
religious minority tenant because they did not want to have to pass that tenant in the
hallways and did not want to have to share a bathroom with that tenant. If Dean
Tarnopolsky had believed that the landlord’s agents should not have had to pass a Black
tenant in the hallways and share the bathroom with a Black tenant, his reasoning and
conclusion would undoubtedly have been different.
In the second case, Laws and Mundeba v. Domokos, Prof. E.E. Palmer applied
Tarnopolsky’s analysis to a similar factual context, where the rental unit consisted of two
rooms on the third floor and a shared bathroom on the second floor.387 His decision is
more significant for how he addressed the remedies issue, which I discuss below.
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The third case, Duncan v. Szoldatits, was decided by Prof. Horace Krever as the
board of inquiry.388 The complainant, Miss Duncan, was denied rental accommodation in
a second-floor flat consisting of one bedroom, one kitchen and a shared bathroom. The
second-floor bathroom was shared by the second and third floor tenants. The landlord
and her family lived on the first floor. They had access to the second-floor bathroom as
well as to a bathroom in the basement. The tenants were permitted to use laundry
facilities in the basement, and they had to pass through at least one room occupied by the
landlord’s family in order to reach the laundry room. This case was decided several
months after the Mitchell v. O’Brien case. Prof. Krever referred to Tarnopolsky’s
decision with approval, but presented his own - albeit quite similar - analysis.
Similarly to Dean Tarnopolsky, Prof. Krever reviewed the legislative history and
concluded that it showed “an unmistakable pattern in the evolution of legislative intention
in human rights legislation”.389 Prof. Krever focused in particular on the removal of the
word “apartments” and the removal of any minimum number of units. He proposed that
the modifier “self-contained” be interpreted more in relation to the word “dwelling” than
in relation to the word “unit”, and articulated the following legal “test” for “selfcontained dwelling unit”: “whether the tenant will be intruding into the landlord’s routine
family life”. A dwelling unit was self-contained if the tenant could “live a complete and
normal life in the rented quarters”, “liv[ing] unto himself” and not becoming a “part of
the landlord’s household”.390 By contrast, a unit was not self-contained where the tenant
388
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“share[d] the landlord’s hearth”.391 Prof. Krever categorically rejected “the necessity of a
private and exclusive access to and from the quarters” for a unit to be self-contained,392
and similarly rejected the common entrance hall and shared bathroom as being
inconsistent with the dwelling being self-contained. Although at one point Prof. Krever
described the tenants’ access to the basement laundry room as requiring them to “invade
the privacy” of the landlord, he did not view the tenants’ access to the basement laundry
facilities as making “the tenant part of the landlord’s household.”393

2 Civil Remedies for Discrimination
The decisions also contain interesting analyses of the appropriate remedial
consequences for discrimination in this factual context. Both Dean Tarnopolsky and Prof.
Krever remarked that the question of remedial recommendations presented perhaps their
greatest challenge.
In Mitchell v. O’Brien, Dean Tarnopolsky wrote: “… I find it very difficult to
know what could be done in the circumstances to assuage the injury suffered by Miss
Mitchell.”394 He rejected prosecution as an option because it would not provide the
complainant with compensation: “The threat of prosecution may be a deterrent, but it is
[sic] ineffective salve to heal the wounds of one who has suffered discrimination.”395
Following the precedents for recommendations made in similar previous cases, he
recommended that the respondent be required to write two letters: a letter to the
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complainant apologizing for the discrimination and inviting her to assume the next
vacancy, and a letter to the OHRC undertaking to comply with the Code. However, he
noted that it was difficult for the OHRC to monitor this type of undertaking and, at the
suggestion of counsel for the OHRC, also made the following recommendations: that the
respondent be required to notify the YMCA/YWCA, the Jamaican Canadian Association
and the OHRC of future vacancies for at least one year; that the respondent be required to
invite the YMCA/YWCA and the Jamaican Canadian Association to refer prospective
tenants; and that the respondent be required to include the phrase “no colour or race bar”
in future advertisements of a rental vacancy. Finally, he recommended that prosecution
be considered in the future if the respondent refused to agree to these undertakings or if
there was evidence of discrimination in the future.
In Duncan v. Szoldatits, Prof. Krever wrote, “I confess that this had been the
hardest part of my task.”396 Similarly to Dean Tarnopolsky, he rejected prosecution as
“inadequate” for three reasons: prosecution provided “limited solace” to the complainant
for the “grievous insult suffered”; there was no “educational value” to payment of a fine;
and there would be problems of proof in a prosecution.397 He then went on to describe
how his thinking had shifted on the question of making recommendations for action
against a respondent who did not accept that their conduct was discriminatory. Prof.
Krever wrote that, prior to finalizing his decision in Duncan v. Szoldatits, he believed that
the types of recommendation the Commission proposed (and that Dean Tarnopolsky
accepted in Mitchell v. O’Brien) made sense only where the respondent accepted these
396
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recommendations voluntarily. According to this (former) view, it did not make sense to
recommend actions requiring compliance with the Code where a respondent “refused to
acknowledge that she had discriminated, or, if she had, claimed a right to do so.”398
Similarly, he believed that “it was difficult to justify a prosecution for failing to obey a
ministerial order” since that would require the respondent “in effect, to act
hypocritically.”399
What turned the tide for Krever were the opportunity for further reflection and his
review of the Report of Governor Rockefeller’s Committee to Review New York Laws and
Procedures in the Areas of Human Rights, dated March 27, 1968, which had been
submitted to him in another matter where he chaired the board of inquiry. He described
this report as emphasizing that “enforcement machinery” was “the greatest deficiency in
human rights legislation”, and he urged the OHRC to give “serious attention” to the
report.400 What he found most useful about the Report was its emphasis on providing
redress to the victim as the “paramount concern”: “It is not, at this late date, sufficient
merely to expose discrimination in the hope that such exposure will have an educational
effect in diminishing the incidence of discrimination in our society.”401 He further
explained that by the time he came to write the decision in the Duncan case, he had come

398

Duncan v. Szoldatits at 15.
Duncan v. Szoldatits at 15. An illustration of how Prof. Krever implemented his former view was
evident in the case of Walls v. Lougheed, unreported decision of a board of inquiry under the Human Rights
Code, SO 1961-62, c 93, dated August 21, 1968. After commenting on the ineffectiveness of both
prosecution and compliance orders, Krever recommended that the respondent be ordered to pay the
complainant $153 to compensate for the travel expenses he incurred when he was looking for rental
accommodation to relocate from Essex to Windsor.
400
Duncan v. Szoldatits at 15.
401
Duncan v. Szoldatits at 16.
399

173

to believe that the board of inquiry’s recommendation powers “permit[ted] more by way
of enforcement than I felt at the time of the hearing.”
In the result, Prof. Krever made the following recommendations: (1) that the
respondent be asked to write a letter of apology to the complainant; (2) that the
respondent be asked to write to organizations and social services agencies interested in
minority group rights to advise them that she no longer had a discriminatory rental
policy; (3) that the respondent be required to offer the complainant the next available
vacancy and, if the complainant was not able to take this vacancy, to provide the
complainant with financial and non-financial assistance in finding accommodation the
next time she was required to move; and (4) that the OHRC publicize the results of the
board of inquiry proceeding as widely as possible and, in particular, to include publicity
in German-language and Hungarian-language publications, since the respondent had
stated both that she did not accept racialized tenants and that she wanted to rent only to
tenants of Hungarian or German ethnic origin.402
Nevertheless, despite his change of heart about the scope of enforcement available
under the Code, Prof. Krever was not prepared to recommend that the requirement to
write letters (his first and second recommendations) be incorporated into a Ministerial
order if the respondent refused to comply with them. He remained of the view that this
type of recommendation made sense only with the respondent’s voluntary compliance.
In Laws and Mundeba v. Domoko, Prof. Palmer granted the Commission’s request
for recommendations that the respondent send letters of apology to the complainants and
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cooperate with the Commission in any future investigations or consultations. He also
granted the Commission’s request for a recommendation that the respondent offer the
first available vacancy to the complainants and inform the Commission when the vacancy
became available. However, he did not grant the Commission’s request for
recommendations that the respondent send letters to community agencies informing them
of future vacancies, or that the respondent be required to assist the complainants to find
alternative accommodation, or that the respondent be required to pay the complainants’
expenses in obtaining alternative accommodation.403
The Bell v. McKay complaint involved a similar rental unit to the ones involved in
the three board of inquiry decisions, and one of the issues in the litigation was whether or
not it was a “self-contained dwelling unit”. Therefore, these three board of inquiry
decisions were undoubtedly an important part of the context in which the Commission
responded to the human rights complaint in the Bell v. McKay case.

Part IV: The Bell v. McKay Litigation
The Bell v. McKay litigation evolved from a human rights complaint involving a
denial of accommodation in a rental unit located on the upper two stories of the
landlord’s home. The Code complaint did not settle and was referred to a board of
inquiry which convened in April 1969. The board of inquiry proceeding hearing was
aborted by a successful application to the High Court of Justice to prohibit the hearing on
the grounds that the Code did not apply to the rental unit. The High Court of Justice
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decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in November 1969, but then
restored by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1971.
The litigation focused on two central issues. The first issue was whether the Code
applied to the rental unit because it did not have a separate entrance. Underlying this
issue was the broader question of the extent to which the law should regulate landlords’
choice of tenants. The second issue was whether the landlord’s liability should be
decided, at least in the first instance, by the board of inquiry. Underlying this issue were
broader questions about the Code’s enforcement process, including the role of
prosecution. The High Court of Justice decision focused on the refusal to proceed by
way of prosecution and on the question of whether the unit was self-contained. The
Court of Appeal decision focused almost exclusively on the OHRC’s civil process,
including the board of inquiry’s role in determining whether the Code applied to Bell’s
rental unit. The Supreme Court of Canada decision placed most emphasis on the process
question but also effectively ruled on the meaning of “self-contained dwelling unit”.

1 OHRC Investigation and Conciliation
The landlord, Kenneth Bell, worked at the Christie bakery plant.404 In 1965, he
and his wife bought a three-storey house where they had been living on the ground floor
as tenants since 1957. Bell and his wife continued to live on the ground floor and rented
the upper two floors as a flat. The rental flat consisted of a kitchen, a bathroom, and one
bedroom on the second floor of the house, and a second bedroom on the third floor.
404
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Access to the rental unit was through the common, main door to the house and the ground
floor hallway to the staircase. The landlord’s three rooms on the ground floor opened to
this common hallway and were not kept locked. Since purchasing the house, Bell and his
wife had rented the flat three times, each time to a married couple. When the flat became
vacant in December 1968, Bell placed an advertisement in the Toronto Daily Star.
Carl McKay, a young Black man from Jamaica, responded to the advertisement
by telephone and was told the unit was available. When he appeared to see the unit the
following day, together with another young Black man, they were told the unit had been
rented. A woman named Nancy Sharp, described as McKay’s girlfriend, went to see the
unit later that same day and was told it was still available. McKay then filed a human
rights complaint, claiming that he was denied rental accommodation on the basis of race,
colour and national origin. Although Ms Sharp was not expressly described as white, it is
presumed that she was white given the prohibited grounds of discrimination alleged in
the complaint.
The record suggests that OHRC investigator Brett Mann met with McKay and
Bell the day after the complaint was submitted. In a letter to Bell following up on this
meeting, Mann wrote:

The Commission has conducted a thorough investigation into Mr.
McKay's complaint and has found sufficient evidence supporting Mr.
McKay's allegations of discrimination to warrant further involvement of
the Commission in this matter. The commission views this matter most
seriously and I would seek to meet with you at your earliest convenience
to discuss possible terms of settlement and conciliation.
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From that point forward, Bell was represented by legal counsel, William Cuttell. Cuttell
responded to Mann’s letter, advising that he would accept the invitation to participate in a
discussion but he first wanted to know what Mann meant by "terms of settlement and
conciliation", since he could not see “ … that Mr. Bell has any liability in the matter
which could be the subject of any settlement …”. Mann responded that the OHRC had
conducted an investigation and “…produced sufficient evidence to justify Mr. McKay's
complaint”. He stated that the OHRC routinely attempted to resolve complaints “in an
amicable manner” and considered more formal options “only as a last resort”. He further
advised that “typical terms of settlement” in a complaint like McKay’s would include a
written apology, an offer of the next available vacancy, and financial compensation for
expenses resulting from the denial of rental accommodation. Cuttell appears not to have
responded to this letter.
One month later the Assistant Director of the OHRC, Herbert Sohn, wrote to
Cuttell to advise him that the matter would be submitted to the next regular meeting of
the Commission if it was not resolved before then. Cuttell responded that he had
discussed the matter with Bell and investigated the premises himself, and had advised
Bell that he had not violated the Code and was not liable for any monetary payment. In
Cuttell’s view, the OHRC should proceed by way of prosecution if it wished to take the
matter further. OHRC investigator Mann subsequently advised Bell and Cuttell that the
OHRC had decided to request the appointment of a board of inquiry “to conduct a public
hearing”. Cuttell then wrote to the Minister of Labour, asking the Minister to refuse to
appoint a board of inquiry and to authorize a prosecution instead. He argued that a board
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of inquiry was not necessary because the OHRC had already conducted an investigation.
He also argued that it was improper for the OHRC to suggest that a breach of the statute
could “be cured” by payment of money, an apology or the promise of future
accommodation.
The Minister of Labour, Dalton Bales, responded to Cuttell’s letter. He began by
explaining that the Code was “… not punitively-oriented. It is basically educational and
conciliatory, using prosecution proceedings as a final resort.”405 He continued by saying
that the board of inquiry was designed to protect the respondent and ensure the
appropriateness of the commission’s investigation:

… a board of inquiry is another step in ensuring that the respondent is
safeguarded and that the allegations of discrimination and the
Commission’s investigatory procedures are carefully examined in a hard
case.406
Therefore, Bales was declining Cuttell’s request to proceed to prosecution and was
proceeding to appoint a board of inquiry. However, he invited Cuttell to put his request
for prosecution to the board of inquiry chairperson for consideration.
Mann subsequently informed Bell and Cuttell that Dean Walter Tarnopolsky had
been appointed as a board of inquiry and that the hearing had been scheduled. Cuttell
responded by putting on the record his position that the board of inquiry did not have
jurisdiction to proceed because the Code did not apply to Bell’s flat, because there was
nothing further to investigate, and because prosecution was the proper enforcement route.
405
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He further wrote that “… any further investigation of the matter is nothing more nor less
than persecution directed to achieving a settlement at the expense of my client, or
persecution which violates fundamental principles of justice.” It appears that neither Bell
nor Cuttell gave the OHRC any information about Bell’s position on the merits of the
complaint during the investigation.
What harm would there have been for Bell in meeting with the OHRC to discuss
the complaint? On the one hand, one can understand how Bell would have felt that a
judgment had already been made against him and that there was no purpose in meeting
with the OHRC if he wanted to dispute his liability. As the Ontario Court of Appeal
subsequently commented, the OHRC’s correspondence contained “unfortunate
expressions, as, for example, the declaration of guilt of Bell”.407 The wording of the
OHRC’s correspondence also raises questions about the extent to which the
Commission’s practices were consistent with its approval of Sid Blum’s view, discussed
above, that conciliation overtures would be undermined if a respondent believed that they
were required to admit to a discriminatory act.
On the other hand, though, what did Bell stand to lose by participating in a
conversation with the OHRC, especially if he were accompanied by legal counsel? It is
possible that he could have persuaded the OHRC that race was not a factor in his decision
not to rent the unit to McKay. It is possible that the OHRC might have agreed to a
minimalist settlement, for example, a simple apology to McKay for any
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misunderstanding. It is difficult to see how Bell would have been further behind if had
participated in a conciliation meeting. At worst, he would have been unable to persuade
the OHRC that there was nothing to resolve, and the OHRC would have been left to
decide whether or not to refer the complaint to a board of inquiry.
What Bell’s refusal to participate in conciliate illustrates, though, is that the OHRC
model depended on respondents’ compliance; and that resort to the “iron fist” was thus
controlled not only by the OHRC but also by respondents.

2 Board of Inquiry Proceeding: Dean Tarnopolsky
The board of inquiry hearing into McKay’s complaint proceeded as scheduled on
Monday April 21, 1969, chaired by Dean Tarnopolsky.408 According to Cuttell, by the
time the hearing commenced there were about 20-30 spectators and at the end of the
hearing three men identified themselves as newspaper reporters.409 Cuttell refused to
address the substance of the complaint at the board of inquiry hearing, because his
position was that the Code did not apply to a rental unit of the type in Bell’s house. His
further position was that Dean Tarnopolsky was required to decline to proceed with the
hearing because the board of inquiry did not have jurisdiction in the matter. As a remedy,
Cuttell requested that the board of inquiry disqualify itself and ask the Minister to refer
the case for prosecution.
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Cuttell advanced six arguments to support his motion. His first argument was that
Bell could not be guilty of an offence under the Code because the Code did not apply to
his rental unit. His second argument was that Bell’s denial of accommodation was not
based on race, religion or ethnic origin but for some other reason. He would not say what
this other reason was, reserving that information for the “proper time”, but maintained
that it was a ground on which Bell was entitled to act. His third argument was that the
board of inquiry was an improper process because the board only had power to
investigate and the OHRC had already completed an investigation into McKay’s
complaint.
Cuttell’s fourth argument was that the board of inquiry’s appointment was contrary
to the right to be presumed innocent under s. 2 of the Bill of Rights, because the
proceeding would definitely expose Bell to the “indignity of cross-examination” and
would probably expose him to the “impertinence of having his home invaded”.
According to Cuttell, Bell could do nothing to protect himself against this violation
because the board of inquiry did not have the power to convict or acquit him. Dean
Tarnopolsky interrupted this submission to confirm that Cuttell was not arguing that the
board of inquiry was a criminal proceeding. Cuttell agreed this was correct, which was
also consistent with his position that Bell’s conduct, if it was to be the subject of a legal
process, should be determined by a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding and not the
board of inquiry civil process.
Cuttell’s fifth argument was that it did not make sense to discuss possible
settlement when there had not yet been a finding of “guilt”. His sixth and last argument
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was that it would be improper to agree to a settlement, which was a possible outcome of
the board of inquiry proceeding, because a person cannot “buy their way out of
prosecution”. From the contemporary vantage point, it is difficult to know how Cuttell
understood the process and meaning of settlement. On the one hand, it is easy to
understand how and why people connect settlement with liability - why would someone
agree to a settlement requiring them to do something if they believed they had no legal
liability for doing anything wrong. On the other hand, and while that perception
undoubtedly remains, settlements can also be a more practical outcome for a respondent
than proceeding through formal litigation, even if there is a strong likelihood that the
litigation will be resolved in the respondent’s favour.410
Throughout the process, Cuttell appears to have been very anxious that he might
inadvertently say or do something that would trigger jurisdiction for the board of inquiry.
Even at the end of the hearing, after it was clear that Cuttell was likely going to bring a
prohibition application but before he provided the paperwork for this application, there
was an issue relating to formally identifying the complaint. Dean Tarnopolsky suggested
that Cuttell’s record for the prohibition application would benefit from having McKay’s
complaint formally identified. He offered to accept the complaint if Cuttell agreed to its
validity; alternatively, he proposed that McKay be called as a witness simply for purposes
of identifying the complaint. Cuttell appears to have felt that the chairperson was trying
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to trick him into doing something that he did not want to do and that might derail his
prohibition application:

MR. CUTTELL: All right, as long as I am not put in any position
as agreeing to anything that goes on with this Board, and then I am
content, as long as I am not asked to consent to anything before this
Board, I am content.
…
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, I am prepared to call [the complainant]
into the witness box, unless Mr. Cuttell waives doing so. …
MR. CUTTELL: As I understand, sir, you are asking me to do
something.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, no, I am just suggesting that if you don’t
waive proof of the complaint itself, then I will call the complainant to
swear him and - - MR. CUTTELL: All right, that is fair enough for him. I will waive.

Robin Scott, a lawyer with the Civil Division of the legal services branch of the
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, represented McKay and the OHRC. Scott did
not address Cuttell’s arguments one-by one, but took a more global approach. He argued
that many boards of inquiry had already been appointed and exercised jurisdiction to
inquire into complaints involving similar housing arrangements. He objected to what he
described as Cuttell’s analogy to criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, reflected in
Cuttell’s use of the term “guilty” to describe Bell’s potential civil liability under the
Code. Scott argued that board of inquiry proceedings were “administrative” in nature,
their function being to “investigate facts upon which administrative action may later be
taken by Commission or Minister”. In his view, the statutory language established the
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opportunity for the board of inquiry to receive evidence and submissions from both
parties, and its role was to attend to the rights of both complainant and respondent.
Dean Tarnopolsky rejected Cuttell’s arguments and proposed remedy. He
emphasized that the board of inquiry process and the prosecution process were separate
and independent options under the Code. He stated that the board of inquiry did not have
jurisdiction to recommend prosecution in the absence of hearing evidence and
submissions. He similarly declined to rule on Cuttell’s argument that the Code did not
apply to Bell’s rental unit since he had not been provided with any evidentiary basis on
which to decide this question. In relation to the board of inquiry’s appointment, he relied
on s. 13(1) of the Code which stated that once the Minister appointed a board of inquiry,
“”… it shall be presumed conclusively that the board was appointed in accordance with
this Act.”411 Finally, he was doubtful that the Bill of Rights could apply to a board of
inquiry proceeding, both because it was federal legislation and because the rights that
Cuttell sought to invoke appeared to apply only to criminal proceedings.
Dean Tarnopolsky also concluded that the board of inquiry hearing could proceed,
even in the absence of one of the parties, except in the face of a prohibition application in
the courts. Not surprisingly, Cuttell had come prepared with the documentation to
commence a prohibition application. Thus, the board of inquiry process was adjourned
sine die, pending the outcome of the prohibition application.
Although in my view Bell would not have exposed himself to any real harm by
participating in a conciliation meeting with the OHRC, the question of what harm Bell
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might have been exposed to had he not objected to the board of inquiry proceeding is
more complicated. In light of Dean Tarnopolsky’s decision in Mitchell v. O’Brien, it is
reasonable to assume that he would have found Bell’s rental unit to be self-contained and
thus subject to the Code. It also seems likely that Dean Tarnopolsky would have found
race to be a factor in Bell’s decision to refuse to consider McKay as a tenant. Dean
Tarnopolsky would then have had to decide which actions to recommend to the Minister.
It is possible that Dean Tarnopolsky would have accepted Bell’s request for prosecution
and recommended prosecution as a course of action. However, even if Dean
Tarnopolsky could have been persuaded to recommend prosecution, it seems very
unlikely that he would have recommended prosecution alone, given the priority he
attached to providing redress to complainants. It is much more likely that he would also
have recommended one or more actions to provide a remedy or remedies for McKay.
If the Minister had both made remedial orders and initiated prosecution, a further
decision would have had to be made about whether to prosecute Bell for contravening the
Code, or for failing to comply with a Ministerial order, or both. If the Minister
consented to prosecution for contravening the Code, it is reasonable to speculate that this
would have provided Bell with a fresh opportunity to establish his liability.412 This
would be consistent with Hill’s view that a board of inquiry proceeding and a prosecution
were completely separate proceedings, the implication being that it would have been
possible for a board of inquiry and a court to make different findings on the same
412
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evidence. As discussed earlier, in his academic writing Dean Tarnopolsky also accepted
the potential for separate board of inquiry and prosecution proceedings, but viewed this
as a disadvantage rather than an advantage. He was concerned that the Code’s dual civil
and criminal liability created the potential for conflicting liability decisions given the
different standards of proof that applied to civil and criminal proceedings.413 He was
particularly concerned about the consequences for the credibility of the Code’s
enforcement process if in the same case a board of inquiry found liability and a
prosecution in court did not: “If this were to happen, great discredit may result to the
administration of human rights provisions.”414
Thus, if Bell had been subjected to a prosecution for contravening the Code, he
may have escaped liability. However, based on the limited information available, it
appears that this outcome would have been less likely if Bell had been prosecuted for
contravening a Ministerial order than if he had been prosecuted for violating the Code
itself. The Code did not expressly recognize the possibility of challenging the validity of
a ministerial order in the context of a prosecution for failure to comply. Moreover, one
case precedent appears to have held that a minister’s order could not be challenged on
prosecution.415 Cuttell could have reasonably believed that he would not have been able
to challenge the validity of the order if Bell were prosecuted for contravening a
Ministerial order and, therefore, would have had reasonable basis for concern about
413
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potential jeopardy to his client by participating in a board of inquiry proceeding and then
proceeding to prosecution.

3 High Court of Justice Prohibition Application: Justice Stewart
Bell’s prohibition application was heard by Justice Stewart of the High Court of
Justice in May 1969. Co-counsel Nelles Starr and Cuttell represented Bell at the High
Court of Justice. Marshall Pollock, a lawyer with the Ontario Department of the
Attorney General, represented the Commission at the High Court of Justice.
In the context of the prohibition proceeding and subsequent appeals, Bell’s
position was that McKay and his friend looked like youths and students and he did not
wish to rent youths and students. He preferred “mature persons” or married couples as
tenants because his chattels were unprotected and his wife was alone in the house when
he worked the night shift. He acknowledged that he had been untruthful when he told
McKay the unit was rented, saying that “‘this is the simplest method and avoids
discussion and argument’”. According to Bell, the vacancy for which McKay applied
was ultimately filled by a “45-year-old Semitic Egyptian”.416
Justice Stewart’s decision reflected a deep concern with both the substantive
possibility that the Code could have applied to Bell’s rental unit and with the process
possibility that Bell could have been denied “the right” to have his liability determined by
a court in a quasi-criminal prosecution instead of by the board of inquiry. For Justice
Stewart, Bell had two rights at stake. One was the right to control access to his property;
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the other was the right to have this substantive property right determined by a court in a
quasi-criminal prosecution.
On the question of whether the Code applied to Bell’s rental unit, Justice
Stewart’s decision records that Pollock did not make submissions on this issue; Pollock’s
sole argument was that the court did not have jurisdiction to prohibit the board of inquiry
because the its function was administrative rather than judicial or, alternatively, that the
application was premature. Thus, it appears that Pollock did not provide Justice Stewart
with the OHRC perspective on why the rental unit was self-contained. Given the tone
and content of Justice Stewart’s comments on this issue, however, it seems unlikely that
he would have been persuaded by the views of board of inquiry chairpersons Dean
Tarnopolsky, Prof. Krever and Prof. Palmer. Justice Stewart undoubtedly believed that a
landlord in Bell’s situation should not be forced to rent to a racialized or religious
minority tenant:

It is equally as important that the rights of a middle-aged white Canadian
homeowner be protected as those of a young, black, Jamaican tenant.
Neither more important or less important. Equally. And perhaps it is time
that this was made clear.417

In his view, the Code was “never intended to limit an arbitrary choice of tenants in a
man’s house to whom he rents unseparated rooms.”418 A landlord renting a non-selfcontained dwelling unit should be able to “exercise an untrammeled and biassed choice
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of those who dined at his table, or slept under his roof.”419 The landlord would not be
able to “protect the property, his chattels or the person of his wife from ill-disposed
tenants” because the tenant would in principle have access to the landlord’s rooms.420
On the process question, Justice Stewart’s evident outrage over the Minister’s
refusal to grant Bell’s request for a court trial seems to have been driven by his
characterization of the Code as quasi-criminal legislation and by his antipathy toward
non-court adjudication. Justice Stewart repeatedly used criminal law language to
characterize the nature of the legal wrong and the Code’s civil process. He characterized
the complaint as a “charge”; he described the OHRC’s position as reflecting a decision
that “Mr. Bell was guilty of an offence against the Ontario Human Rights Code”; he
described a board of inquiry has having the power to “force a person accused of an
offence under the Code to give evidence against himself … without any real protection
from any Evidence Act ….”; and he described the board of inquiry’s potential
recommendation as including “what punishment should be inflicted”.421 This language
echoed Cuttell’s submissions to the board of inquiry and likely reflected the arguments
that Starr and Cuttell presented in court.
According to Justice Stewart, if discrimination was a quasi-criminal offence then
Bell was entitled to the legal process protections provided by prosecution in court: the
presumption of innocence until proven guilty, protection against self-incrimination, and
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. None of these protections was available
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in the board of inquiry proceeding, in Justice Stewart’s view. In a board of inquiry
proceeding, according to Justice Stewart: McKay would have been considered “more
equal” than Bell;422 Bell could have been forced to testify against himself; the tribunal
had the power to enter Bell’s home and to “interrogate people outside of any formal
hearing”; and the tribunal could make findings on the basis of any evidence it wished to
consider, whether or not such evidence would have been admissible in court.423 For
Stewart J., this board of inquiry process was a travesty of injustice:

I do not think any comment is necessary on the danger inherent in such
powers and that the finding of this board can be the basis of actions
deleterious to the person and property of the subject.424

Justice Stewart was also outraged by the fact that there were no statutory limitations on
the orders available to the Minister and, since he assumed – not unreasonably perhaps –
that there was no doubt as to how Bell’s liability would be determined, he was certain
that the Minister would have made orders against Bell:

If ever there has been absolute power given to one man it is here, and Lord
Acton has made further comment by me unnecessary. There is no
limitation in the nature or scope of the order, the amount to be made
payable, the extent of the incursion into the real property rights of the
citizen, or otherwise howsoever.425

Justice Stewart also invoked the then-recent report of the Honourable J.C.
McRuer, Commissioner of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights. This inquiry
422
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had been established by the government in response to growing resistance to
administrative law models and, in particular, opposition to proposed legislation that
would have increased the powers of the Ontario Police Commission in order to address
organized crime.426 The overall mandate of inquiry was to study the extent to which
Ontario laws resulted in unjustified encroachment on the personal freedoms, rights, and
liberties of the individual."427 The Report included both general discussion of broad
principles and specific discussions of particular agencies and tribunals. By the time of
the Bell v. McKay prohibition hearing, the first two volumes of the Report had been
published, and Volume Two included some preliminary, specific discussion of the
OHRC. Justice Stewart referenced the Report as providing support for his concern about
the Code’s very limited access to court proceedings. He described the Code as
“…generally so contrary to the principles set forth by the Honourable J.C. McRuer's
advice … that the policy of not granting access to the Court is understandable.”428
Justice Stewart was not wrong to highlight McRuer’s general support for
individual rights protected by the courts. However, McRuer’s preliminary assessment of
the OHRC process was generally positive and not opposed to the Code’s emphasis on
conciliation and voluntary persuasion. McRuer described the Code as “an outstanding
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piece of legislation” and wrote that the OHRC experience was “most useful and
instructive when considering what can be accomplished by educative and persuasive
processes without the imposition of sanctions.”429 McRuer acknowledged that he had yet
to provide a more complete assessment of the “adequacy of the safeguards for the rights
of the individuals”430 under the Code; this further assessment was published a few years
later in Volume Three of the Report and is discussed later in this chapter.
Finally, Justice Stewart described the Code’s prosecution option as a “legislative
beartrap” and, thus, not a viable legal process option or an “opportunity”, as described by
Hill.431 Justice Stewart focused on the potential prosecution for contravening a
Ministerial order. He described this option as a legislative beartrap because it was his
understanding that an individual who was prosecuted for contravening a Ministerial order
could not challenge the validity of the order as part of that prosecution – and this
understanding appears to have been correct, based on the limited information available.
Justice Stewart does not appear to have considered the prosecution option for
contravention of the Code, other perhaps than to suggest that this option was available
only with consent of the Minister, which was also correct. Justice Stewart’s overall
concern, then, was that the Code did not provide Bell with a right to have his liability
determined within the procedural framework of a quasi-criminal prosecution and did not
permit a court to review a board of inquiry’s findings, either directly or in the context of a
prosecution.
429
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Justice Stewart’s understanding of the Code processes was correct from a
technical and descriptive perspective. His analysis also reflected a judicial approach to
law and legal process, rejecting the alternative approach reflected in the Code
enforcement model. Justice Stewart did not accept the fundamental policy issues raised
by the Code enforcement model, and made no effort to understand or engage with
them.432

4 Court of Appeal for Ontario: Justice Laskin
In the appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Bell appears to have been
represented by Starr alone, whereas Pollock was joined by Senior Crown Counsel, Frank
Callaghan, in representing the OHRC. Bell’s arguments received a completely
opposition reception from the Court of Appeal than the reception they had received from
Justice Stewart. Although the Court of Appeal did not specifically address the merits of
the substantive issue, it did communicate an entirely different sensibility towards the
Code. In the decision authored by Justice Laskin, the Court acknowledged that the Code
had “drastically changed” the common law position of employers, owners of housing
accommodation and owners of places to which the public was customarily admitted, and
did not exhibit Justice Stewart’s concern about this fact.433 Moreover, in concurring
separate reasons (not included in the reported version of the decision), Justice Evans
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wrote that he was “unable to ascertain from the evidence” how Stewart J. reached his
conclusion that the premises were not self-contained.434
The Court of Appeal focused most of its attention, however, on the procedural
issue. According to Justice Laskin, the primary argument advanced on behalf of Bell was
that the Code’s civil enforcement process deprived Bell of his “rights at law” and was “so
offensive to democratic principle as to justify a Court to prohibit its invocation.”435
Justice Laskin described this argument as a “startling proposition”.436 Similarly, in
response to the argument that Bell had a right to be “confronted by his accusers in a
summary conviction Court” and should not be required to participate in the board of
inquiry process, Justice Laskin wrote: “This contention is unacceptable.”437 In Justice
Laskin’s view, it was an open question as to whether a board of inquiry finding or
ministerial order could be challenged in the context of a prosecution, and he left those
issues to be determined in a case that squarely raised them.438
The Court of Appeal’s decision clearly reflected a different perspective from
Justice Stewart’s on what constituted legitimate “substantive due process”:

[T]he Courts of this country have no mandate to enforce their own, let
alone Bell’s, notions of substantive due process to nullify legislation
which is competently enacted under the constitutional distribution of
legislative powers; at the most, they may, where the legislation is open to
such construction, enforce procedural due process in line with principles
worked out by common law techniques.439
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In this to and fro between the courts and the legislature, the Court of Appeal’s view was
that Bell could not claim “legal immunity from administrative procedures prescribed by a
competent Legislature for effectuating a policy which has been translated into substantive
statutory prescriptions.”440 However, it is arguable that deference to the legislature, as
such, was not the principal value underlying this endorsement of the Code and its
enforcement process. Given Justice Laskin’s mistrust of the courts’ ability to enforce
social legislation, it seems most likely that he did not find the board of inquiry process in
any way offensive, either in general on in relation to any common law prescriptions.
Justice Laskin would also have viewed the Code’s primary purpose as being civil and
remedial, rather than criminal (or even “quasi-criminal”) and punitive. Therefore, he
would not have been sympathetic to the argument that Bell’s interest in protecting
himself against liability for discrimination was a paramount legal process value.

5 Supreme Court of Canada: Justice Martland
The Supreme Court of Canada (“SCC”) overruled the Court of Appeal decision,
with Justice Abbott and Justice Hall dissenting, in separate reasons. The SCC majority
decision, written by Justice Martland, represented a return to a more narrow view of the
Code, somewhere between the approaches of Justice Stewart and the Court of Appeal.
The overwhelming theme of the decision was boundaries and respect for boundaries. The
majority described the Code as seeking “to prevent certain kinds of discrimination in
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respect of specified fields. It applies only to the fields thus defined.”441 The Court
repeated that the Code was “specifically limited by its terms to dealing with such
discrimination when it occurs in relation to defined fields of operation” and then listed
several fields to which the Code did not apply: free expression of opinions, employment
of domestic servants, and rental of non-self-contained dwelling units.442
The majority decision characterized the main issue in the case as whether the
Supreme Court of Ontario had the authority to prevent the board of inquiry from
proceeding where the complaint alleged discrimination in an area not covered by the
Code. However, by the time it came to this question, the majority decision had already
discussed the meaning of self-contained dwelling unit and expressed the opinion that
Bell’s rental unit was not self-contained.443 The majority based this opinion on their
analysis of the legislative history, concluding that because the Code had twice previously
used the language of “apartments” in apartment buildings, the government intended selfcontained dwelling units to be those “similar to an apartment in an apartment house”.444
Thus, the SCC reached the completely opposite conclusion on the significance of the
legislative history to the conclusion reached by the boards of inquiry when they examined
this same legislative history. Whereas the boards of inquiry saw the removal of the word
“apartment” as signaling an intention to broaden the scope of legislative protection, the
SCC attached no significance at all to the removal of the word “apartment” from the
legislation; for the SCC, the meaning of “apartment” was exactly the same as “self441
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contained dwelling unit”. Thus, the Court effectively based its interpretation of the
legislation on a version of the statutory language that was no longer in effect.445
On the process issue, the SCC majority held that both the board of inquiry and the
court on a prohibition application had the authority to decide the question of whether or
not the Code applied to Bell’s unit, and that it was up to Bell to decide whether he was
willing to go through the board of inquiry process or whether he preferred to have this
question determined first by a court.446 This view aligned well with the Court’s previous
conclusion that the Code did not apply to Bell’s unit and, thus, ex post facto legitimated
Bell’s course of action. The decision did not express any views about the nature of the
Code’s enforcement process, did not discuss the dual civil / quasi-criminal options, and
did not address Bell’s claimed right to have the matter decided by way of prosecution.
Justice Hall’s dissenting reasons adopted the Court of Appeal’s reasons.447
Justice Abbott framed his dissenting reasons with reference to upholding correct
boundaries for legislatures and courts. Legislatures had authority to define the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal; courts had responsibility to ensure that the
tribunal remained within its jurisdiction.448 However, it is not clear how he applied these
principles to Bell’s situation. He stated that the board of inquiry did not have adjudicative
authority, implying that the board was not subject to prohibition. He also wrote:
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Whatever view one may take of the desirability or efficacy of such an
inquiry or of the inconvenience it may cause to persons concerned, these
are questions which the Courts are not called upon to determine. The
language of s. 13 is plain and, in my opinion, effect must be given to it.449

In the end, it is not clear what remedy Justice Abbott believed would have been available
for Bell if he had participated in the board of inquiry process and faced ministerial orders
as a result of that process.
With the SCC decision, the litigation came full circle back to the result imposed
by Justice Stewart, for slightly less inflammatory reasons but mostly likely with a similar
ideological sub-text. However, the SCC did not have the last word on the subject.

PART V: After the Bell v. McKay Litigation
The Code’s protection against discrimination in rental housing and its
enforcement provisions were both amended following the SCC decision in Bell v.
McKay. As will be discussed, the legislature overturned the court’s interpretation of a
self-contained dwelling unit but maintained the Code’s enforcement model, making no
changes to the fundamental principles or structure of the process.
In a letter to Tory candidates in the 1971 provincial leadership contest, Alan
Borovoy, then General Counsel to the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, asked
candidates to express public support for a legislative amendment to override the SCC
decision and to express public support for the Commission and its work .450 He argued
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that the effect of the SCC decision was to deny the Code’s protection to low income
members of minority groups, since rooming houses and “flats” were typically less
expensive than rental units in apartment buildings. He also made the argument about the
public nature of the market, which was a consistent theme for fair practices and human
rights advocates:

Of course, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association is as concerned as
anyone to protect from legislative intrusion the right of privacy. But the
landlord who offers part of his property for rent on the public market, has
by that act willingly surrendered a portion of his privacy. … Surely, he
cannot have it both ways. He cannot simultaneously declare part of his
building available for rent on the public market and maintain that the same
part is subject to his right of privacy. In our respectful opinion, it is most
appropriate for the law to insist that once a portion of property is put on
the public market all dealings with respect to that portion of property must
be governed by public standards of fair play.451

The one possible exception Borovoy proposed was the situation where the tenant was
essentially a companion of the landlord, evidence of which would be that the tenant was
free to use most or all of the landlord’s space. On the question of the OHRC, Borovoy
praised the Commission for its work in the field of “race relations”, stating that the
Commission had achieved something that very few other government agencies had
achieved: “…an admirable balance between vigorous enforcement and restrained
fairness. It has effectively championed the interests of complainants and judiciously
safeguarded the rights of respondents.”452 He expressed concern that the work of the
Commission might suffer because “Judicial reversal can undermine communal respect.”
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The Code’s rental housing protection was amended in 1972, without opposition.
The amended provision eliminated the “self-contained dwelling unit” language and
replaced it with the phrase “housing accommodation”. The amended provision further
defined housing accommodation to mean “any place of dwelling” other than one in a
building where the owner or the owner’s family lived and the tenant shared a bathroom or
kitchen with the owner or the owner’s family.453 Bell’s rental unit would, in my view,
have been captured by this new language, since Bell’s tenant was not required to share a
kitchen or bathroom with him and his wife.
On the procedural side, the final volume of the report of the Royal Commission
Inquiry into Civil Rights was published in 1971. In this report, McRuer continued to
endorse the Code’s enforcement model. He emphasized that the purpose of the Code
“can best be accomplished by an investigatory procedure rather than by an adversary
one” and expressed continuing approval of the OHRC’s emphasis on conciliation:

In the administration of the Act the emphasis has been rightly placed
on education and conciliation. The area of human behaviour covered by
the Act is a field for law enforcement that has many social aspects making
it quite different from that covered by ordinary criminal law. Respect for
the dignity of the individual human being is something that cannot readily
be enforced by sanctions, although sanctions are necessary as a last resort
to enforce compliance and minimum standards.454
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In the passage above, McRuer appears to have characterized the Human Rights Code as a
form of criminal law, albeit a somewhat different form of criminal law. At a later point
in his commentary, however he wrote that the Code was more like “health legislation”:

This legislation is more like health legislation, than criminal legislation.
There are a great many health statutes and by-laws designed to maintain
health standards that are enforced by inspection, warning and agreement to
improve facilities, but these nevertheless make it an offence to fail to
maintain prescribed standards.455

Although this comparison appears to have been intended to shift the focus away from
criminal law and toward civil law, it made no reference to the remedial dimension of the
Code and identified criminal liability as the only potential form of liability. McRuer also
disagreed with Tarnopolsky’s view that the discrimination should not be an offence under
the Code, writing that it made the legislation “more meaningful to say in express terms
‘thou shalt not discriminate’ and to provide that if you do sanctions will flow.”456 At the
same time, however, McRuer recommended that failure to comply with a Minister’s
order not continue to be an offence; alternatively, if it did continue to be an offence, he
recommended that the order should subject to challenge in the context of a prosecution
for failure to comply with it.457
This continuing link with criminal law was also reflected in McRuer’s
recommendations for changes to the adjudication component of enforcement. He
described the respondent in a case where conciliation failed as a “person accused of
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wrongdoing” and recommended that persons in this situation “should have a clear right of
resort to the ordinary courts where the issue of his guilt may be decided rather than his
guilt being determined on the mere order of the Minister.”458 McRuer was not
recommending that the board of inquiry process be eliminated; he was instead
recommending that a Minister’s order be enforceable in civil court and that the person
against whom the order was made – described as the “alleged offender” – be able to
challenge the basis for the order.459
McRuer acknowledged that concerns about the Code’s enforcement process had
been raised in the Bell v. McKay litigation, but he did not recommend any changes of the
kind that Bell’s counsel and Justice Stewart clearly preferred. In his view, the
conciliation procedure was “well designed to safeguard civil rights and to protect
individuals from unnecessary prosecution.”460 McRuer did appear to agree that there
were some concerns relating to the board of inquiry process, but he did not recommend
any changes to that process itself. Instead, he appeared to be of the view that the
concerns would be addressed by ensuring that the respondent could challenge the basis
for Ministerial orders either in a civil proceeding to enforce the order or in a prosecution
for failure to comply with the order.461 Moreover, he responded to Bell’s counsels’ and
Justice Stewart’s concerns about the potential for self-incrimination by expressing the
opinion that a respondent who was “sufficiently advised” could take advantage of the
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Evidence Act.462 Indeed, McRuer’s only recommendations for the board of inquiry
process were recommendations to give the Commission even more power in that process
in the following ways: by giving the Commission power to consider the board of inquiry
report; by making it a condition precedent that the Commission consider the board of
inquiry report before it was recommended to the Minister; and by giving the Commission
power to change or rescind board of inquiry recommendations.
When the Civil Rights Law Amendment Act was passed in 1971 to implement
McRuer’s recommendations, it included amendments to the Code.463 Some, but not all,
of McRuer’s recommendations for the human rights enforcement were implemented;
indeed, the main components of the Code’s enforcement process emerged intact. The
amendments:
• expanded the Commission’s investigatory powers [s.12(4)];
• identified the Commission, the complainant, and the respondent(s) as parties to
a board of inquiry proceeding and specifically gave the Commission carriage of
the complaint [s. 13b(1)];
• made clear that a member appointed to a board of inquiry could not have
participated in the prior Commission investigation [s. 13b(3)];
• provided for the recording of oral evidence presented to a board of inquiry
[s.13b(4)];
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• required a board of inquiry’s findings of fact to be based exclusively on
evidence in accordance with the newly-minted Statutory Powers Procedure
Act, 1971 [s. 13b(5)];
• gave the board of inquiry exclusive jurisdiction to determine any question of
fact, law, or both, required to reach a decision about whether the Code was
contravened [s. 13b(6)];
• gave the board the authority to decide whether or not a party contravened the
Code and the authority to make orders required to constitute full compliance
with the Code, to rectify injuries caused, and to provide compensation for
injuries [s. 13c(a)(b)]; and
• provided a right of appeal from a board of inquiry decision to the Supreme
Court of Ontario on questions of law, fact, or both [s.13d(1)(4)].
These amendments not only maintained the Code’s enforcement model but also arguably
strengthened the board of inquiry process to which Cuttell, Starr and Justice Stewart had
been so opposed and to which the Supreme Court of Canada declined to give preference.
However, although the Code’s enforcement process remained formally intact, this model
had already raised a number of questions about the role of anti-discrimination legislation
in governing social relations and the meaning of legal responsibility in relation to antidiscrimination legislation.
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Conclusion to Chapter Two
When law becomes involved in governing social relations, there will be many
opportunities for decisions to be made, and for questions about who should be given the
power and control to make these various decisions. Ian Hunter’s 1972 commentary on
the SCC’s decision described it as a “pernicious” result rooted in “muddled logic”, and as
a hypocritical, “shortsighted essentially ethnocentric result”.464 He wrote that the
decision led to the Code’s protections being “effective for those who need them least”,
because the type of rental housing provided by Bell and other landlords was the “lowest
cost urban housing” most needed by members of minority groups who were often
immigrants and poor.465 Hunter repeated this view in an article published in 1979, albeit
in a somewhat more muted tone, writing that the result of the decision was “anomalous”
for the same reason: that the Code would not apply to lower cost urban housing, which
was “economic necessity” for racialized minorities.466 By contrast, in the same article,
Hunter castigated the 1974 British Columbia board of inquiry decision in the Gay
Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun case.467 The complaint in that case was
against a newspaper that refused to publish an advertisement for a gay rights magazine.
The newspaper’s argument was that the advertisement would offend many readers. The
board of inquiry rejected this argument as “ludicrous”. Prof. Hunter described the board
464
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of inquiry’s conclusion “one of those arrogant, self-righteous assertions that increasingly
characterize decisions of human rights inquiries and that must give pause to even the
most ardent supporter of the legislation.”468
Why did Hunter see the social issue of minority group access to low-cost rental
housing as an issue of concern, but not the issue of a newspaper refusing to publish an
advertisement for a gay rights magazine? Perhaps he had more sympathy for newspapers
than for landlords? Perhaps he believed that access to housing was a more serious social
issue than access to newspaper advertising? In fairness, part of Hunter’s rationale was
that the existing BC human rights legislation did not expressly protect sexual orientation
as a prohibited ground of discrimination. However, the Supreme Court of Canada
responded similarly in Bell v. McKay, in finding that the Ontario Code did not apply to
non-self-contained dwelling units, and that Bell’s rental unit was not self-contained. In
the same way that Hunter had different views about how human rights legislation should
apply to two different social issues – low-cost rental housing for racialized minorities, on
the one hand, and social inclusion of gays, on the other hand - the Ontario High Court of
Justice, Court of Appeal for Ontario and Supreme Court of Canada in Bell v. McKay had
different views about how human rights legislation should apply to the social issue of
access to rental housing.
The Bell v. McKay litigation also raised other issues about decision-making
authority involved in legal regulation of social relations: issues about the respective
authority of legislatures and adjudicative bodies to decide how to approach the
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substantive and procedural regulation of social issues; and issues about the respective
authority of administrative agencies and citizens to decide questions about access to the
processes where legal responsibility and consequences are at stake. In his commentary on
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bell v. McKay, Peter Hogg focused on the
question of who had the authority to decide whether Bell’s rental unit was self-contained
- should this authority have rested with the board of inquiry or with the courts.469
On the question of the dual civil and quasi-criminal dimensions of the Code, the
Bell v. McKay litigation mirrored on-going issues about the nature of human rights legal
norms and the legal processes for enforcing these norms. Discrimination was constituted
by statute to be simultaneously a civil wrong and an offence, and the Code created both
civil liability and quasi-criminal liability for discrimination. The civil wrong was
enforced primarily through the conciliation-board of inquiry process, with a clear
emphasis on providing remedies for the complainant through a process that was private
and, preferably, voluntary. The offences were enforced (to the limited extent that they
were used) through prosecution in court. On the one hand, the clear intention was that
the focus of the Code and its enforcement would be civil and remedial rather than
criminal and punitive. On the other hand, the language of criminal law continued to be
pervasive. This criminal law language was not only used by Bell’s counsel, Justice
Stewart and the McRuer Report, but also by those who advocated for a remedial and nonpunitive approach: Dan Hill described the written human rights complaint as “a statement
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of charges” and the respondent to a complaint as “the accused”;470 Sid Blum used the
word “guilt” to describe legal responsibility for discrimination;471 board of inquiry
chairpersons described the complaint as “charges”,472 discriminatory conduct as an
“offence”, 473 and respondents as “offenders”474 and as “found guilty of discriminatory
practices”;475 and even Justice Laskin, in the Court of Appeal decision in Bell v. McKay,
referred to the OHRC’s letter as containing “the declaration of guilt of Bell”.476
Tarnopolsky alone seems to have refrained from this use of criminal law language,
although he too drew a comparison between human rights law and criminal law on the
question of the using law to address morality:

Opponents of human rights legislation have often argued that the law
cannot legislate morality. However, this overlooks the fact that our
Criminal Code is based to a large extent upon a commonly accepted moral
code.477

It could be said that this continuing use of criminal law language was simply a semantic
legacy of the original quasi-criminal law roots of anti-discrimination. However, I believe
it is more than this. I believe this language reflected on-going tension between the dual
civil and criminal perspectives on human rights legal norms, with the civil perspective
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focusing more on their remedial goals and the criminal perspective focusing more on
their role in defining public norms for social conduct.
Finally, the Code’s public goal of norm enforcement and private goal of resolving
individual claims had the potential to be into conflict with one another. A remedial
outcome that was considered appropriate from the perspective of private dispute
resolution, because it satisfied the parties, might not be considered appropriate from the
perspective of public goals if, for example, it did not include public recognition of legal
responsibility, and vice versa.478 As discussed above, under Dan Hill’s leadership the
OHRC’s perspective on the implementation of its public role within the Code’s
enforcement model gave priority to the more private purpose of complaint resolution.
Since we do not know anything about the content of these settlements, we do not know to
what extent they sought to balance the Code’s competing public and private purposes.
For those cases that proceeded to a board of inquiry hearing, board chairpersons
were faced with having to determine how to balance the Code’s competing public and
private purposes. Stenning reported that some chairpersons, such as Tarnopolsky,
resolved the conflict by defining the separate purposes in relation to one another, that is,
by “… defining the compliance enforcement purpose primarily in terms of the
achievement of a settlement between the parties”479. Other chairpersons believed that the
conflict was irreconcilable because it reflected competing policy “paradoxes” which by
definition called for contradictory processes and resolutions:

478
479

Stenning, Conciliation to Judgement at 135.
Stenning, Conciliation to Judgement at 140.
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… the Act embodies a series of policy paradoxes. On the one hand, public
respect for the policies embodied in the statute is enhanced by publicity,
yet at the same time the opportunity to preserve confidentiality and
anonymity, and to avoid stigma, is an inducement to a respondent to agree
to a settlement. Second, because there is an individual complainant on
whose behalf the proceedings are instituted, a premium is properly placed
upon obtaining effective relief for him. Moreover, the hazards of litigation
generate pressures for both sides to compromise their differences with the
result that the complainant may forego some degree of vindication. Yet to
the extent that the complainant abandons his claim, the Commission's
objectives remain unfulfilled. To this extent, pursuing the private interests
of the complainant may be inimical to the full achievement of public
purposes.480

This passage captures what I would suggest are better described as tensions, than as
paradoxes.481 I would also suggest that these tensions were not, and are not, unique to the
Code but are shared by most, if not all, legal norms and their enforcement. It may be the
case that some legal norms and related enforcement processes are considered to be more
“public” than others; for example, criminal and quasi-criminal legal norms and processes
are often held out as paradigmatic of public law.482 However, all legal norms have a
public dimension, since they all seek in some way to govern social relations by
establishing public expectations and requirements.
This tension between public and private goals and processes was a key issue in
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Ruest v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Report of a Board of Inquiry (Professor H. W.
Arthurs) under the Ontario Human Rights Code, dated April 9th, 1968 at 24, quoted in Stenning,
Conciliation to Judgement at 142.
481
I prefer to characterize these competing values and goals as tensions rather than paradoxes because the
concept of tensions is more dynamic and more suggestive of the processes by which law in action engages
with these competing goals and values. The concept of paradoxes is more static and suggests that it is
possible, or should be possible, to create legal processes that do not have to contend with paradoxical
challenges. My work assumes that conflict over issues of social inequality is on-going, and that law is one
tool with which people engage with conflicts over social inequalities. I recognize that other ideological
perspectives may hold the view that it is possible to create societies without conflict, but I do not share this
view.
482
Stenning, Conciliation to Judgement at 127-134.
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the developments that ultimately led to the dismantling of the OHRC enforcement model
in Ontario, the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter Three
Statutory Human Rights and Access to Justice:
From “Gatekeeper” to “Direct Access”, 1972-2012

Introduction to Chapter Three

To purport to give someone a ‘right’, and then insist that he may only dispose of
that right in ways which are consistent with a government agency’s perception of
the dictates of social policy, however, is inherently problematic.483
I feel I should also return for a moment to the matter of litigiousness. It has been
argued that not enough human rights cases go before a tribunal. But there are other
observers who find the system too litigious, in other words that too many cases
wend their way through tribunals and the courts, with the additional delays and
potential harm to both complainant and respondent that they may involve. The
question who is right will not be settled here today. My only plea is that we not
simply assume that the gate keeping functions of commissions that intervene before
complaints reach a tribunal are necessarily all bad.484 [emphasis in original]

The decades following the Bell v. McKay litigation saw three significant
developments in the Canadian statutory human rights regimes. The first two
developments expanded the scope of the legislation to respond to more social conditions.
The third development, in some provinces, was to change the processes for enforcing
statutory human rights. Developments relating to the enforcement process were
provoked by questions about which legal process best provides “access to justice” for

483

Philip Stenning, From Conciliation to Judgement: The Role of Boards of Inquiry under the Ontario
Human Rights Code, 1962-1974 (LL.M. Thesis, York University, 1977) at 149 [Stenning, Conciliation to
Judgement].
484
Max Yalden, “Looking Back – Looking Forward” in Le Tribunal des droits de la personne et le Barreau
du Québec. L’accès direct à un tribunal spécialisé en matière de droit à l’égalité: l’urgence d’agir au
Québec? / Access to a Specialized Human Rights Tribunal: an Urgent Need to Act in Quebec?
(Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008) 55 at 79.
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statutory human rights claims.485 Should a government agency be responsible for
resolving claims submitted by individuals and groups? Or should claimants be able to
bring their claims directly to a tribunal, with government support provided by funding the
tribunal and funding legal services for claimants? These were the principle questions that
dominated discussions that began in the late 1980s about the role of statutory human
rights as a tool in struggles against social inequalities. On their face, these questions
focused primarily, if not exclusively, on the enforcement of human rights statutes, and
engaged little with the promise of human rights statutes. However, this development
raised questions not simply about the practice of human rights law, but also about how
this practice relates to and interacts with the promise of human rights law.
As we saw in Chapter Two, the human rights commission model of claims
resolution that evolved from the similar state agency fair practices enforcement model,
embodied several tensions that reflected competing goals and values:
• tension between “public” goals and interests and “private” goals and interests;
• tension between “voluntary” legal processes and more “coercive” legal processes;
• tension between “social” goals and values and “legal” goals and values; and

485

As we know from Chapter Two, in the context of human rights commission enforcement models, a
human rights claim is called a “complaint” and a person who brings a human rights claim is called a
“complainant”. I prefer to use the terms “claim” and “claimant”, rather than “complaint” and
“complainant”, even though they are not technically accurate in relation to commission enforcement
models. In my view, the “complaint”/“complainant” terminology labels a claimant as a “whiner” and a
“victim”. The “complaint”/“complainant” terminology also ignores, or at least de-emphasizes, the
relational dimension of legal claims. The “complaint”/“complainant” terminology no longer applies in
jurisdictions which have moved away from commission enforcement models.
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•

tension between the commission’s claims-resolution function and its other
“enforcement” responsibilities.486

In Ontario, questions about which legal process best provides “access to justice” for
statutory human rights claims led to the adoption in 2006 of a new model of claims
resolution, which its proponents call a “direct access”487 enforcement model, and the
corresponding elimination of the OHRC’s responsibility for claims resolution. Central to
the “direct access” model is the replacement of the human rights commission’s claims
resolution role with a process in which persons bring statutory human rights claims
directly to an adjudicative tribunal.
The case for “direct access” in Ontario evolved in a context of wide-ranging
critiques of how human rights commissions carried out their claims resolution role.
Proponents of “direct access” relied on these criticisms to support their arguments for
moving to a “direct access” model. However, the case for “direct access” went beyond
criticisms of how the commission-based model was implemented; it challenged the
fundamental structure of a model in which a claim is adjudicated only at the behest of a
third-party agency. Many human rights activists had lobbied for moving to a “direct
access” model and supported the draft legislation when it was introduced, but others were
strongly opposed to moving to this model. Thus, the Ontario government’s introduction
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I describe the human rights commission claims resolution process in the past tense because it no longer
exists in Ontario (or in British Columbia). However, many of the observations about the human rights
claims resolution process apply not only to its operation in Ontario but to is operation in jurisdictions across
Canada. Therefore, these observations would continue to apply in jurisdictions which continue to maintain
the human rights commission complaints resolution model.
487
“Direct access” is a contested descriptor and goal. Opponents of the “direct access” model do not accept
that it provides direct access to adjudication. As we will see later in the chapter, they argue that this model
simply replaces the commission as gatekeeper with new gatekeepers to the tribunal.
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of Bill 107, the draft legislation to implement a “direct access” model, led to a fierce and
often acrimonious debate within the human rights advocacy community over whether this
proposal, if implemented, would enhance or diminish access to justice for statutory
human rights claims (“Bill 107 debates”).
This chapter examines the Ontario move to “direct access” through the lens of
four tensions identified above, as well as the tension under the new model between the
role of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“HRTO”) and the role of other
adjudicative tribunals in addressing claims of discrimination. The chapter is divided into
three parts. In Part I, I analyze the contextual background for the move to “direct access”
in Ontario. In Part II, I analyze Ontario’s move to a “direct access” model in 2006. In Part
III, I examine themes that have emerged in the first years of Ontario’s experience with
the “direct access” model. Ontario’s move to a “direct access” model provides
opportunities to reflect on different approaches to the role of legal process in struggles
against social inequalities. It also provides opportunities to reflect on the tension between
the substantive goals of social struggles and the formal goals of legal process that may
result from engaging with law in struggles against social inequalities.
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Part I: Contextual Background to Ontario’s Move to “Direct Access”
The statutory human rights landscape evolved considerably in the period between
the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bell v. McKay in 1971 and Ontario’s move to
“direct access” in 2006. In this part of the chapter, I examine themes in three areas that
had particular implications for the move to “direct access” and that played a role in the
Ontario debates on this question. These three areas are: (1) developments in the
substantive scope of the Code’s protection, (2) developments in the practice of engaging
with the Code in formal legal processes outside the OHRC claims resolution process, and
(3) critiques of the commission-based claims resolution model.

1

Expanding the Substantive Scope of Statutory Human Rights
The scope of Ontario’s statutory human rights protection expanded in two

significant ways in the post-Bell v. McKay period – through the addition of prohibited
grounds of discrimination to the Code, and through the recognition of adverse effect and
systemic discrimination in addition to direct discrimination.488 The addition of prohibited
grounds of discrimination to the Code began with age, sex and marital status in 1972,489
followed by disability and family status in 1981,490 sexual orientation in 1986,491 and

488

There were similar expansions in the substance of statutory human rights in all Canadian jurisdictions.
The Ontario Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 1972, SO 1972, c. 119. This amending statute
repealed The Age Discrimination Act, SO 1966, c 3, which was passed in 1966 to prohibit discrimination in
employment on the basis of age, where age was defined to mean between 40 and 65 years of age, and The
Women’s Equal Opportunity Act, RSO 1970, c 501 passed in 1970, to prohibit discrimination in
employment on the basis of sex and marital status.
490
Ontario’s Code was re-enacted in 1981 as the Human Rights Code, 1981, SO 1981, c 53, which was
then incorporated in the 1990 statutory revision as the Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19 [Code
(1990)]. When the Code was re-enacted in 1981, the substantive statutory provisions were re-framed as
rights “to equal treatment without discrimination” in the following social areas: s. 1 (goods, services,
489
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most recently gender expression and gender identity in 2012.492 Incorporating more
prohibited grounds of discrimination expanded the range of social conduct and practices
that could potentially be challenged under the Code, and expanded the range of social
groups with a direct stake in the potential of the Code to address social inequalities.493
Expansion of the legal understanding of discrimination to include not only “direct
discrimination” but also “adverse effect discrimination” and “systemic discrimination”
began in 1985 with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Ont. Human Rights Comm.
v. Simpsons-Sears.494 The historical record suggests that the limits of the legal concept
of direct discrimination were understood from the beginning. The stated intention of
expanding the legal concept of discrimination was to extend the anti-discrimination legal
norm to include other social conduct and practices. As we will see, there are challenges
with proving all forms of discrimination.

facilities), s. 2, 4 (accommodation), s. 3 (contract), s. 5 (employment), s. 6 (trade union, occupational
association, self-governing profession).
491
Equality Rights Statute Law Amendment Act, 1986, SO 1986, c 64, s. 18.
492
Toby’s Act (Right to be Free from Discrimination and Harassment because of Gender Expression or
Gender Identity, 2012, SO 2012, c 7, s. 1.
493
In recent years, there has also been much debate about whether poverty should be recognized as a
prohibited ground of discrimination in human rights legislation. In these debates, this proposed new
category is often called “social condition”. In Promoting Equality, the CHRA Review Panel recommended
that social condition be added as a ground of discrimination to the Canadian Human Rights Act: Canadian
Human Rights Act Review Panel, Promoting Equality: A New Vision (Ottawa, 2000) at 106-113 [CHRA
Review Panel, Promoting Equality]. A consultation report on economic and social rights prepared by the
OHRC canvasses differing views about the potential effectiveness of adding social condition as a ground of
discrimination – see Ontario Human Rights Commission, Human Rights Commissions and Economic and
Social Rights, http://www.ohrc.on.ca/english/consultations/economic-social-rights-paper.shtml. The
Quebec Charte des droits et libertés de la personne, CLQR, c C-12 includes provisions dealing with
“economic and social” rights. However, Colleen Sheppard argues that social condition will have limited
effect as a prohibited ground of discrimination unless it is interpreted to recognize the material
disadvantage that flows from being a social assistance recipient. See Colleen N. Sheppard, “The Promise
and Practice of Protecting Human Rights: Reflections on the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms” in Nicholas Kasirer and Roderick Macdonald, eds. Mélanges Paul-André Crépeau,
(Cowansville, Québec : Éditions Yvon Blais, 1997) at 106-113 [Sheppard, “Promise and Practice”].
494
[1985] 2 SCR 536 [Simpsons Sears].
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Direct Discrimination and Legal Responsibility
As we know from the preceding chapters, conduct and practices may be judged
discriminatory under Canadian human rights law when there is a link between the
conduct or practice and one or more prohibited grounds of discrimination. Legal
responsibility for direct discrimination is predicated on a respondent’s intention to engage
in conduct or practices that are directly or expressly linked to one or more prohibited
grounds of discrimination. In disputes over legal responsibility for direct discrimination,
it is not necessary to prove that a respondent intended to cause harm, but only that the
respondent intended the conduct which the legal prohibition deemed to be harmful. It is
also not necessary for a claimant to prove that a prohibited ground of discrimination was
the sole reason for the conduct or practice, as long as it was a factor in how the claimant
was treated.
Where there is no expressly demonstrable connection, and a respondent refuses to
acknowledge a connection, an adjudicator may sometimes be persuaded to infer an
intended connection. In some situations, the adjudicator may reject a respondent’s denial
that their conduct or practice was linked to one or more prohibited grounds of
discrimination. In other situations, an adjudicator may conclude that the respondent
made an “unconscious” link between their conduct or practice and one or more prohibited
grounds of discrimination.495 Despite all these refinements, however, there is a long-

495

See, for example, Shaw v. Phipps, 2010 ONSC 3884, upholding Phipps v. Toronto Police Services
Board, 2009 HRTO 877 (liability decision) and Phipps v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2009 HRTO
1604 (remedy decision). “Unconscious discrimination” is analyzed as a form of direct discrimination by
arguing that people are responsible for both their conscious and their unconscious biases. In relation to
their unconscious biases, they have a responsibility to make themselves aware of unconscious biases and
find strategies to eliminate the impact of these biases. See, for example: Charles R. Lawrence III, “The Id,
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standing recognition that in the absence of direct evidence of the respondent’s intention,
it is generally difficult to persuade an adjudicator that one or more prohibited grounds of
discrimination was in some way a factor in the respondent’s conscious or unconscious
mind.

Adverse Effect Discrimination and Legal Responsibility
With adverse effect discrimination, the analytical underpinning of legal
responsibility purports to shift away from the respondent’s intention and towards the
impact of the conduct or practice on the claimant. There are two key aspects to this
analytical framework. The first aspect is that the conduct or practice alleged to be
discriminatory is “neutral” on its face, because there is no direct or explicit connection
with prohibited grounds of discrimination. The second aspect is that it is not necessary
for the respondent to have intended the conduct or practice to have a disadvantageous
impact linked with prohibited grounds of discrimination. Béatrice Vizkelety described
direct discrimination as requiring a “causal connection” between the conduct or practice
and prohibited grounds of discrimination, and adverse effect discrimination as removing
this causal connection.496 In Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. Simpsons-Sears, Justice

the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism” (1987), 39 Stan L Rev 317; Charles
R. Lawrence III, “Unconscious Racism Revisited: Reflections on the Impact and Origins of ‘The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection’” (2008), 40 Conn. L Rev 931. See also Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and
Slow (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2011).
496
“Discrimination, the Right to Seek Redress and the Common Law: A Century-Old Debate” in Justice
Walter S. Tarnopolsky, Joyce Whitman, Monique Ouellette, eds., Discrimination in the Law and the
Administration of Justice / La Discrimination dans le Droit et l’Administration de la Justice (Montreal:
Éditions Thémis, 1993) 555 at 567-568 [Vizkelety, “Discrimination, the Right to Seek Redress”].
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McIntyre wrote that impact on the claimant should be the central concern in assessing
responsibility for discrimination:

The Code aims at the removal of discrimination. This is to state the
obvious. Its main approach, however, is not to punish the discriminator,
but rather to provide relief for the victims of discrimination. It is the result
or the effect of the action complained of which is significant. If it does, in
fact, cause discrimination; if its effect is to impose on one person or group
of persons obligations, penalties, or restrictive conditions not imposed on
other members of the community, it is discriminatory.497

However, legal responsibility for adverse effect discrimination still requires a link
between the challenged conduct or practice and one or more prohibited grounds of
discrimination. If the respondent’s intention to make this link is no longer required, the
link has to be established in some other way.
In the absence of express or deemed intention by the respondent to link their
conduct or practice with prohibited grounds of discrimination, it may be possible to
establish this link if the facts support a conclusion that the respondent intended the link
but found a way to hide their intention behind what appears on the surface to be “neutral”
conduct or practice. Bill Black has suggested that the concept of adverse effect
discrimination was in fact initially developed to circumvent this type of situation: “… the
Courts seem originally to have developed their approach to systemic discrimination as
much to avoid problems of proof of intent as to cover effects that are truly unintended . .

497

Simpsons-Sears at para. 12.
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.”.498 The Supreme Court of Canada made a similar observation in Ont. Human Rights
Comm. v. Simpson Sears:

The idea of treating as discriminatory regulations and rules not
discriminatory on their face but which have a discriminatory effect,
sometimes termed adverse effect discrimination, is of American origin and
is usually said to have been introduced in the Duke Power case, supra, in
the Supreme Court of the United States. In that case the employer required
as a condition of employment or advancement in employment the
production of a high school diploma or the passing of an intelligence test.
The requirement applied equally to all employees but had the effect of
excluding from employment a much higher proportion of black applicants
than white. It was found that the requirements were not related to
performance on the job, and the Supreme Court of the United States held
them to be discriminatory because of their disproportionate effect upon the
black population….
...
To take the narrower view and hold that intent is a required element of
discrimination under the Code would seem to me to place a virtually
insuperable barrier in the way of a complainant seeking a remedy. It
would be extremely difficult in most circumstances to prove motive, and
motive would be easy to cloak in the formation of rules which, though
imposing equal standards, could create, as in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), injustice and discrimination by the equal treatment
of those who are unequal …499

In its subsequent 1999 landmark decision in British Columbia (Public Service Employee
Relations Commission) v. BCGSEU (“Meiorin”), the Supreme Court of Canada similarly
commented that the categories of direct and adverse effect discrimination are not
mutually exclusive, inasmuch as an intention to discriminate does not need to be
expressed but can be couched in non-expressly discriminatory actions.500

498

William W. Black, “Human Rights Reform in B.C.” (1997) 31 UBCL Rev. 255 at note 11, citing Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
499
In the Court’s decision, these paragraphs appear in reverse order. Simpsons Sears, paras. 16, 13.
500
[1999] 3 SCR 3 [Meiorin] at para. 29.
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While the difficulties associated with proving direct discrimination may have
been the origin of the doctrine of adverse effect discrimination, this basis for liability is
not really any different than the basis for liability for direct discrimination. Once it is
accepted that there can be legal responsibility for conduct or practices that are
intentionally linked with prohibited grounds of discrimination, it is not a leap to find legal
responsibility where a respondent was deliberately seeking to masquerade direct
discrimination in the form of “facially neutral” conduct or practice. The more difficult,
and authentic, adverse effect situation is where the facts do not support a conclusion that
the respondent was seeking to avoid liability for discrimination. In this situation, the
human rights claim is that facially neutral conduct or practice adversely affects an
individual or group because of one or more prohibited grounds of discrimination.
For example, what was at issue in the Ont. Human Rights Comm. v. SimpsonsSears case was a workplace rule requiring full-time employees to rotate through Friday
evening and Saturday work shifts. The employee, Theresa O’Malley, who alleged a
Code violation, was a Seventh Day Adventist whose religious observance made it
impossible for her to work on Friday evenings and Saturdays. The workplace rule was
facially “neutral” because it did not explicitly target persons affiliated with particular
religions for disadvantageous impact. The SCC held that link with a prohibited ground of
discrimination was established on the basis that the claimant’s religion made it
impossible for her to meet the requirements of the workplace rule. Underlying this
finding was the Court’s willingness to accept the requirements of religious practice as a
basis for exemption from a workplace rule applying to all employees. Put another way,
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underlying this finding was Court’s willingness to say to the employer that the impact of
the rule on the claimant was something for which the employer may have to account,
even though the employer in no way intended this impact.501
The Court could have refused to find the link between the impact and the
prohibited ground of discrimination, by finding that the cause of the impact was the
neutral work rule and not the claimant’s religion. This alternative analysis may sound
disingenuous and contrived; however, there are many cases where this type of reasoning
has been applied to deny a link with prohibited grounds of discrimination.502
As noted earlier, the connection between conduct or practices and prohibited
grounds of discrimination is at the heart of the legal recognition of discriminatory harm.
With direct forms of discrimination, the respondent’s intent creates the link between the
conduct or practice and prohibited ground(s) of discrimination. With claims of adverse
effect discrimination, the lynchpin is a link between the negative effect of the conduct or
practice and one or more prohibited grounds of discrimination. A legal finding of
responsibility for adverse effect discrimination thus requires either the respondent’s

501

The question of the link between the respondent’s conduct and prohibited grounds of discrimination was
not the central issue in the BCGSEU case. At issue in the BCGESU case was a workplace rule that required
all forest fighter employees to pass new physical fitness tests, including a test of aerobic capacity. The
grievance arbitrator accepted the Union’s evidence that women employees would generally not be able to
pass the aerobic capacity test. In the courts, the central issues were whether the standard was justified
because it was bona fide and reasonable and provided for individual testing and, if not, whether the remedy
was limited to exempting the individual grievor from the application of the standard.
502
See, for example, Andrea Wright, “Formulaic Comparisons: Stopping the Charter at the Statutory
Human Rights Gate” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike, and M. Kate Stephenson, eds., Making Equality
Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality Under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2006) 409
[Faraday et al, Making Equality Rights Real]. Wright’s analysis focuses on the use of problematic
comparisons; cf. Daphne Gilbert and Diana Majury, “Critical Comparisons: The Supreme Court of Canada
Dooms Section 15” (2006), 24 Windsor YB Access Just 111. See also Elizabeth J. McIntyre, Karen
Schucher and Fay Faraday, “The Arbitrator as Human Rights Adjudicator: Has Meiorin Made a
Difference?” (2000-2001) Labour Arbitration Yearbook 31.
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acceptance of a link between the unintended negative effect and prohibited grounds of
discrimination, or an adjudicative finding that there is this link. When adverse effect
discrimination claims are addressed through formal legal process, the question of linking
the conduct or practice with prohibited grounds of discrimination is tied to the question of
whether or not the adjudicator is prepared to impose legal responsibility for the truly
unintended impact of conduct or practices.
In principle, the recognition of adverse effect discrimination had the potential to
expand the scope of social conduct and practices that might be challenged under the
Code, and there have been certainly been situations where the doctrine of adverse effect
discrimination has been successfully used through formal legal process. More often,
though, it has been difficult in practice to persuade adjudicators to accept these claims.503
One reason why it is difficult to establish adverse effect claims through formal legal
process is the adjudicative preference for finding some intentionality as the basis for
imposing legal responsibility. Therefore, although intent is not formally a requirement to
establish adverse effect discrimination, from the beginning it has played a subterranean
role in the process of determining when and why “facially neutral” conduct or practices
should be judged discriminatory. Adverse effect discrimination claims are also difficulty
to establish in formal legal process because they typically put into question social
503

On the difficulties of “providing” or establishing adverse effect discrimination claims, see also
Vizkelety, “Discrimination, the Right to Redress” at 584 and Colleen Sheppard, Inclusive Equality: The
Relational Dimensions of Systemic Discrimination in Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2010) at 147 [Sheppard, Inclusive Equality]. For a period of time after adverse effect was
first held to be conduct prohibited by the Code, there was a substantive reason for distinguishing between
the legal categories of direct and adverse effect discrimination because they attracted different remedial
consequences. The Supreme Court of Canada decision in the Meiorin case eliminated this distinction.
However, the separate legal categories continue to serve the purpose of making clear the range of conduct
and practices that may constitute discrimination under statutory human rights.
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conduct and practices that are considered “normal” and, therefore, should not be judged
harmful and unlawful.
Thus, the conceptual underpinning of adverse effect discrimination gives rise to
questions about how formal legal process responds to claims based on adverse effect
discrimination. One reason adjudicators might hesitate to impose legal responsibility is
because they believe it is unfair to hold people responsible, and require them to provide
remedies, where they had no actual or constructive understanding that their conduct or
practice could result in discriminatory harm.504 A second reason adjudicators might
hesitate to impose legal responsibility is because, by imposing a judgment of
discrimination on conduct or practices considered “normal” and not harmful, they
effectively establish a new norm relating to discriminatory harm. It can therefore be
argued that adjudicators will make the linkage between conduct or practice and
prohibited grounds of discrimination in two possible situations: (1) where they can find
some element of intent or proxy for intent, 505 or (2) where they are persuaded that it is
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A similar concern about the reintroduction of intent as a requirement to establish a prima facie violation
of s. 15 of the Charter has also been the subject of considerable commentary. See, for example, paras. 2024 of the Factum of the Intervener Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund and accompanying
references in Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E. in Faraday et al, Making Equality Rights Real
471 at 476-477 (Fiona Sampson and I were LEAF’s co-counsel in this case); Sheila McIntyre, “The
Equality Jurisprudence of the McLachlin Court: Back to the 70s” in Sanda Rodgers and Sheila McIntyre,
eds., The Supreme Court of Canada and Social Justice: Commitment, Retrenchment or Retreat (Canada:
LexisNexis Canada Inc., 2010) 129; Bruce Ryder, Emily Lawrence and Cidalia Faria, “What’s Law Good
For? An Empirical Overview of Charter Equality Rights Decisions” (2004) 24 SCLR (2d) 103.
505
Similarly, although the more recent doctrinal development, which imposes a proactive obligation on
respondents to anticipate discriminatory impact in their conduct and practices, is a positive development, it
too introduces an element of intent similar to the reasonable foreseeability element of negligence law.
Vizekelety considered and rejected a comparison with negligence principles as basis for liability for
adverse effect discrimination: “Discrimination, the Right to Seek Redress” at 569-572. As noted in the
Introduction to this dissertation, Denise Réaume reconsidered this question in “Harm and Fault in
Discrimination Law: The Transition from Intentional to Adverse Effect Discrimination” (2001) Theor Inq
L 349. Réaume has since moved away from this tort-type analysis of discrimination and now focuses on a
dignity-based analysis of discrimination- see, for example: Denise G. Réaume, “Discrimination and
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appropriate to impose a judgment of discrimination on conduct or practice previously
considered “normal” and unharmful.
In the end, there are significant challenges to successfully advancing both direct
and adverse effect discrimination claims. In the case of direct discrimination, the
challenges are more connected with problems of proof than with problems of the
conceptual basis for liability. In the case of adverse effect discrimination, in my view the
challenges are more connected with the conceptual basis for liability, and with the fact
that liability is more a question of adjudicative fiat than a question of proof.

Systemic Discrimination and Legal Responsibility
Lastly, systemic discrimination was also recognized as a new category of
discrimination with potential to expand the substantive scope of Code protection.
Systemic discrimination is often connected with adverse effect discrimination; indeed,
adverse effect discrimination is sometimes incorrectly used as a synonym for “systemic
discrimination”. Similarly, “individual” discrimination is often connected with direct
discrimination, and direct discrimination is sometimes incorrectly used as a synonym for
individual discrimination. As Colleen Sheppard explained, systemic discrimination
includes both adverse effect and direct discrimination:

The legal concept of “systemic discrimination” emerged in the
1980s to describe discrimination that is pervasive, linked to structural
inequalities, and institutionalized in social and organizational practices
Dignity” in Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate Stephenson, Making Equality Rights Real: Seeking
Substantive Equality under the Charter (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2006) 123 and Denise Réaume,
“Dignity, Equality and Comparison” in Deborah Hellman and Sophia Moreau, eds., Philosophical
Foundations of Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 7.
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and procedures. Though sometimes considered synonymous with adverse
effect discrimination, it is a broader concept that often results from both
adverse effect discrimination (inequitable policies and practices) and
direct discrimination (e.g. recurrent and pervasive harassment, overt
exclusions and mistreatment) within a particular workplace environment,
school, occupation, or profession [or other social area covered by statutory
human rights]. …
… What is so disconcerting about systemic discrimination is the ways in
which it often imperceptibly reproduces, reinforces, and legitimizes
inequality and exclusion. Inequitable opportunities, resources, and socioeconomic conditions result in unequal accomplishments, which then
appear to justify the initial inequitable distribution of social goods.
Accordingly, stereotypes and prejudices are perpetuated by the conditions
of exclusion and inclusion, making social privileges and advantages
seemingly fair. The complex interplay between intentional and
unintentional discrimination means that unraveling the two is almost
impossible. The idea of systemic inequality embraces both.”506

The concept of systemic discrimination reflects the argument that discrimination in
society is not an exceptional or isolated event, but is pervasive and deeply embedded in
social structures and practices. This does not mean, however, that individual claims of
discrimination arise only in situations where discrimination is in fact an exceptional or
isolated event. Individual claims may also come forward in contexts where they are
simply one instance of systemic issues.
In the Bill 107 debates, the categories of “systemic” and “individual” claims,
rather than direct and adverse effect claims, were predominant, but in ways that are not
always entirely clear. In some cases, the categories seem to have been used correctly: that
is, systemic discrimination was used to refer to claims of widespread discrimination whether the form of discrimination was direct or adverse effect or a combination, and
individual claims was used to refer to claims by individuals about their individual
506
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circumstances - even though in some situations such individual claims might also involve
systemic discrimination. In other cases, the categories seem to have been used
incorrectly: that is, they seem to have been used as substitutes for adverse effect and
direct discrimination. Acknowledging the conceptual distinctions underpinning these
different categories is important to analyzing how legal process responds to these
different types of claim. At the same time, the interplay between direct, adverse effect,
individual, and systemic claims of discrimination can be confusing, and this confusion
sometimes obscured aspects of the competing perspectives in the Bill 107 debates.

2

Access to a Range of Legal Processes for Advancing Human Rights Claims
The legal process for addressing statutory human rights claims and issues was the

second area in which there were important developments after Bell v. McKay. The first
development related to the potential for using civil court legal processes either to enforce
the Code itself, or at least to seek remedies for discrimination outside the OHRC process.
The second development related to the potential for using other administrative law
processes to enforce the Code or to address human rights issues that were connected with
other issues being addressed. These developments raise questions about the practice of
human rights, or how legal process engaged with statutory human rights. They also raise
questions about the tension between statutory human rights as a discrete area of law and
as an area of law that informs a wide range of social conduct and related areas of law.
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No Civil Action for Discrimination: Bhadauria v. Seneca College
A potential role for the courts in providing an enforcement avenue for statutory
human rights protections was dealt a significant blow by the 1981 decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada in Seneca College of Applied Arts and Technology v.
Bhadauria (“Bhadauria”).507 Pushpa Bhadauria commenced a civil action claiming that
Seneca College discriminated against her at common law on the basis of ethnic origin,
and breached the Code by failing to grant her an interview on any of the ten job
competitions she applied for in a four-year period. Seneca College successfully brought a
motion to strike out the statement of claim. Two issues were raised on the appeal to the
Ontario Court of Appeal: (1) whether or not the claim could give rise to a civil cause of
action based on a common law duty not to discriminate, and (2) whether or not a claimed
violation of the Code could give rise to a civil cause of action. In reasons written by
Justice Bertha Wilson, the Court addressed the first issue first, holding that there was a
common law duty not to discriminate:

I regard the preamble to the Code as evidencing what is now, and probably
has been for some considerable time, the public policy of this Province
respecting fundamental human rights. If we accept that "every person is
free and equal in dignity and rights without regard to race, creed, colour,
sex, marital status, nationality, ancestry or place of origin", as we do, then
it is appropriate that these rights receive the full protection of the common
law. The plaintiff has a right not to be discriminated against because of her
ethnic origin and alleges that she has been injured in the exercise or
enjoyment of it. If she can establish that, then the common law must, on
the principle of Ashby v. White et al., supra, afford her a remedy.
I do not regard the Code as in any way impeding the appropriate
507

[1981] 2 SCR 181; rev’g sub nom Bhadauria v. Board of Governors of Seneca College of Applied Arts
and Technology (1979), 27 O.R. (2d) 142 CA [“Seneca College v. Bhadauria”].
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development of the common law in this important area. While the
fundamental human right we are concerned with is recognized by the
Code, it was not created by it. Nor does the Code, in my view, contain any
expression of legislative intention to exclude the common law remedy.
Rather the reverse since s. 14a [enacted 1974, c. 73, s. 5] appears to make
the appointment of a board of inquiry to look into a complaint made under
the Code a matter of ministerial discretion.508

In the Court of Appeal’s view, the rights protected by the Code were public policy, for
which the common law must provide a remedy. These rights were not “created” but
“recognized” by the Code; the codification of these rights could not impede
developments in the common law; and the Code did not exclude the possibility of
common law remedies for discrimination. In light of this conclusion, the Court did not
address the second issue as to whether the Code itself could be enforced by way of civil
action.
The Court of Appeal decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada, in
reasons written by Chief Justice Laskin, who rejected both the possibility of a common
law civil action for discrimination and the possibility of enforcing the Code by way of
civil action rather than by way of the OHRC process. Chief Justice Laskin appears to
have rejected the Court of Appeal’s distinction between founding a civil action on the
“public policy” of legislation and founding a civil action on an alleged breach of
legislation, for reasons based entirely on the Code’s enforcement scheme:

There is, in my view, a narrow line between founding a civil cause of
action directly upon a breach of a statute and as arising from the statute
itself and founding a civil cause of action at common law by reference to
policies reflected in the statute and standards fixed by the statute.
508

Seneca College v. Bhadauria (OCA) at 150.

231

…
It is one thing to apply a common law duty of care to standards of
behaviour under a statute; that is simply to apply the law of negligence in
the recognition of so-called statutory torts. It is quite a different thing to
create by judicial fiat an obligation--one in no sense analogous to a duty of
care in the law of negligence--to confer an economic benefit upon certain
persons, with whom the alleged obligor has no connection, and solely on
the basis of a breach of a statute which itself provides comprehensively for
remedies for its breach.
…
I confess to some difficulty in understanding the basis of the learned
justice's observation that "While the fundamental human right we are
concerned with is recognized by the Code, it was not created by it" (or, I
assume, by its predecessors). There is no gainsaying the right of the
Legislature to establish new rights or to create new interests of which the
Court may properly take notice and enforce, either under the prescriptions
of the Legislature or by applying its own techniques if, on its construction
of the legislation, enforcement has not been wholly embraced by the terms
of the legislation …509

In Chief Justice Laskin’s view, the Code and OHRC claims resolution process occupied
the entre field of discrimination law, leaving no room for common law, civil court
processes:

In the present case, the enforcement scheme under The Ontario Human
Rights Code ranges from administrative enforcement through complaint
and settlement procedures to adjudicative or quasi-adjudicative
enforcement by boards of inquiry. The boards are invested with a wide
range of remedial authority including the award of compensation
(damages in effect), and to full curial enforcement by wide rights of
appeal which, potentially, could bring cases under the Code to this Court.
…
I would have thought that [Ministerial discretion to request the
appointment of a Board of Inquiry] fortifies rather than weakens the
Legislature's purpose, being one to encompass, under the Code alone, the
enforcement of its substantive prescriptions. It is unnecessary to consider
here how far the Minister's discretion is untrammelled, or whether a clue
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to its character is afforded by the ensuing provisions for appeal to the
courts from a decision or order of a board of inquiry.
The view taken by the Ontario Court of Appeal is a bold one and may be
commended as an attempt to advance the common law. In my opinion,
however, this is foreclosed by the legislative initiative which overtook the
existing common law in Ontario and established a different regime which
does not exclude the courts but rather makes them part of the enforcement
machinery under the Code.510

Chief Justice Laskin acknowledged the possibility of breakdown in the OHRC claims
resolution process, but held that this was not in itself a justification for allowing civil
actions based on the Code:511

There is a possibility of a breakdown in full enforcement if the Minister
refuses to appoint a board of inquiry where a complaint cannot be settled
and, further, whether penalties on prosecution will be sought also depends
on action by the Minister. I do not, however, regard this as supporting (and
no other support was advanced by the respondent) the contention that the
Code itself gives or envisages a civil cause of action, whether by way of
election of remedy or otherwise. The Minister's discretion is simply an
element in the scheme.512

From the perspective of competing legal processes, the decision in Bhadauria can be read
as a vindication of the OHRC claims resolution process, a process that the SCC had been
so willing to override in its Bell v. McKay decision one decade earlier. From the
perspective of effective legal process, Chief Justice Laskin’s analysis does appear to be
predicated on an assumption that the OHRC claims resolution process was reasonably
510
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functional.513 More significantly in relation to the “direct access” initiatives that later
evolved, Chief Justice Laskin’s reasons also suggest that his analysis assumed that claims
would be referred to adjudication if they could not be resolved by agreement. Put another
way, it seems fair to read the decision as upholding the view that claimants should have
access to all dimensions of the legal process, but that it is appropriate for access to be
gained by way of an administrative law process rather than in the courts.
In principle, the decision in Bhadauria foreclosed the option of using civil actions
to pursue discrimination claims.514 Over time, courts began to chip away a bit at the
potential impact of Bhadauria in situations where discrimination claims could be
attached to another civil wrong.515 The Bhadauria case did, however, continue to prevent
civil claims that alleged a tort of discrimination or that rested directly and exclusively on
an alleged human rights statutory violation. More recently, in Honda v. Keays, the
Supreme Court of Canada opened the door to revisiting Bhadauria’s rejection of a
common law tort of discrimination:
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I agree that it is not necessary to reconsider Bhadauria in the present
appeal. But in my opinion Laskin C.J. went further than was strictly
necessary in Bhadauria….
The development of tort law ought not to be frozen forever on the basis of
this obiter dictum. The legal landscape has changed. The strong
prohibitions of human rights codes and of the Charter have informed many
aspects of the development of the common law.516

There are opposing perspectives on whether or not there is any meaningful benefit
either to recognizing a tort of discrimination or to enabling people to use civil actions for
the sole purpose of enforcing statutory human rights.517 From an access to justice
perspective, civil actions are generally not considered to be the most accessible form of
legal process because they tend to be more expensive and more complex than
administrative legal processes.518 Most human rights advocates also continue to believe
that tribunals are generally more effective at addressing human rights issues than courts
are. In Ontario, the question has for now been answered by a policy decision made in
connection with the Bill 107 process. When the Code was amended to implement the
“direct access” model,519 it was also amended to allow civil courts to decide and provide
remedies for Code claims, provided that the civil action is not “based solely on an
infringement of” the Code, and that persons cannot make an application to the tribunal
516

[2008] 2 SCR 362 (“Honda v. Keays”) at paras. 118, 119.
For some critique of Honda v. Keays see Geoffrey England, “Evaluating the Implications of Honda
Canada v. Keys” (2008) 14 CLELJ 327 at 351-355 and note 71. For discussions, that are more favourably
oriented to civil actions for discrimination, see: Larry Chartrand, “The Crumbling Wall of Bhadauria: If
Not Today, Tomorrow” (2009) 44 SCLR 107 and Rakhi Ruparelia, “I Didn't Mean it That Way!: Racial
Discrimination as Negligence” (2009) 44 SCLR 81.
518
In Ontario, this issue is also complicated by the ever-increasing jurisdiction of the Small Claims Court,
which is now set at the $25,000 and is expected to increase in the future.
519
The amending statute enacting Bill 107 was the Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2006, SO 2006, c
30. However, I will refer to these provisions by referring to them as they have been integrated in the Code
(1990).
517

235

under the Code where their human rights claim is settled or decided in the context of a
civil action.520 These provisions essentially codify the Bhadauria outcome, as qualified
by subsequent cases that permitted statutory human rights claims and issues to be
integrated with a civil action based on other claims.

Addressing Statutory Human Rights Claims in Other Social and Legal Contexts
The second development in the practice of statutory human rights was an
increasing engagement with these issues in other legal contexts and processes. When the
Code was re-enacted in 1981, a new provision was added which acknowledged that Code
claims could arise in other contexts. This provision, s. 34(1), gave the Commission the
authority to decide not to deal with complaints that, in its opinion, “could or should be
more be appropriately dealt with under an Act other than this Act”.521 This new power
gave the Commission another tool with which to manage its claims resolution caseload.
Collective agreement grievance arbitration processes, in particular, became a key
area where human rights issues where frequently raised and litigated. The integration of
human rights claims and issues in grievance arbitration has had significant impact on
grievance arbitration.522 This integration has also produced some important
developments in substantive human rights doctrine, with application beyond the
collective agreement context, the most significant example being the Meiorin case.
520
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Furthermore, the integration has raised significant issues about the scope of union
responsibility for human rights issues in the workplace, and about competing legal
forums for addressing human rights issues in unionized workplaces.523 In relation to
grievance arbitration, the OHRC adopted a policy in 1993 of exercising its discretion
under s. 34(1) so as not to deal with most claims by unionized employees.524
The Supreme Court of Canada has resoundingly endorsed the authority of nonhuman rights tribunals to address human rights that are raised in connection with the
other issues before the tribunal. In the Parry Sound v. OPSEU case,525 the SCC upheld a
grievance arbitrator’s ruling that a probationary employee could challenge her dismissal
from employment on human rights grounds, even though the collective agreement denied
probationary employees the right to grieve employment termination. The employee,
Joanne O’Brien, went on maternity leave during her probationary period, and the
employer terminated her employment within a few days after she returned to work.
When the employee and the union grieved the employment termination, the employer
took the position that the arbitration board did not have jurisdiction to review the
termination of probationary employees. The main issue in the case was whether the
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arbitrator had jurisdiction over the grievance by virtue of s. 48(12)(j) of the Labour
Relations Act, 1995, which provides that a labour arbitrator has power “to interpret and
apply human rights and other employment-related statutes, despite any conflict between
those statutes and the terms of the collective agreement.”526 The decision records that the
OHRC intervened in the Supreme Court of Canada appeal to ensure that it did not lose
jurisdiction, and took the position that there should be concurrent jurisdiction for both the
Code’s statutory enforcement process and labour arbitrators. As part of its analysis
upholding the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, the Court reasoned that unionized employees
would have less protection in relation to human rights in the workplace if these rights
could not be addressed through grievance arbitration and had to be pursued under the
Code’s enforcement process:

… Put simply, there are certain rights and obligations that arise
irrespective of the parties' subjective intentions. These include the right of
an employee to equal treatment without discrimination and the
corresponding obligation of an employer not to discharge an employee for
discriminatory reasons. To hold otherwise would lessen human rights
protection in the unionized workplace by allowing employers and unions
to treat such protections as optional, thereby leaving recourse only to the
human rights procedure.527

Labour arbitration has arguably been the main site where statutory human rights
have been addressed outside the Code’s enforcement process. However, it is also
arguable that integration of human rights in labour arbitration has provided a model for
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the integration of human rights issues in other tribunal and civil contexts.528 The point is
demonstrated by the second Supreme Court of Canada decision endorsing the authority of
non-human rights tribunals to address human rights issues. The case of
Tranchemontagne v. Ontario529 involved the Ontario Social Benefits Tribunal, a statutory
tribunal that deals with appeals involving social assistance benefits claims. The issue in
this case was whether a provision of the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, 1997
that excluded coverage for disability related to substance abuse was contrary to the
Code.530 The Attorney General was the respondent and took the position that the tribunal
did not have the authority to decide this question. The SCC disagreed.531 The Court
confirmed that statutory human rights issues can and must be considered in the context
where they arise and held that the tribunal was not only authorized, but also obliged, to
address human rights issues and challenges that arise in connection with the disputes it is
statutorily mandated to decide:

The Code is fundamental law. … the adjudication of Code issues is no
longer confined to the exclusive domain of the intervener the Ontario
Human Rights Commission ("OHRC"): s. 34 of the Code. The legislature
has thus contemplated that this fundamental law could be applied by other
administrative bodies and has amended the Code accordingly.
…
In its present form, the Code can be interpreted and applied by a myriad of
administrative actors. Nothing in the current legislative scheme suggests
528
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that the OHRC is the guardian or the gatekeeper for human rights law in
Ontario. … [I]n Charette, I noted how allowing many administrative
actors to apply human rights legislation fosters a general culture of respect
for human rights in the administrative system: see para. 28; see also Parry
Sound, at para. 52. These pronouncements are consistent with the
legislature's removal of the exclusive jurisdiction clause for the OHRC, as
well as its current policy of permitting the OHRC to decline jurisdiction
where an issue would be best adjudicated pursuant to another Act: see s.
34(1)(a) of the Code. It is hardly appropriate for this Court to now argue
with this legislative policy shift towards concurrent jurisdiction, and seek
to restore exclusive jurisdiction for the OHRC.532

The Tranchemontagne holding was not based on a novel legal proposition. As early as
1971, the Supreme Court of Canada held that courts and administrative tribunals have
both the authority and the obligation to consider and potentially apply laws that are
relevant to the claims and issues in the case they are deciding.533 However, in
Tranchemontagne the Court went even further, to suggest that the non-statutory human
rights tribunal would usually be the most appropriate adjudicative body to address the
human rights issue in the context of the whole claim to which it was connected:

Where a tribunal is properly seized of an issue pursuant to a statutory
appeal, and especially where a vulnerable appellant is advancing
arguments in defence of his or her human rights, I would think it
extremely rare for this tribunal to not be the one most appropriate to hear
the entirety of the dispute. I am unable to think of any situation where
such a tribunal would be justified in ignoring the human rights argument,
applying a potentially discriminatory provision, referring the legislative
challenge to another forum, and leaving the appellant without benefits in
the meantime.534
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The Tranchemontagne decision thus had significant implications for the competing
authority over human rights issues that would emerge with the adoption of an
enforcement model providing “direct access” to a statutory human rights tribunal.
Integrating human rights issues within legal processes outside the OHRC process
highlighted the argument that human rights issues are not “separate” and “discrete”
issues which can only be addressed in a separate and dedicated legal process. Indeed, the
ultimate goal of human rights protections should be to affect conduct and practices in the
important social areas of employment, housing, public spaces and services. On the one
hand, then, it should be possible to address human rights issues in the social contexts in
which they arise, using the legal processes that are part of those social contexts. On the
other hand, there is debate about whether human rights issues will be addressed
adequately if they are determined by non-human rights adjudicators. With the move to
“direct access”, there is also debate about the role of the statutory human rights tribunal
in relation to other legal processes where human rights issues may be raised. I will
return to all of these issues later in this chapter, and in my concluding reflections.

3

Critiques of the Commission-Based Claims Resolution Process
Human rights commissions in Canada were (and in some provinces still are)

mandated to carry out multiple responsibilities, which typically include(d): claims
resolution, education, policy development, and research. It is possible to look at all of
these responsibilities as different forms of “enforcement”, inasmuch as they can all
provide opportunities for using the legislation to respond to social inequalities. However,
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enforcement is more traditionally understood as a form of legal process, and the claims
resolution function was the only one carried out using legal process.
There is nothing to suggest that any one of these responsibilities was in principle
considered more important than the others. Over time, though, commissions’ claims
resolution responsibilities consumed increasing proportions of their resources, eventually
reaching the point where commissions typically spent most of their resources on their
claims resolution role. At the same time, and despite the significant allocation of
resources to claims processing and resolution, there was growing dissatisfaction with how
commissions were carrying out this responsibility; there was also growing disgruntlement
with the relative lack of attention being paid to commissions’ other responsibilities.
As we know from the earlier chapters, there was a typical structure to the
commission-based claims resolution process. The process was “reactive”, rather than
proactive, in that its function was to receive claims and respond to claimants seeking
remedies under the Code. When a claim was received, the commission was typically
mandated to investigate the claim and assist the parties to try to achieve a voluntary
resolution. If the commission could not facilitate a voluntary resolution, it then decided
whether or not to refer the claim to formal adjudication before a tribunal. If the
commission decided not to refer the claim to formal adjudication, which was typically the
case, the claimant’s only recourse was to ask the commission to reconsider the nonreferral decision or bring an application in court for judicial review of the non-referral
decision. Although commission decisions not to refer to adjudication were occasionally
reversed, this did not happen often. Moreover, judicial review in particular is an
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expensive legal process, and would not have been an option for most human rights
claimants.
Between 1989 and 2004, seven Canadian common law jurisdictions conducted
government-sponsored reviews of their statutory human rights regimes.535 New
Brunswick was the first province to conduct a review, in 1989, with a follow-up review
in 2004.536 It was followed by Ontario in 1991,537 Alberta538 and British Columbia in
1994539 (with a second review in British Columbia in 2001540), Saskatchewan in 1996,541
the Federal government 2001,542 and Nova Scotia in 2002.543 All of these reviews
addressed questions relating to enforcement of human rights legislation, at least to some
extent. They reported similar concerns with how the commission-based claims resolution
model was working, but came to different conclusions about how these concerns should
be addressed. Several of the reviews also addressed questions relating to substantive
535
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protection. However, with the notable exception of the 1994 report for British Columbia,
the reviews generally did not draw links between questions of substantive protection and
questions of enforcement.544
The reports emphasized six areas of concern, which I group into three categories.
The first category of concern was low rates of referral to tribunal adjudication and undue
pressure to settle claims. The second category of concern was conduct of the
investigation and related settlement processes and, in particular: extreme delays and
backlogs, unevenness in the quality of investigations and duplication of investigation for
cases referred to tribunal adjudication; and tension and confusion between the
commissions’ roles as “advocate” and as “neutral” investigator. The third category of
concern was excessive focus on individual claims and inadequate attention to systemic
discrimination issues.545 These areas of concern often involved interrelated issues about
the design of the process and how the process worked in practice.

Concern About Low Rates of Referral to Adjudication
Critics of the commission-based claims resolution model dubbed it the
“gatekeeper” model. It was empirically accurate to describe the commission as a
gatekeeper to the tribunal, because that is what it did. However, the “gatekeeper” label
was not meant to be a neutral moniker. Critics of the model did not like the fact that there
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was a gatekeeper to the tribunal, nor did they like how commissions exercised their
gatekeeping function.
The concern about limited access to tribunal adjudication had both design and
operational aspects. From the design perspective, the human rights claims-processing
model was built on the view that most claims would, and should, be resolved by
voluntary agreement and that recourse to formal adjudication would, and should, be the
exception. From the operational perspective, given the very high proportion of cases not
referred to adjudication, one can speculate that there may have been some elision
between what would happen and what should happen, i.e. the expectations about what
“would” and “should” happen became the reality of what did happen. Most claims that
resolved were resolved by agreement; very few of the cases that did not resolve by
agreement were referred to adjudication for determination.
From the operational perspective, there were a number of concerns. One issue was
the process commissions used to make their referral decisions. Commissions based their
decisions on reports prepared by staff and on written submissions from the claimants and
respondents; there was never an opportunity for oral submissions. Commissions
provided no reasons for their decisions not to refer a claim for adjudication. The “behind
closed doors” nature of the process, and lack of reasons for the non-referral decision,
fuelled arguments that commissions routinely denied access to formal adjudication to
claimants with meritorious claims. It should be no surprise that this process was
perceived as procedurally unfair; nor did the process instill confidence in the substance of
the non-referral decisions. At the same time, in the absence of concrete information about
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the substance of settlements and about why cases were not referred to adjudication, it is
impossible to do any meaningful analysis of the cases that were not referred. In the
absence of reasons for non-referral decisions, there is no way of knowing to what extent
meritorious claims may not have been referred to adjudication. It is also impossible to
know whether commissions could have provided reasons for non-referral that would have
satisfied most claimants.
A related operational concern was the allegation that commissions placed undue
pressure on the parties, and particularly on claimants, to agree to voluntary resolutions.
With a model that both structurally and operationally gave preference to voluntary
resolution of claims, it is perhaps not surprising to hear that claimants experienced
pressure to agree to settlements of their claims. To say that there was undue pressure to
settle, however, is to assert – or at least to suggest - that claimants were pressured to
settle for an outcome that was less favourable than the result they should have received.
It seems clear that at least some claimants experienced dissatisfaction with the
conciliation process and its outcomes. Again, however, since there is no concrete
information about the types of settlements to which claimants were being asked to agree,
there is no way to analyze their content and try to assess their substantive fairness or
unfairness. As discussed in Chapters One and Two, lack of access to information about
settlements has been a chronic challenge in the commission-based enforcement process.
The Ontario review report recommended that settlements be publicly available unless the

246

claimant requested confidentiality or the mediator felt that confidentiality would be
appropriate.546

Concern About Conduct of the Investigation Process
Access to a publicly-resourced investigation process was a hallmark of the
commission-based claims resolution model. The reviews tended to note three areas of
concern with the conduct of the investigation and related settlement processes: (1) delay
and inconsistent quality, (2) confusion about the commissions’ various roles, and (3)
pressure to agree to voluntary resolutions (addressed above).
Delay was a primary concern, and there is no question that the commission-based
investigation and related settlement processes were often subject to significant delays.
Concerns about the quality of investigation were more vague and difficult to assess.
Insufficient staff, created by inadequate funding of human rights commissions, was often
identified as a significant cause of the delay and of other operational problems, and there
is no reason to doubt that commissions could have been better funded.547 Underfunding
alone cannot, however, explain all the delay that plagued the commissions' process. The
claims-resolution function was a legal process, and delay is a pervasive problem for all
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Canadian legal processes, whether in the courts, before government agencies, or at
administrative tribunals - it is not a problem unique to the commissions.548
In the Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission) case, the
Supreme Court of Canada expressed concern about the delays for which the commission
claims resolution process was notorious, but was not willing to provide a remedy and also
did not accept lack of resources as the sole explanation:

To summarize, it cannot be said that the respondent's s. 7 rights were
violated nor that the conduct of the Commission amounted to an abuse of
process…
Nevertheless, I am very concerned with the lack of efficiency of the
Commission and its lack of commitment to deal more expeditiously with
complaints. Lack of resources cannot explain every delay in giving
information, appointing inquiry officers, filing reports, etc.; nor can it
justify inordinate delay where it is found to exist. The fact that most
human rights commissions experience serious delays will not justify
breaches of the principles of natural justice in appropriate cases….549

I share Rosanna Langer’s view that it is important to put the concerns about how
commissions conducted their investigation and settlement processes into a larger context
of legal process generally. As Langer commented, the claims resolution process was
carried out “… in an administrative environment constrained by expectations about
procedural fairness and operational efficiency and held to an ideal standard promised by
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the subject of the Commission’s mandate.”550 Langer focused in particular on the
competing goals of human rights legal practitioners:

The community of human rights practitioners shares an understanding that
the current structure of human rights administration in Ontario is deeply
flawed and that appropriate reform would involve a significantly enhanced
role for legal representatives and advocacy. Collectively, these
practitioners may be considered one of the organizational pressures faced
by the Commission, but many comments made by lawyers condemning
the current structure of human rights administration indicate that there is
much more at work than the faults of the system itself. [T]hese
intermediaries have multiple layers of motivation in taking and
discouraging individual cases, based on client advocacy, professional
advancement, and desire for social change.551

I focus more generally on questions about the enforcement role of the OHRC in relation
to broader questions about the role and operation of legal process. There are innumerable
ways in which the formal requirements of legal processes can result in delay. For
example, parties can bring motions and make procedural requests that, when granted, will
results in delays. In the context of the human rights commission claims resolution
process, the strong preference in favour of voluntary resolution also likely contributed to
delays. Since respondents would have known there was little likelihood of a human
rights claim being referred to adjudication, there was little if any incentive for them to
engage efficiently with the conciliation process.
The concern about commissions playing conflicting roles, and the confusion that
resulted from these conflicting roles, was more of a structural concern. Human rights
550
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commissions were clearly expected to be advocates for human rights in their education,
research and policy-development capacities. Their role in relation to individual claims
was more complicated. Critics argued that commissions understood themselves as
playing a neutral role in relation to individual claims, which created confusion for
individuals in the claims resolution process. Another perspective on this question was
that commissions were neutral in relation to individual claims in the sense that they were
not advocates for individuals, but that they were advocates in relation to the human rights
issues that could be raised by individual claims. This is perhaps a subtle distinction, and
it goes to the question of who decides the human rights merits of an individual claim - a
key feature of the commission-based model, which “direct access” proponents reject.

Concern About Insufficient Focus on Systemic Discrimination
Some of the reviews argued that the emphasis on claims resolution also had the
effect of improperly determining the commission’s priorities – both in relation to method
of enforcement and in relation to substantive issues.552 Critique of the disproportionate
emphasis on individual claims resolution was also linked to a concern that systemic
discrimination did not receive enough attention. One aspect of this concern was the view
that claims resolution, as a legal process, was not an effective or preferable method for
addressing systemic discrimination. It was not always clear, however, whether the
concern arose from the idea that claims tend to be focused on individuals rather than
groups, or whether it arose from the idea that claims resolution processes tend to be
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reactive rather than proactive. Although the claims resolution model often focused on
individuals, this model did not necessarily preclude group claims, third-party claims, and
commission-initiated claims. As discussed earlier in the chapter, it is also possible to
raise systemic issues in the context of individual claims.
The second aspect of the argument was that positive or proactive enforcement
methods are better equipped to address systemic discrimination. The individual claims
model tended to be characterized as a reactive or responsive approach because it was
activated as a response to claims when they came forward. Positive or proactive
measures, on the other hand, can be pursued at any time and are usually systemic in
nature. They include research, policy development and education, as well as standardsetting and related compliance processes, and affirmative action measures. The reviews
generally agreed that commissions were not devoting enough attention to education,
research and policy functions, and that these functions needed to be given more
“enforcement” priority. They generally recommended that the commissions’ research,
policy and educational roles should be maintained, invigorated and expanded.553 A
number of the reviews also suggested greater use of regulatory measures such as
standard-setting, both under human rights statutes and under other statutes, such as
building codes.554
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4

Human Rights as a Shared Responsibility
In addition to recommending changes or improvements to the human rights legal

regime, a number of reviews of statutory human rights regimes also suggested that there
is a need to share or spread responsibility for addressing discrimination and inequality.
According to these reviews, responsibility could be shared by expanding the enforcement
avenues for human rights statutes, as well as by incorporating anti-discrimination and
equality goals into more statutes and statutory provisions. The reports generally
encouraged measures that create alternative enforcement avenues for addressing human
rights claims and issues. For example, where collective agreements include antidiscrimination provisions, the grievance-arbitration procedure can in some cases be
available for employee claims. The Federal review went one step further to recommend
that an internal responsibility model be required for all workplaces with more than five
employees. It recommended that the internal responsibility system include an internal
claims-resolution mechanism, and that the human rights tribunal be allowed to dismiss a
claim unless the claimant could show that the internal system either failed to deal fully
with the human rights issues or failed to provide an adequate remedy.555 In relation to the
public school system, the Saskatchewan review argued that human rights education is a
fundamental proactive strategy for eliminating discrimination and achieving equality, but
recommended that schools and schools boards have primary responsibility for providing
this education.
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On the question of additional legislative measures, one option suggested in the
reviews was to incorporate anti-discrimination and equality-promoting provisions into
other statutes. For example, anti-harassment provisions could be added to occupational
health and safety legislation.556 This strategy can both provide additional substantive
protection and make available the enforcement avenues under the other statute. For
example, if harassment provisions were added to occupational health and safety
legislation, government enforcement avenues available under this legislation could be
available for harassment claims. Similarly, if building codes included accessibility
requirements, these requirements could be enforceable under building code enforcement
mechanisms. Some reviews also identified a need for more statutes, such as employment
equity and pay equity legislation.557 Employment equity and pay equity statutes in
Canada have typically sought to prescribe proactive measures for addressing
discrimination in access to employment (in the case of employment equity legislation),
and sex discrimination in wages (in the case of pay equity legislation).

5 Recommendations for Statutory Human Rights Enforcement
Four of the seven reviews supported the commission-based claims processing
model, but with appropriate changes to ensure that the commissions substantially
556
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improved their performance of this role: New Brunswick (1989), Alberta (1994), British
Columbia (1994), and Saskatchewan (1996). In the case of New Brunswick and British
Columbia, the recommendation to maintain a commission-based model flowed from
slightly different contexts than in the other provinces. In New Brunswick, the
commission did not previously have gatekeeper authority. The 1989 review
recommended that it be given this authority, which it was, and a subsequent 2004 review
did not recommend any changes to the structure of the enforcement process.558 In the
case of British Columbia, there had been a commission-based complaints processing
model, which was dismantled in 1983 and replaced with a system that had some
structural similarities but was significantly scaled down.559 The review conducted in
1994 by Bill Black recommended a return to the commission-based model that British
Columbia had previously had and that was more similar to models across the country.560
A second review was conducted in British Columbia in 2001, as part of an
Administrative Justice Project undertaken by the British Columbia Ministry of the
Attorney General. The report prepared as part of this review was intended to inform the
work of at least two other projects, a Workplace Tribunals Review and an Agency
Appointments Policy Paper, and was not expected itself to make recommendations.561
However, British Columbia was subsequently, in 2003 the first Canadian province to
implement a “direct access” model.
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Although the Saskatchewan review recommended maintaining the commission
enforcement model, it included an additional recommendation that had elements of a
“direct access” model, by proposing that human rights claimants have the option of going
to the tribunal at their own expense and without commission representation.562 In
addition, although Saskatchewan still maintains a commission-based model, in 2011 the
Saskatchewan government eliminated the statutory adjudicative tribunal and amended the
statute to provide for the commission to refer cases to court for adjudication.563 Finally,
the Alberta review did not recommend any changes to the commission’s role, but did
recommend staffing increases to address the delays and backlog in the process.564
The Ontario (1991) and Federal (2001) reviews recommended eliminating the
commissions’ claims-processing role and replacing it with a ““direct access”” model that
would establish a process for claimants to file claims directly with an adjudicative
tribunal. The Nova Scotia review report recommended that consideration be given in the
future to moving to a “direct access” model.565 The analysis in the Ontario review is
discussed in more detail in the next part of this chapter, to which I now turn.
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Part II: Ontario’s Move to Bill 107 and “Direct Access”
Ontario’s move to “direct access” began in 1991 with an initiative led by a group
of more than 40 community groups called the Coalition for Human Rights Reform.566
This initiative led to the creation of the Ontario Human Rights Code Review Task Force
(“Cornish Task Force”), which issued its report (“Cornish Report”) and recommendations
in 1992.567 The Cornish Report recommended a complex, tripartite structure composed
of an adjudicative tribunal, community-based legal services organizations, and a body
similar to the OHRC focusing on systemic issues, education, policy development, and
research.
The NDP government that established the Cornish Task Force did not take up
these recommendations. Instead, it passed employment equity legislation, a proactive
approach, which required employers to analyze their workforces through a diversity lens
and develop plans to achieve statutory diversity goals. This employment equity
legislation became a high profile issue in the next provincial election and may have
played a role in the successful 1995 campaign of the Progressive Conservative Party, led
by Mike Harris. The new government acted quickly to repeal the employment equity
legislation and, not surprisingly, did not take up any of the Cornish Report
recommendations during its two terms in government.
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In the 2003 election campaign, the Liberal party included a commitment to move
the Ontario Human Rights Commission and Code from the Ministry of Citizenship to the
Ministry of the Attorney General, which “‘has the authority to treat human rights issues
with the gravity they deserve.’”568 Also in 2003, British Columbia became the first
Canadian jurisdiction to implement a “direct access” model. The BC version of the
model not only replaced the commission enforcement process with tribunal adjudication
but also completely dismantled the human rights commission in British Columbia.569
In January 2005, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law hosted a conference,
titled “Administrative Design and the Human Rights Process in Ontario: Can We Do This
Better?”, at which all of the presenters were supporters of moving to a “direct access”
model.570 In February 2006, Ontario Attorney General Michael Bryant announced the
government’s intention to “modernize” Ontario’s human rights system. Like the “direct
access” model implemented in British Columbia, the model proposed for Ontario would
take the claims-processing role away from the OHRC. Unlike the approach taken in
British Columbia, Bill 107 proposed maintaining the OHRC, but with a modified
mandate.
568

Juliet S. Robin, “Modernising Ontario’s Human Rights System: The Human Rights Code Amendment
Act, 2006” in Le Tribunal des droits de la personne et le Barreau du Québec, eds., L’accès direct à un
tribunal specialize en matière de droit à l’égalité: l’urgence d’agir au Québec? Access to a Specialized
Human Rights Tribunal: an Urgent Need to Act in Quebec? (Québec: Les Éditions Yvon Blais Inc.: 2008)
321 at 326 [Robin, “Modernising Ontario”. The OHRC had previously been under the authority of the
Ministry of Labour. Ms Robin was Senior Counsel to the Ministry of the Attorney General.
569
For more discussion on the British Columbia “direct access” model see Heather M. MacNaughton,
“Direct Access: The B.C. Experience” in Le Tribunal des droits de la personne et le Barreau du Québec,
eds., L’accès direct à un tribunal specialize en matière de droit à l’égalité: l’urgence d’agir au Québec?
Access to a Specialized Human Rights Tribunal: an Urgent Need to Act in Quebec? (Québec: Les Éditions
Yvon Blais Inc.: 2008) 169 [McNaughton, “The B.C. Experience”]. MacNaughton was chair of the British
Columbia Human Rights Tribunal when she wrote this article.
570
The materials from this conference are archived on-line at http://www.law.utoronto.ca/scholarshippublications/conferences/archives/administrative-design.

257

Many human rights activists, as well as the OHRC itself, supported the move to a
“direct access” model in Ontario. However, other human rights activists strongly
opposed the proposed change, and the introduction of Bill 107 led to a divisive and
acrimonious debate within the community of human rights advocates. Opponents of the
proposed move to “direct access” also voiced concerns that the Attorney General had
failed to carry out a proper consultative process before moving forward with this
initiative, and repeatedly called on the Attorney General to halt the Bill 107 process, go
back to the drawing board, and engage in a consultative process. The Attorney General
denied these accusations, and maintained that he had consulted widely before moving
forward.
Bill 107 was introduced for First Reading on April 26, 2006. Second Reading
began on May 8, 2006, but was then adjourned to May 30, 2006; it continued on June 5
and June 6, 2006, when the motion passed and the bill was referred to the Standing
Committee on Justice Policy. Although the bill was vigorously opposed by some
advocates, Attorney General Bryant repeatedly signaled that there was no room for
debate over whether or not to move to a “direct access” model, but only over how to
move to that model.
Public hearings were held in London, Ottawa and Thunder Bay in August, and
were scheduled for Toronto in November and December. In an article published in the
Toronto Star on October 16, 2006, journalist Ian Urquhart queried whether the
government might shelve Bill 107 after losing a by-election in Parkdale-High Park in
September. He wrote:
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… my sources say the bill, while not quite dead, is in critical condition.
However, as word of this began to leak out this month, supporters of the
bill, heretofore mostly silent because they assumed a government with a
majority would tough out the criticism, began their own counter-lobby.
In recent days, McGuinty has been on the receiving end of anxious letters
from a variety of supporters of Bill 107.
"I urge you to demonstrate the leadership that is called for at this time,"
Catherine Frazee, the highly respected former head of the human rights
commission, wrote to McGuinty. "I urge you to stay the course."
"Please do not lose courage on this important legislation," wrote
representatives of more than 40 legal clinics in a joint letter to the premier.
A letter from a group of eminent citizens - including former Supreme
Court judge Claire l'Heureux-Dube, June Callwood, three senators, and
five law deans and professors - noted that the United Nations Human
Rights Commission has urged Canada to adopt the very reforms contained
in Bill 107.
…
And the Ontario Bar Association issued a hopeful-sounding press release
last week that commended McGuinty and Bryant "for having the courage
to bring forward pioneering legislation that, if passed, will fix a broken
human rights system." The conditional phrase, "if passed," is not usually
needed with a majority government.571
The Toronto hearings scheduled for November proceeded as scheduled, but the
December dates were cancelled, leaving the key spokesperson against “direct access”,
David Lepofsky of the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act Alliance
(“AODAA”), without an opportunity to make oral submissions to the Committee.572
Instead, the bill was referred for Third Reading, which it received on December 4 and 5,
2006. The Bill received Royal Assent on December 20, 2006 and came fully into force
on June 30, 2008, providing for an 18-month transitional period.
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1 Who were the Key Players in Ontario’s 2006 “direct access” Debates?
There was no direct correlation between the positions taken in the “direct access”
debates and different areas of social inequality. Indeed, disability rights advocates
arguably had the highest public profile in the debates and they found themselves on both
sides of the question. The move to “direct access” was supported by Catherine Frazee disability rights activist, former Chief Commissioner of the OHRC and one of the few
non-lawyers who had a high profile in the debates, and by two specialty legal clinics
focusing on disability rights issues - ARCH Disability Law Centre and the HIV and Aids
Legal Clinic Ontario. Opposition to “direct access” was in large measure led by the
AODAA, and supported by community-based disability activists.
Most of the key spokespeople on both sides of the “direct access” debate were
lawyers. Some of these lawyers were specifically human rights practitioners; others
practiced in community legal clinics; one was a government lawyer, whose human rights
advocacy was done in his personal capacity. These lawyers would all describe
themselves as human rights advocates, sharing a common goal of achieving access to
human rights justice, and they would all be publicly recognized as human rights
advocates. Like the lawyers involved in the campaigns for fair practices legislation and
enforcement, they are “cause lawyers”. Yet they also held radically different views about
what access to human rights justice meant, and the debates over the proposed move to
“direct access” were both divisive and publicly acrimonious.
The key spokespeople supporting the proposed move to “direct access” were
private practice lawyers Mark Hart and Geri Sanson, and legal clinic lawyer Katherine
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Laird, who at that time was with the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (“ACTO”), a
specialty clinic.573 Many other legal aid clinics supported the proposed “direct access”
model, both general service community clinics across the province and other specialty
clinics, including ARCH Disability Law Centre and the HIV & AIDS Legal Clinic
(Ontario).574 Other supporters of moving to a “direct access” model included Raj Anand
(a human rights practitioner who served briefly in the late 1980s as Chief Commissioner
of the OHRC), the Advocates’ Society,575 the Centre for Equality Rights in
Accommodation (CERA), a coalition of women’s anti-violence and other equality rights
organizations, and the Ontario Bar Association, represented by its Civil Liberties and
Human Rights Section.
The key spokesperson for the opposition to Bill 107 was David Lepofsky,
speaking through the AODAA. He was joined by legal clinic lawyers Avvy Go (with the
Metro Toronto Chinese & Southeast Asian Legal Clinic) and Margaret Parsons (with the
African Canadian Legal Clinic), the South Asian Legal Clinic of Ontario and Parkdale
Community Legal Services, and also supported by the Native Women’s Association of
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Canada (“NWAC”) and the Ontario Native Women’s Association (“ONWA”).576 The
Canadian Federation of Independent Business, the League for Human Rights of B’Nai
Brith Canada and 519 Anti-Violence Programme also opposed Bill 107.577
Organized labour does not appear to have taken an official position on Bill 107.
The Ontario Federation of Labour co-sponsored at least one community forum raising
concern about Bill 107, but did not make oral or written submissions to the Standing
Committee.578 Several large trade unions supported Bill 107 in written submissions to
the Standing Committee: the Canadian Auto Workers, the Elementary Teachers’
Federation of Ontario, the Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation, and the
United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and
Service Workers International Union.579 The Ontario English Catholic Teachers’
Association opposed Bill 107 in written submissions, as did several labour councils.580
The Ontario Public Service Employees Union, Local 710 (Thunder Bay) made brief
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written to the Standing Committee, which did not explicitly oppose Bill 107 but which
recommended instead a model which would provide a choice between filing claims with
the commission or with a tribunal.581
The high profile of human rights practitioners as supporters of Bill 107 gave rise
to some criticism that these practitioners were driven by self-interest rather than the
public interest. Attorney General Michael Bryant dismissed this criticism in the
following way when he introduced Bill 107 for second reading:

I've cited a number of people in support of this model, but I want to pause
with respect to some of those endorsements and respond to a particularly
invidious line of inquiry that has been brought by both of the opposition
parties in trying to label some the people who support this model as
somehow acting in their own self-interest. Those who support this have
been dismissed as lawyers by the leader of the official opposition and by
the justice critic in the third party. Certainly, the former chief
commissioner of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, Catherine
Frazee, doesn't happen to share the profession that is being castigated here.
But I want to say something about the people who work in the human
rights system. Believe you me, if they wanted to act in their self-interest,
they would be in a different area of law. They would be practising
something else; they would not be in the area of human rights. People who
work in the human rights field, who have devoted their careers, their
talents and their energies to that area, do so out of a spirit of social justice
and for assistance, trail-blazing, championing in many cases the underdog,
people who are victims of human rights discrimination. I think it would be
helpful in the debate going forward if that really invidious line of
argument did not play the prominent role it has played thus far, because it
does not, firstly, in any way characterize the people who have lent their
name and support to this social justice reform.582
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Attorney General Bryant was correct to challenge the argument that support for “direct
access” was driven by self-interest on the part of human rights practitioners. To the extent
that this “invidious line of criticism” might have been based on a stereotype of practicing
lawyers as highly-paid – or even excessively-paid - professionals, this stereotype is
generally not a good fit for the human rights practitioners and legal clinic lawyers who
supported Bill 107. At the same time, to the extent that Ontario’s “direct access” model
would include some public funding specifically for legal services, there was the potential
for some benefit to practitioners.
Nonetheless, the lawyer dominance critique reflects the extent to which the Bill
107 debate was focused much more on legal process than on social issues. Relatively
few human rights social activist groups were active participants in the debates, and
relatively few of the submissions to the Standing Committee addressed the social issues
relevant to the Code and its enforcement.583 These absences may to some extent be
explained by the extent to which the Bill 107 debate was focused on legal process rather
than on social issues. One wonders, however, whether non-legal social advocacy
organizations did not consider the Bill 107 debate - and thus the important questions
about the Code and the OHRC - as significant to their work.
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Additional Note on the OHRC
In the context of the Bill 107 debates, supporters and opponents of “direct access”
agreed that the commission-based claims resolution process was not working, although
there does seem to have been some difference of opinion about the degree to which the
process was not working.584 There was also significant consensus about how the process
was not working. However, the fact that there were human rights advocates who
supported retaining the commission-based process indicates that they believed the
process was capable of functioning effectively and consistently with human rights goals
and values. It is impossible to assess in the abstract whether or not their confidence was
misplaced. One of the ADOAA’s recommendations was that an independent review and
audit of the OHRC process be conducted to determine the source of the problems and
how to reform the process.585
The OHRC was ready to relinquish its claims processing role in 1992, when the
Ontario review was being conducted. In the period between the release of the Ontario
review report and the move to “direct access” in 2006, the OHRC continued to be willing
to relinquish its claims processing role, unless the government legislated procedural
requirements that would enable the OHRC to exercise more control over the process.
These changes never came.
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During the public hearings on Bill 107, MPP Peter Kormos took great exception
to the accusations or suggestions that the OHRC was abusing its gatekeeper role:

The government and its collaborators have made a concerted effort to
generate a myth around the Human Rights Commission and its staff, a
myth that quite frankly allows no other inference than widespread
incompetence or outright corruption.
This ain't Telus Corp. It's not a huge corporate body with hundreds of
staff; it's a pretty small group of people. You see, Chair, if there's
incompetence or corruption by the front-line staff, there's incompetence
and corruption by their managers and there's incompetence and corruption
by the chairs of the commission. What a ridiculous, what an absurd
allegation. It is beyond belief. It is incredulous. That's how this
government has been marketing this legislation.586

However, there is no evidence that the OHRC was interested in “clearing its name” in
2006, when a “direct access” model was on the verge of being adopted.

2 Moving Adjudication from the Exception to the Norm
Unmediated access to formal adjudication is at the heart of “direct access” models
for resolving statutory human rights claims. Examining the arguments made by “direct
access” proponents provides an opportunity to reflect on the contribution of formal legal
processes to the aspirational promises of law.
Within the Canadian legal system, formal legal process generally refers to a
process in which there are disputing parties, one of whom bears the burden of proving
two things: (1) that the other party is responsible for engaging in conduct or practices
586
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which are contrary to law, and (2) that the other party should be held to account through
the imposition of a consequence, either remedial or punitive or both. The process creates
a triad consisting of opposing disputants and an impartial adjudicator.587 While there is a
wide range of formal legal process practices, they all share this general structure. For
persons who wish to advance legal claims, formal legal process offers the potential
opportunity to tell their story and, if their claims are accepted, to receive a remedy or to
have some other consequence imposed.588 Formal legal process is potentially coercive in
its power to require parties to listen and respond to each other’s perspectives, and its
power to impose consequences for illegal conduct and practices.
Proponents of “direct access” focused on the claimant perspective and the benefits
for claimants of having unmediated access to formal legal process. They emphasized
three goals: (1) empowerment, (2) control, and (3) being heard. All these goals reflected
a concern for individual and group agency, and the potential for law to be a vehicle for
social agency. Access to formal legal process would be empowering for claimants
because it would connect them more directly with the power of law. As discussed in
Chapters One and Two, there were structural similarities between the commission-based
enforcement process and the criminal justice system. In the commission-based model, as
in the criminal justice model, the person(s) claiming to have been negatively affected by
conduct or practice are on the sidelines; they are not in charge of directing how the legal
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process will address their claim. Thus, the Bill 107 supporters’ argument for
empowerment and control for claimants was also an argument for abandoning an
enforcement framework in which the claimant’s interest was inextricably tied to the
“public” interest, and in which the “public” agency determined how the claimant’s
interest should and would be addressed and resolved.
The goals of empowerment and control were closely connected in the arguments
made by “direct access” proponents. The commission-based model was criticized for
being “paternalistic” and for “disempowering” claimants, because it gave the commission
control over deciding whether or not a claim had sufficient merit to warrant a particular
voluntary resolution or to be referred to adjudication. In the OHRC’s 1992 submission to
the Cornish Task Force, empowering “equality-seekers”589 was one of twelve
fundamental principles proposed to guide “establishing a fair and practical enforcement
system”:

2.2.7

Recognizing the inherent imbalance of power within
society, the human rights complaint resolution system must
be built from the perspective of the equality seeker, and must be
enacted to empower the equality-seeker.590

In elaborating on this principle, the submission described the commission-based process
as “paternalistic” and out-moded:
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The process established by the Code should empower the communities
whose interests are protected and promoted under the legislation. The
paternalistic model, which may have seemed progressive and innovative in
the 60’s, is now out of step with our developing understanding of equality,
as well as with current standards of administrative and procedural fairness.
Equality-seekers are entitled to a process which respects their right to
frame the issues according to their own experience, to settle complaints on
their own terms, or alternatively, to present their own complaints at a
public hearing. The equality-seeker must have the right to decide if (s)/he
wants a private remedy, a public interest remedy or both.591

The Cornish Report echoed the importance of empowerment by describing the Code as
playing a role in providing redress for imbalances in social power resulting from social
disadvantage:

Many individuals and community groups called for a system that will give
a stronger and more empowering role to people who make rights claims.
Equality means more than just treating people the same on the surface. It
means changing deep patterns of exclusion and power imbalances and
bringing about more equal relationships in society. The process of making
a claim should empower people to bring about such a change.592
People of colour, people with disabilities, people on public assistance,
women, and other minority groups lack social, legal, political, and
economic power. It is precisely because of this imbalance of power that
the Code was passed with the specific purpose of breaking down
discriminatory barriers and bringing about the full and equal participation
of these groups in all aspects of society.593

Joanne Birenbaum and Bruce Porter, in their research paper prepared for the La Forest
Review, described the experience of dialogue at a hearing as empowering, in contrast
with the disempowering dialogue of the commission screening process:
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The experience of rights claiming at the screen is thus the opposite of the
transformative or empowering dialogue which we experience when
claimants get a hearing. The screening function ensures that rights
claiming will frequently repeat rather than redress the systemic patterns of
social disadvantage and marginalization which are the subject of the claim
itself.594
Our consultations have discovered that equality seekers want a partnership
with a Human Rights Commission based on a recognition of their own
capacities, not a paternalistic system in which the Commission assumes
carriage of all of their issues or sets itself up as the “screen” to determine
if their complaints are meritorious.595

They also emphasized the need to recognize the right of “equality-seekers” to frame their
own claims:

The original idea of human rights commissions assuming responsibility
for investigating all human rights complaints, selecting the ones to take
forward and retaining a monopoly on all human rights litigation was likely
rooted in a sincere desire to relieve those who are most disadvantaged in
society of the burden of challenging discrimination. But we cannot relieve
these groups of the burden of challenging discrimination. It is equality
seekers themselves who are best qualified to identify discrimination, to
challenge it and to develop appropriate remedies. The point is not to
relieve them of the burden but to ensure that they have the opportunity to
take their claims forward and have them heard, free of the many systemic
barriers which are now put in the way of advancing their claims.596

Geri Sanson, in her oral submissions at the Justice Policy Standing Committee hearings
on Bill 107, explicitly connected the goals of empowerment and control over the process
in the following way:
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But for women, apart from the delay -- and you've heard lots about
that -- this is an issue of empowerment. This is something that the
women's movement refers to as agency. That means they do not want a
paternalistic, patronizing, anachronistic process which is going to say,
"There, there. We'll tell you what's good for you." They want the right to
make their own choices and decisions, they want the right to control how
their case is managed, and they want to [sic] right to be able to speak
directly to the decision-maker.597

Another common critique was that this paternalistic approach to enforcing legal rights
was unique to human rights, as the CERA noted in their oral submissions to the Bill 107
public hearings:

The present system of human rights [in Ontario] is based on an outdated
notion of rights and of rights claimants. It is a paternalistic system that
appropriates control of the process from the claimant and invests
significant powers in a bureaucracy. In no other area of the justice system
is there so little control by the person whose rights are infringed.598

The goals of empowerment and control were ultimately connected to a claimant
having the right to have their claim proceed to adjudication, i.e. to a hearing. The “direct
access” model in effect turned the commission-based model upside-down, by making the
formal legal process a primary goal and an entitlement, instead of a rare necessity. This
model did not mean that “direct access” proponents expected every claim in fact to
proceed to a hearing and to be decided by an adjudicator. They expected informal legal
processes to be a part of a new system; they also expected that some number of claims
597
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would continue to be resolved through informal legal process and not proceed to formal
legal process. It did mean, though, that the decision to proceed to a hearing would be the
claimant’s decision rather than the Commission’s decision.
The Cornish Report described as “unconscionable” the fact that the commissionbased process denied claimants the right to a hearing:

The Task Force believes it is unconscionable for the Code to give people
and groups fundamental equality rights and then deny them access to a
hearing to claim those rights.599

CERA described the hearing as “… an opportunity to tell [a claimant’s] story to a
decision-maker. Under the current system, it's very difficult for [CERA’s] clients to be
able to tell their story to a decision-maker.”600
Being able to tell one’s story would not necessarily result in a positive outcome
for the claimant, but it would give the claimant the opportunity to test their story against
the requirements of law. Birenbaum and Porter described this opportunity as a form of
engaging with law through conversation. Their description of this conversation illustrates
the potentially coercive aspect of the formal hearing, which can provide claimants with
an opportunity to call respondents to account for their conduct and practices:

We often experience in human rights work the sense of initiating a
conversation which would otherwise never take place. A bank refuses an
applicant a mortgage based on its income rules. The applicant suggests
the rule is not fair or reasonable. The banker says rules are rules. The
conversation is over. Human rights protections create the possibility of a
new conversation wherein rules are not rules but patterns which can be
599
600

Cornish, Achieving Equality at 108.
Hansard, Justice Policy Cttee, 22 November 2006 at 1109.

272

judged against higher values. Where the process works, claimants may be
as astonished to find themselves listened to as respondents are surprised to
find themselves having to justify something which they had never
questioned.601

The Cornish Report also argued that an additional potential benefit of placing
formal adjudication at the centre of the legal process would be to increase the number of
voluntary settlements. The rationale was that placing the decision to proceed to
adjudication within the control of the claimant would significantly alter the dynamic of
the conciliation process. If adjudication was inevitable rather than improbable, there was
much more at stake for both claimants and respondents if a settlement could not be
reached. As the Cornish Report stated: “The imminence of hearing has often proven to
be a strong incentive to settlement.”602
In the “direct access” model’s central focus on claimant access to adjudication,
there is a clear link between the opportunity to present a claim to a decision-maker and
the opportunity to receive a remedy from that decision-maker. Indeed, Bill 107 supporters
sometimes suggested that access to a hearing would inevitably lead to a “remedy”. The
primary emphasis, though, was on gaining access to the decision-making process – to the
opportunity to “tell” one’s “story” and to require the respondent to respond to that story.
In my view, this argument resonates with Sarat and Scheingold’s category of “individual
client” cause lawyers, whom they contrasted with “impact” cause lawyers. Sarat and
Scheingold argued that individual client cause lawyers emphasize the client goals to be
achieved through cause lawyering, while impact cause lawyers emphasize the social
601
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goals to be achieved through cause lawyering.603 I would argue that “direct access”
proponents more closely resemble Sarat and Scheingold’s category of “individual client”
cause lawyers than their category of “impact” cause lawyers. For “direct access”
proponents, the primary emphasis was on furthering client control and client goals, with
no real attention given to what those goals were or to the broader social impact of those
goals. I acknowledge that it would be unfair to say that “direct access” supporters were
indifferent to how claimant control over claims resolution would affect substantive
outcomes for claimants, and would more generally address issues of social inequality.
However, it is interesting to note their virtual silence on questions of substantive
outcome, both for clients and for social groups.
It was understood that there would be exceptions for claims clearly not within the
jurisdiction of the Code and tribunal. There was also some discussion about whether the
tribunal should have some ability to refuse to hear “unmeritorious” claims. However,
there was extensive debate over a provision in the original version of the bill that would
have given the tribunal considerable authority to dismiss a claim without a hearing. This
provision was removed from the final version of the bill, leaving to the tribunal the
authority to develop rules to provide for summary processes for certain kinds of claims.
The final statutory wording states that the HRTO must afford the parties “an opportunity
to make oral submissions in accordance with the rules” before finally disposing of an
application within its jurisdiction.604 Pursuant to this power, the HRTO has developed
603
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Rule 19A to establish a “Summary Hearing” process for claims that either the Tribunal or
a party believe have no “reasonable prospect” of success: “The Tribunal may hold a
summary hearing, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, on the question of
whether an Application should be dismissed in whole or in part on the basis that there is
no reasonable prospect that the Application or part of the Application will succeed.”605
Bill 107 opponents were not specifically opposed to formal legal process. They
agreed that more claims should proceed to adjudication; they argued that more cases
would be referred to adjudication with a better-functioning commission-based model; and
they suggested that there were situations when cases should automatically be referred to
adjudication, or when claimants and respondents should be entitled to make their own
decision to proceed to adjudication. They did not, however, share the view that “direct
access” would empower claimants, and they did not place value simply on giving – or
appearing to give - claimants control over the process.

Note on Respondents
The arguments for “direct access” were made primarily on behalf of individuals
and groups seeking to bring claims and seek remedies. Little attention was directly paid
to the interests of respondents during the Bill 107 debates. Where there was reference to
the effects of a “direct access” model on respondents, Bill 107 proponents asserted that a
“direct access” model would work better for respondents as well as for claimants. This
can be contrasted with the arguments made in the fair practices campaigns and in the

605

Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, Rules of Procedure, Rule 19A.1

275

OHRC’s description of its processes in the 1960s, when the stated disadvantages of
formal legal process related primarily to the impact of formal legal process on
respondents.
As discussed in Chapters One and Two, one disadvantage of formal process was
that it would encourage respondents to focus on defending themselves and the propriety
of their conduct, instead of focusing on examining the nature of their conduct and
providing remedies and solutions for its negative impact. A second and related
disadvantage was the potential for formal legal process to expose a respondent to adverse
publicity; informal resolution processes offered respondents the benefit of avoiding this
potential adverse publicity. Although the effects of formal legal process on the
respondent were the direct focus of this concern, a respondent’s resistance to efforts to
resolve a claim would of course also have negative implications for claimants who might
have wanted to achieve a voluntary resolution.
Concern about the potential impact of formal legal process on respondents has
also given rise to a perceived need for a high level of due process when formal legal
processes are engaged in the human rights context. This perceived need arises, at least in
part, from the continuing concern about the stigma that can result from a finding (or even
an allegation) that a respondent has violated a human rights statute. The La Forest
Report, in the context of considering the appropriateness of confidentiality clauses in
settlement agreements, described a human rights claim as having a stigmatizing effect on
the respondent:
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Confidentiality clauses for settlements may be contrary to the public
interest in educating the public about human rights issues. However,
respondents would normally want to avoid the stigma of a finding, or even
an accusation of discrimination.606

Similarly, during the Bill 107 debates, this concern was emphasized by the then-Chair of
the HRTO, Michael Gottheil:

Being involved in a human rights complaint, whether as a complainant or
a respondent, is a very serious matter. While an individual human rights
complaint certainly has a public element, being involved in a complaint
can be an intensely personal affair. It affects economic rights, oftentimes
the ability to work free of harassment and discrimination, or indeed the
ability to work at all. It involves, for the complainant, issues of dignity and
self-worth and, for the respondent, the stigma of being labelled a violator
of human rights.607

The argument that there is a stigma associated with “being labeled a violator of human
rights” resonates strongly with the arguments made in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s for
preferring conciliation over adjudication. It also resonates with what I see as a
continuing association between discrimination and questions of fault, immorality, and
criminal law, also seen in the arguments for fair practices legislation and in the Bell v.
McKay litigation. This association continues despite the Simpsons Sears analysis of
statutory human rights, which sought to de-emphasize a respondent’s legal fault in
preference to the opportunity for a respondent to correct a problem that has been created
by their conduct or practice.
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It is also arguable that the special status that began to be accorded to human rights
legislation in the early 1980s had the negative effect of increasing the potential stigma
associated with discrimination. Beginning with the 1982 decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink,608 the
jurisprudence developed a rhetoric of human rights legislation as having elevated status:
it was “fundamental”, “special”, “not quite constitutional but certainly more than the
ordinary”.609 Looked at from the perspective of social inequalities, this rhetoric focuses
on the positive and remedial benefits associated with human rights legislation. Looked at
from the perspective of imposing liability and legal responsibility, however, I believe this
rhetoric had the effect of elevating the bar for procedural fairness concerns for
respondents, in the same way as criminal law does. Both the New Brunswick and the
LaForest reviews linked the elevated status of human rights legislation with an elevated
concern for procedural fairness. While these comments can apply to the interests of both
claimants and respondents, in relation to respondents it is my view that they reflect the
concerns about stigma and liability for discrimination. The LaForest review stated:

Since the Act was passed, the courts have recognized human rights issues
to be almost constitutional in nature. This heightens the importance of the
process used for determining whether there has been a breach of the
Act.610

The New Brunswick review stated:
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Paralleling the need for a fast, efficient and economical investigative
function is the belief that the New Brunswick Human Rights Commission
must be respectful of the principles associated with due process. This
respect is especially significant in view of the fact that the Commission is
charged with the administration of a near constitutional document.611

These two perspectives on according elevated status to human rights legislation
also resonate with the two perspectives on using legislation against discrimination in the
arguments for fair practices legislation: the positive perspective focused on fairness and
the negative perspective focused on harm. The harm perspective is linked with
arguments that discrimination is wrong, immoral and unacceptable conduct, which in the
context of formal legal process tends to attract more rigorous procedural requirements.
As Sheila McIntyre has argued, individuals and groups who benefit from the dominant
worldview respond to claims of discrimination by trying to reduce them to a small
number of grave allegations. Since these allegations are grave, they cannot be dealt with
informally but require a high degree of formality and legal due process.612
Thus, the need to attend to the interests of respondents flows both from the
potential stigma attaching to discrimination and from the fact that the legal process may
hold respondents accountable and require redress from them. And where due process
requirements are enhanced to protect the interests of respondents, this change will affect
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claimants as well. They will face heavier burdens to establish that “normal” conduct or
practices are contrary to law, and to establish entitlement to the remedy or other
consequence they seek to have imposed.

3 Public Wrong and Public Process: Public “Prosecution” or Public Funding

As we know from Chapters One and Two, public responsibility for addressing
discrimination was a central theme in the rationale for enacting fair practices and then
human rights legislation, and a central theme in the OHRC enforcement model. We also
know that the argument for public responsibility to address discrimination had its roots in
the argument that discrimination harms both society and the individuals and groups who
are directly affected.
Public responsibility for discrimination was also a central theme in the Bill 107
debates, with both sides claiming that their model would further the public responsibility
to address discrimination. For Bill 107 supporters, public responsibility was to be
maintained through funding the tribunal, through the provision of publicly-funded legal
support for claimants at the tribunal, and through maintaining the OHRC as a public
advocate for human rights. Bill 107 opponents disagreed, and argued that the “direct
access” model privatized statutory human rights enforcement by taking away the
commission’s role as public investigator and public prosecutor, and the commission’s
responsibility to pursue public interest remedies.
For “direct access” supporters, unmediated access to an adjudicative tribunal was
the central goal, but this unmediated access to an adjudicative tribunal was never a stand280

alone proposition. They argued that “direct access” to an adjudicative tribunal had to be
accompanied by publicly-funded legal assistance and representation. Some “direct
access” supporters expressly linked the requirement to provide publicly-funded legal
assistance to claimants to the argument that there is a public responsibility to address
discrimination because discrimination causes public harm. For example, the Cornish
review maintained that publicly-funded legal representation was a vehicle for recognizing
discrimination as a public harm and fulfilling the public responsibility to address this
harm:

… it has been public policy for many years that human rights claimants
should receive publicly funded assistance to bring their claims forward.
This was evident in the creation of the Ontario Human Rights Commission
with its mandate to investigate and try to settle claims and at times assign
lawyers to argue claims before Boards of Inquiry.
… it is important that the good and essential features of the system are not
lost in the reform process.
The public commitment to funding representation for human rights claims
is crucial and should be continued. It represents an important statement by
Ontarians that discrimination is a societal problem requiring publicly
funded solutions.
… many if not most people who make a human rights claim need
assistance and support. Often they feel hurt, angry, confused and afraid.
Without assistance they cannot enforce their rights. Opening up access to a
hearing may be a hollow achievement if support and advocacy are not
provided.613

The South Ottawa Community Legal Services legal clinic, in their oral submissions to the
Standing Committee, compared public responsibility to fund human right enforcement
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with the public responsibility to fund criminal law enforcement:

All claimants who are victimized by illegal acts of discrimination should
not have to bear those costs of righting the wrong. The same way we
protect our society from criminal violations, we must protect society from
discrimination. It is a social commitment, not an individual cost.614

Some “direct access” proponents also argued that there was a broader public interest in
providing legal assistance to claimants because this would enable the adjudicative
process to run fairly and more smoothly. As Raj Anand stated in response to a question
from NDP MPP Peter Kormos:

Without the public interest element in the form of a legal support centre to
advise, assist and represent complainants in the human rights process, I
say that the system falls to the ground, and it falls to the ground for exactly
the reason that you've indicated: that there's less of a public interest.615

Similarly, in an article written after Bill 107 was passed, Michael Gottheil and Katherine
Laird expressly connected this public interest dimension in part to the public harm of
discrimination:

The greatest challenge perhaps is the need to balance the public interest
role that the Tribunal is required to play under the Code and the more
narrow function of individual dispute resolution. In the end, however,
these two mandates are not that divergent. While there is a public interest
in eliminating discriminatory policies and barriers, and in promoting
equality, there is likewise a public interest in ensuring that individuals
have timely access to a Tribunal that can resolve human rights claims
614

Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), 38th Parliament, 2nd Session,
Standing Committee on Justice Policy, Human Rights Code Amendment Act, 2006 (9 August 2006) at
1700.
615
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fairly and expeditiously, through a transparent and understandable
process.616

More often, though, the rationale for publicly-funded legal assistance for
claimants was based on the need to provide meaningful access to justice by increasing the
likelihood of claimants being able to present their claims effectively. For example, in the
La Forest Report, the requirement to provide legal assistance to claimants was based on
evidence that claimants in the United Kingdom and Quebec were rarely successful
without legal representation:

In our view, providing assistance to claimants is key for the “direct
access” model to be successful. As noted above, the experience in the
United Kingdom and Québec have shown that unrepresented claimants are
rarely successful, partially because respondents are often large wellresourced corporations or governments. This will be particularly true in
the federal sector. The practical result of no assistance would be to deny
access. The human rights tribunal process is often complicated and
requires experience in human rights in order to assemble and argue a case
successfully. In the human rights context many claimants do not speak
either official language or have disabilities that may make it difficult for
them to access the system.617

It goes without saying where one party to litigation has legal representation and the other
party does not, the party with legal representation generally has a better chance to achieve
a successful outcome. In the human rights enforcement process, moreover, claimants are
already at a disadvantage in relation to respondents because of the particular challenges
616

Michael Gottheil and Katherine Laird, “Direct Access to a Specialized Tribunal: The Ontario
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of proving both direct and adverse effect discrimination; this disadvantage is
compounded if the claimant does not have legal representation and the respondent does.
The first reading version of Bill 107 made a very weak commitment to public
funding for legal representation, so that obtaining a clear commitment for this public
funding became a key issue during the public hearings.618 The argument that claimants
needed legal assistance in order to have meaningful access to an adjudicative process was
repeated throughout the Bill 107 debates.
Bill 107 opponents agreed that it was essential to provide financial support to
claimants. Conservative MPP Christine Elliot, for example, described legal support as
“…the linchpin, the fundamental piece of this legislation that has to be right in order for
it to be successful.”619 However, they were skeptical about the government’s statements
that there would be funding for legal representation for all claimants. More significantly,
Bill 107 opponents contended that the “direct access” model structurally privatized
statutory human rights enforcement by shifting the enforcement responsibility on to
claimants. They argued that Bill 107 took away “victim’s rights” to a public
investigation and a public prosecution, and took away the commission’s responsibility to
seek public interest remedies:

The Human Rights Code now gives every discrimination victim who files
a timely and non-frivolous complaint the right to have the Human Rights
Commission publicly investigate his or her human rights complaint….

618

The original version of Bill 107 only provided the government with discretionary authority to enter
agreements for the provision of legal services in tribunal proceedings: 46.1 (1) The Minister may enter into
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619
Hansard, Justice Policy Ctte Hearings, 23 November 2006 at 1120.

284

Section 33 of the Code now gives the Commission extensive investigatory
powers, including the ability to enter businesses, to interview witnesses, to
request documents, and to seek a search warrant to compel access to
relevant documents and other physical evidence.
…
At the Human Rights Tribunal hearing, the Commission is the public
prosecutor. The Commission has carriage of the case to prove that the
complainant was the victim of discrimination. … The prosecutor therefore
effectively represents the complainant's interest as well as that of the
public.
…
In contrast, Bill 107 would totally abolish the complainant's right to have
his or her case investigated by the Human Rights Commission. Bill 107
would repeal s. 33 of the Code. That takes away from the Commission its
power and duty to investigate human rights complaints. Bill 107 would
force all discrimination victims to go directly to the Human Rights
Tribunal, without a prior Human Rights Commission public investigation
of their human rights complaint.620

Bill 107 opponents also compared the benefits of the commission-based enforcement
system to the benefits of the criminal justice system. A representative for Parkdale Legal
Services, a student community legal clinic attached to Osgoode Hall Law School,
described the benefits of state-controlled enforcement in the following way in their oral
submissions to the Standing Committee:

The second conceptual flaw is the shift that Bill 107 requires toward the
privatization of human rights disputes. The current system, underfunded
and flawed as it is, still conceives of each and every violation of human
rights as being a harm to the crown or to society at large. There is a public
prosecutor at the tribunal to represent that societal interest in maintaining a
society free of discrimination. When I explain this to my students, I
compare it to criminal law: The police investigate the crime and, where
there is sufficient evidence, the matter is passed to crown counsel for
prosecution. Crimes are suffered by victims, but they are also violations
against society. There is a deep public interest in maintaining a society
free of crime, and a very similar system is currently in place for human
620
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rights. There is a slight difference, as noted by Mr. Shulman: In the human
rights system the victim remains a party and can participate actively if
they are able to do so. But if they cannot actively participate, the public
prosecutor is there to proceed against the offender.621

This comparison between statutory human rights enforcement and criminal justice
enforcement underscored the link between discrimination as public harm and public
responsibility to address this harm. At the same time, as it always did, the language of
“offender” and “prosecution” undermined the remedial perspective on human rights and
instead fed the fault and stigma perspective. As discussed earlier, comparisons have been
drawn from the beginning between the structure of the commission enforcement model
and the structure of the criminal justice enforcement model.622 In both models,
responsibility for enforcement rests with the state, and the state is in theory advancing the
interests of both the community and the “victim”,623 although the “victim” in the
commission-based enforcement model had more status than the “victim” in a criminal
justice process.624
Bill 107 opponents agreed that human rights claimants have an interest in their
claims and the resolution of their claims. However, they had confidence in the ability of
621

Hansard, Justice Policy Cttee, 22 November 2006 at 1240.
There may also be similarities with some regulatory enforcement models. I focus on similarities with
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an improved commission to properly further the claimant’s interest and, at the same time,
the public interest. Similarly, they did not in principle object to the commission playing a
gatekeeper role, as long the performance of this role was improved. They believed that
the commission-based process could be made to work properly.
Bill 107 opponents also argued that the “direct access” model would not eliminate
gatekeeping as such but would simply transfer the gate-keeping function from the
commission to the tribunal, as well as to whichever body would be responsible for
deciding how to allocate public funding for legal representation at the tribunal and to
private lawyers who might consider taking human rights cases:

The Government suggests it’s eliminating the “gatekeeper” who decides
whether a discrimination victim gets a hearing on his or her human rights
complaint. However, the Government’s plan doesn’t eliminate the gatekeeping role. It just moves it from the Human Rights Commission to the
Tribunal. Also, private lawyers and Legal Aid clinics will become
gatekeepers, when they decide which human rights complainants they will
or won’t represent.625

Proponents of Bill 107, on the other hand, flatly rejected the commission’s
gatekeeper role. They also fundamentally disagreed that the commission, as public
investigator and public prosecutor, was in fact representing the claimant’s interests. In
their view, the commission represented the claimant’s interest only to the extent that the
claimant’s interest aligned with the commission’s view of the public interest; the role of
the commission was not to represent the claimant but to represent the public interest
raised by the claimant’s claim. Put another way, the commission-based process was not
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tied to what claimants sought but to the commission’s judgment about what claimants
sought or should have sought.626
This objection went to the core of the tensions between public and private
interests and responsibilities embedded in the commission enforcement model, and to the
division between “direct access” supporters and their opponents. The debate was not
about whether the commission-based process could be made to function better. The
debate was a philosophical (or ideological) debate about different perspectives on the role
of the state in legal processes for addressing statutory human rights claims, as illustrated
in the following exchange between Liberal MPP David Zimmer and Mark Hart,
representing the Association of Human Rights Lawyers:627

Mr. Zimmer: How is it that experts with the same background, dealing
with the same problems with the same good ambitions in place, can be so
different in their approach to the problem?" I know that's a philosophical
query, but I'd be interested in your reaction.
Mr. Hart: It's a very important question and a very interesting question.
There is a fundamental structural and philosophical difference between the
two sides of this debate. What I'm encouraging this committee to have
consideration of is the fact that these very debates, in terms of different
approaches to trying to address these well-documented problems, have
been debated before. They were debated in the context of the widespread
consultations, both in the Cornish report and the La Forest report. These
blue-ribbon task forces, with people who have a tremendous amount of
expertise in the areas, considered all of the back and forth and conflicting
626
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views and, having considered all of that, came to conclusions which are
now embodied in Bill 107.628

Bill 107 supporters divided public responsibility for discrimination into two
categories: public responsibility in relation to individual claimants, and public
responsibility in relation to society as a whole. In relation to individual claimants, they
argued that the state has a responsibility to facilitate the independent social agency of
human rights claimants in their efforts to engage law to address social inequalities; this
aspect of the state’s public responsibility would be fulfilled by maintaining an
adjudicative tribunal and by providing claimants with legal support to bring claims to this
tribunal. In relation to society as a whole, they argued that the public responsibility was
to continue the OHRC as a public advocate for human rights, with a particular focus on
systemic discrimination. Opponents of Bill 107 did not separate the public responsibility
to claimants from the public responsibility to society. For them, public responsibility to
address discrimination was simultaneously a responsibility to individual claimants and a
responsibility to society, to facilitate remedial outcomes, in the public interest, through
public investigations and public prosecutions.

4 The Commission’s New Role: Legal Process vs Education, Policy, Research
During the Bill 107 debates, opponents of “direct access” raised concerns that Bill
107 would result in dismantling the commission, as had happened in British Columbia.
However, there is no suggestion that eliminating the commission was ever part of “direct
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access” advocacy in Ontario; what advocates for “direct access” wanted to eliminate was
the commission’s role in claims processing. A continuing role for the OHRC, or a similar
body, appears to have been consistently contemplated by Ontario “direct access”
advocates.629 In the Ontario “direct access” model, the commission was to be the third
pillar in the human right access to justice system, in which the other two pillars would be
the adjudicative tribunal and the provision of legal support for claimants. There were also
two consistent themes relating to the proposed role for the commission. One was that the
commission would be focused on systemic discrimination. The second related to the
methods by which the commission would carry out its role, and whether the methods
would include litigation as well as education, policy development and research.
Human rights advocates, regardless of their position on “direct access”, shared the
view that the systemic dimensions of discrimination were the most pressing concern.
They also shared the view that these systemic dimensions included both direct and
adverse effect forms of discrimination. Moreover, as noted earlier, one of the critiques of
commissions was that the predominant focus on their claims resolution function had led
them to pay insufficient attention to systemic discrimination issues, and one of the
arguments put forward by advocates for “direct access” was that removing Commission’s
responsibility for claims resolution would allow them to direct their attention to systemic
issues. The Cornish Report presented the argument as follows:

[The Commission’s] role has been reactive, not proactive, and geared to
individual cases of discrimination, not systemic discrimination.
629

The La Forest Report also recommended maintaining the federal commission, with a role similar to the
role envisioned for the commission in Ontario’s “direct access” model.
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Placing almost all the resources into pursuing individual claims and
leaving out a broad, strategic approach is costly, time-consuming, and
unlikely to bring about positive results. Even if an individual claim is
successful, it usually changes the circumstances of the individual only and
makes little difference in overcoming widespread, systemic discrimination
in society.
…
The absence of a systemic approach to achieving human rights for all has
worked to the detriment of everyone concerned.
…
Under the new system proposed by the Task Force, Human Rights Ontario
[proposed new name for the OHRC] will no longer have responsibility for
handling individual claims. It will therefore have the ability to concentrate
on its other significant equality responsibilities.630

Katherine Laird (representing ACTO) emphasized the Commission’s responsibility for
systemic discrimination in her description of the three pillars to the Standing Committee:

Catherine [Frazee] said it so much better than I could, but what is
important to people in these circumstances is “direct access” to a hearings
tribunal, access to publicly funded legal services, a commission that will
fight the systemic battles, the public interest battles, will intervene, launch
applications and will educate employers and landlords and service
providers and government.631
The argument advanced by Bill 107 proponents rested on a distinction between
“individual claims” and “systemic claims”. In their framework, the category of
individual claims represented claims brought by individuals and groups, which might
raise exclusively individual issues or which might also raise systemic issues. The goal of
Bill 107 advocates was to remove the Commission’s role in processing and “gatekeeping” individual claims, and to have it focus exclusively on systemic discrimination
issues. This framework did not set up a dichotomy between individual and systemic
630
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claims, inasmuch as individual and group claimants could bring systemic discrimination
claims directly to a tribunal. What it did do, though, was remove the Commission from
having a direct role in relation to individual claims.
The AODAA rejected this analysis, arguing that the effort to distinguish between
individual and systemic cases in this way was misplaced and misguided because
“individual” claims are often indicators or instantiations of systemic discrimination. The
AODAA argued that removing the Commission’s responsibility for individual claims
processing would cut off its ability to become aware of and to address the systemic
discrimination issues raised by these individual cases:

Under the current system, for the Commission to be involved in a case,
there is no need to specifically categorize a case's issues as "individual" or
"systemic." The Human Rights Commission as investigator, conciliator or
public prosecutor can address all issues which arise from a complaint.
Every violation of the Code is treated as potentially raising societal
concern.
Bill 107 effectively limits the Commission's mandate and prosecutorial
powers or focuses it on "systemic" matters. This is based on the false
premise that from the outset, human rights cases and issues can be easily
divided into either of two categories, either "systemic" cases or
"individual" cases. … The Bill's provisions then design parts of the human
rights system on the basis of this problematic categorization of human
rights cases. Making things worse, Bill 107 doesn't define "systemic"
matters.
It is fundamentally wrong to design a human rights enforcement system on
this elusive and unhelpful categorization of human rights cases. Those
individuals who are victimized don't present themselves to the human
rights enforcement system with a label of "systemic complaint" or
"individual complaint" stamped on them. A case might begin as a single
report of a seemingly isolated incident. If properly investigated, a broader
pattern of discrimination could be revealed, or a deep-rooted, hithertounseen practice can have produced this result. Many, if not most so-called
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"systemic" cases come to light because an individual complained about an
individual incident of mistreatment.632

Barbara Hall, Chief Commissioner of the OHRC, responded to this argument in her oral
submissions to the Standing Committee, by maintaining that the OHRC’s priorities in
addressing systemic issues had been unduly shaped by individual claims rather than by
proactively working to identify systemic issues:

But I think one of the challenges of the current system is that we have
identified systemic issues primarily based on what has come before us as
individual complaints, and we have tended to focus on what's come in the
door as opposed to working more closely with communities out there to
identify what the systemic issues are and how they can be strategically
proceeded with or addressed. Our priorities, in a sense, are set by what
comes in the door, and I believe that there are many situations where we
miss issues because communities are not connected to the process, are not
aware of those rights, do not believe that there's a way of addressing them.
As I said in my comments, we need to go out and work more closely with
communities and set our priorities through that relationship.633

When Bill 107 proponents said that the Commission would focus on systemic
issues in a “direct access” model, this argument was another way of saying that the
Commission would no longer have responsibility for individual claims. There is no
evidence they meant that systemic discrimination would be the exclusive responsibility of
the Commission, or that individuals could not raise systemic discrimination issues in their
claims to the tribunal. They appear to have meant that the Commission’s independent
role related only to systemic discrimination. What remains unclear in the debate on this
point, however, is exactly what Bill 107 advocates meant when they distinguished
632
633
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“individual” claims from “systemic” issues. When they talked about individuals and
individual claims, were they referring to claims that affected only one individual, or a few
individuals? If so, how did their emphasis on improving enforcement for individual
claims mesh with the position that systemic discrimination issues are the most important
concern?
On the question of how commissions would fulfill their responsibility to address
systemic discrimination, considerable emphasis was placed on using education, policy
development, and research as key tools. For example, the La Forest Report stated:

In this Report, the Panel has been particularly concerned with the issue of
systemic discrimination. We have described a number of ways that the
goal of equality can be furthered within the federal sector. Human rights
education and promotion is perhaps one of the most powerful tools for
addressing equality issues, particularly in the area of systemic
discrimination which is based on attitudes and assumptions that are held
and acted on, often unknowingly. Giving people this knowledge should be
the first step towards eliminating the problem.634

The Cornish Report also emphasized the important role for strategic education:
One strong common thread throughout the consultation was a call to use
strategic education initiatives to enforce the Code. Research conducted for
the Task Force by the Urban Alliance on Race Relations finds that ‘[f]ew
people know what rights are protected under the Code.” “[T]he best antidiscrimination laws with the strongest of provisions are ineffective if no
one knows about them, understands them or is able to use them.” Many
respondents said that education would enable them to improve their
performance in ensuring equality.
…
The Task Force believes that the strategic use of education initiatives is an
important part of the new human rights enforcement system. Human
Rights Ontario has a unique and important role to initiate and oversee
education activities which will advance its overall strategic plan for the
634
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enforcement of human rights. Human Rights Ontario should focus on
educational initiatives which are most likely to concretely contribute to the
reduction of systemic discrimination in the strategic areas it has identified.
Education can help to establish the proper environment of understanding
for dealing with and redressing systemic discrimination and therefore
avoiding the filing of claims.635

However, the Cornish Report insisted as well that the commission retain investigatory
powers and powers to take cases forward. The original version of Bill 107 did not make
provision for the Commission to take cases to the tribunal or to seek to intervene in cases
at the tribunal. These powers were added as amendments following the Standing
Committee hearings, with the result that Ontario’s “direct access” model includes a role
for the Commission within the adjudicative process, both as an initiator of claims and as a
potential intervenor in claims initiated by others.636
The assumptions underlying “enforcement” by way of claims resolution are very
different from the assumptions underlying “enforcement” by way of research, policy and
education. Research and policy development assume that there are, or may be, social
problems which should be studied and for which remedies should be proposed.
Education similarly assumes that there are, or may be, social problems to be addressed
and that information and training can contribute to providing remedies for these
problems. The resolution of claims, on the other hand, does not necessarily assume that
there is a problem to be addressed. From the claimant’s perspective, the ultimate goal of
a claims resolution process is to require the respondent to provide a remedy for a problem
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the claimant identifies. Unless the respondent voluntarily agrees to provide a remedy,
however, the legal process will first need to determine whether there is a problem and
whether the respondent should be judged responsible for that problem. In a claims
resolution process, then, the first question to be addressed is whether the claim raises a
problem to be addressed.
This aspect of the “direct access” debate again illustrates the extent to which the
debate was disconnected from the substantive goals for statutory human rights
enforcement. The most important problem was said to be systemic discrimination, best
addressed by the Commission - but the most important goal was obtaining individual
access to adjudication. This aspect of the debate underlines questions about the role of
the Code and the role of legal process in addressing social inequalities resulting from
systemic discrimination. In addition, the attribution of fundamental importance to human
rights laws adds a further layer of complexity to the tensions among these different
enforcement processes. From the research, policy and education perspectives, the
importance of human rights underscores the importance of pursuing proactive
enforcement activities. In relation to claims processing, however, the importance of
human rights raises different considerations, such as the heightened due process concerns
discussed earlier.
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Part III: Ontario’s “Direct Access” Model Post-Implementation
Ontario’s “direct access” model has been in place since June 2008. The implementation
of Bill 107 saw the continuation and growth of the HRTO, the continuation but
diminution of OHRC, and the establishment of a Human Rights Legal Support Centre
(HRLSC). The HRT0 has received on average 46% of the budget allocation for the
three-pillared human rights system, and the HRLSC and OHRC have each received
approximately 27% of this budget allocation.637 The funding allocation for Ontario’s
three-pillared human rights system has increased from the level of funding provided to
the previous commission-based system by approximately 40%, although it remains to be
seem whether that level of funding will be maintained during periods of fiscal restraint.
The HRTO is one of seven adjudicative tribunals within the Ontario Social Justice
Tribunals cluster.638 It has an Associate Chair and 21 full-time Vice-Chairs, who provide
both mediation and adjudication services. Mediation at the HRTO is voluntary, but
encouraged; the tribunal’s Practice Directions allow a Vice-Chair to try to engage the
parties in mediation even where one or both parties indicate that they are not willing to
participate in mediation:

If the applicant or a respondent does not indicate a willingness to
participate in mediation, the HRTO will determine whether, nonetheless,
637
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mediation appears to offer an opportunity for a fair, just and expeditious
resolution. If so, the HRTO may contact the parties and discuss the
possibility of engaging in mediation. The decision to participate in
mediation remains voluntary.639

The Tribunal’s Rules of Practice also provide hearing dates can be used for mediationadjudication with the agreement of the parties640
The HRLSC was set up to be an independent agency and not a clinic within the
Legal Aid Ontario system. Its statutory objects are:

(a) to establish and administer a cost-effective and efficient system for
providing support services, including legal services, respecting
applications to the Tribunal under Part IV;
(b) to establish policies and priorities for the provision of support services
based on its financial resources.641

The legislation does not stipulate that the HRLSC can provide services only to applicants,
but the Centre has so far implemented its mandate to provide services exclusively to
claimants.
The Commission has been continued with its revised mandate, and downsized to
conform to its more-than-50% reduction in budget.
Bill 107 called for a review of “the implementation and effectiveness of the
changes” to be conducted three years after the legislation came into effect, i.e. three years
after June 30, 2008.642 In August 2011, Attorney General Chris Bentley appointed
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Andrew Pinto to conduct this review of the “direct access” model. Andrew Pinto is a
human rights practitioner who was a public supporter of Bill 107. His Report was
released in November 2012.
Pinto provided some comparative data on the number of cases resolved through
mediation and the number of cases decided through adjudication. The data on voluntary
resolution were as follows: in the Commission process, approximately 71%-73% of
claims were resolved voluntarily during the period from 1997-1998 through 2007-2008;
in the HRTO process, approximately 65% of claims were voluntarily resolved during the
period from 2009-2010 through 2011-2012.643 The data on access to adjudication are
more difficult to compare, because the Report did not (and could not because of the
structural differences between the two processes) present the same data for both
processes. I have chosen to compare the data for referrals to adjudication in the OHRC
process with the data on decisions on the merits in the HRTO process, as these data are
the most closely comparable in my view. In the Commission process, approximately 5%
of claims were referred to the tribunal (some of these would have settled after referral)
during the period from 1997-1998 through 2007-2008.644 In the HRTO process
approximately 5% of the decisions made by the Tribunal during the period from 20092010 through 2011-2012 were final decisions on the merits of the cases; 29% of the
decisions were decisions dismissing claims on a preliminary basis; the remaining
decisions were deferrals, withdrawals, other procedural issues, reconsideration decisions,

643
644

Pinto, Human Rights Review at 42, 60, 203, and 213.
Pinto, Human Rights Review at 9, 203.

299

and breach of settlement decisions.645 The HRTO does not yet have a long track record.
However, it is interesting that on average 5% of claims were referred to adjudication in
the OHRC process, and on average 5% of claims in the HRTO process have so far
resulted in decisions on the merits.
Pinto reported that during the period from June 30, 2008 to March 31, 2012, the
HRTO found discrimination on average in 40% of the cases it decided.646 He did not
express a view on whether a rate of 40% for findings of discrimination was reasonable or
disappointing. He also did not compare this success rate with the success rate under the
commission-based enforcement system; in my view it would have been impossible for
him to conduct a meaningful comparison, since the OHRC would have referred to
adjudication only cases it believed to be meritorious. Although the Commission did not
win every case, its screening function would have affected the proportion of meritorious
cases proceeding to adjudication. With a significant increase in the number of cases
proceeding to adjudication, it would not be surprising to see some decrease in the rates of
success.647 However, it is difficult to assess whether the success rate would be higher if,
for example, more applicants had legal assistance.
On the issue of legal representation, Pinto reported that 35% of applicants, on
average, had legal representation in proceedings at the HRTO (both mediation and
adjudication), as compared to 85% of respondents.648 Pinto correlated data on applicants
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succeeding at the tribunal with the data on applicant representation, and concluded that
applicants had some form of legal representation in 66% of the cases where they were
successful, and no representation in 44% of cases in which they were successful. He
interpreted these data to suggest the following:

The insight that arises from my analysis of the 143 Tribunal cases is that,
while representation by a lawyer (from the [HRLSC] or otherwise) can
make an important contribution to the success of a case before the
Tribunal, it may not be as important a factor as has traditionally been
believed. Out of the 50 cases in which applicants won, they were selfrepresented in 44% of them. This is a significant percentage of selfrepresented applicants who successfully argued their own case. Of course,
we should also not overstate the case for self-representation keeping in
mind that, in the 93 cases in which applicants lost, they represented
themselves 72% of the time. The conclusions I draw are: (a) applicants
fare relatively better with legal representation at Tribunal hearings;
however (b) applicants who are self-represented can still fare reasonably
well.649

There may be other relevant considerations, as well, that this analysis did not address.
First, at least some of the applicants who were “self-represented” at a hearing may have
received assistance and coaching from the HRLSC to help them prepare to “represent
themselves”.650 Second, at least some of the claims may have been ones on which the
HRLSC would not provide any legal services since the claim did not raise a human rights
issue or a meritorious human rights issue. Pinto reported that the HRLSC was only able
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to provide representation at the HRTO to 12% of all applicants and, even though he
affirmed that it was appropriate for the HRLSC to assess the merits of claims and provide
services accordingly, he described this rate of representation as too low.651 Nevertheless,
he did not make a specific recommendation about what level of representation would
reflect a better balance. He did, however, recommend that the HRLSC work with the
HRTO to provide more duty counsel mediation services to applicants.652
In examining what the OHRC has done in its new role, Pinto observed that the
Commission has rarely exercised its power to bring cases to the HRTO or to seek to
intervene in cases at the HRTO. He described the Commissioners as being conflicted on
the extent to which they should engage in litigation strategies:

Commissioners explained that they have debated and held divergent views
on the appropriate balance between litigation and cooperative strategies to
effect positive change. To date, the consensus of the Commission has
been that collaboration with respondents is more effective than
confrontation.
…
Litigation is seen as a last resort that, if used unwisely, could result in the
Commission setting the clock back on much of the progress it has
achieved.653

Pinto expressed the view that the OHRC should engage more with litigation, making
more use of its power to initiate cases and to seek leave to intervene in cases,
emphasizing that the OHRC’s mandate includes strategic litigation:
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Ontario followed the recommendations of the Cornish Report and La
Forest Report to reorient the Commission to championing human rights in
the province without the burden of mandatory involvement in each and
every individual human rights case. However, that did not mean
abandoning strategic litigation in select applications with systemic
dimensions – particularly where an individual or group of individuals
would have great difficulty in obtaining justice without the Commission’s
involvement.654

Ironically, perhaps, one of Pinto’s rationales for this view was that more OHRC
participation at the HRTO could reduce the high rate of “self-represented” claimants:

Another reason why the Commission should be more actively engaged at
the Tribunal is to incrementally reduce the high rate of self-represented
applicants at the Tribunal. As discussed earlier, in the last 4 years since the
Code reforms, the Centre has only been able to represent (as opposed to
give advice to) 12% of all applicants before the Tribunal. If the
Commission took on greater responsibility of representing applicants with
cases (a) involving the public interest; (b) involving a systemic deprivation
of rights; and (c) where the applicants would otherwise have difficulty
advancing and proving their case, I anticipate this would make a small but
strategically important contribution towards reducing the high number of
self-represented applicants in the system.
The Commission was preserved, in part, not only to promote human rights
through education and outreach, but also through inquiries, applications
and interventions. During the second reading of Bill 107, the Attorney
General introduced amendments that enhanced the Commission’s powers
in the area of conducting investigations, intervening in and bringing
applications if, in the Commission’s opinion, it was in the public interest.
The Commission cannot champion human rights without becoming more
involved in litigation at the Tribunal, specifically by initiating cases
against recalcitrant respondents.655
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Pinto’s overall conclusion was that the Bill 107 reform was a “qualified success”.
He also commented that there continued to be strong opposition to the reform:

In conducting the Review, I heard from many Ontarians with strongly held
views on how the human rights system should work. My characterization
of the Code reforms as a qualified success is unlikely to change the minds
of those firmly committed to the previously enforcement model where the
Commission played a predominant role in complaints. Indeed, I do not
believe that the values that animate the previous and present Ontario
human rights system are entirely reconcilable, which suggests that my
Report will contribute to, but not end the underlying debate.
…
Those who believe that human rights breaches are almost entirely about a
public wrong will favour an approach closer to the criminal public
prosecution model whereby the state takes on the entire responsibility for
“prosecuting” the human rights breach. Those who believe that human
rights disputes are closer to private civil disputes, albeit with a public
dimension, will favour an approach that apportions responsibility for
dispute resolution to the parties and the state. The approaches are not
really reconcilable and the public policy options flow from this
fundamental difference of characterization. 656

Pinto also noted that the role of the three-pillared human rights system must also be
assessed in relation to the other legal venues where human rights issues are addressed,
with specific reference to grievance arbitration and internal workplace procedures. Pinto
found it beyond the scope of his mandate to assess how the statutory human rights system
interacts with other “methods of human rights dispute resolution”, but expressed the view
that this interaction must be considered in future reform efforts.657
As discussed earlier in this chapter, human rights issues were being addressed in
multiple legal venues by the time Bill 107 was implemented. This reality raises issues for
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potential human rights claimants about whether or not they can raise claims in multiple
venues and, if they cannot raise claims in multiple venues but must select one, which is
the best venue to select. To the extent that decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada
involving access to non-human rights tribunals appear to offer claimants more and
different options about where they can pursue human rights claims, it may seem that
potential claimants have access to multiple venues in which to pursue human rights
issues. However, having potential access to multiple venues does not mean that claims
may be simultaneously, or even sequentially, pursued in more than one venue. Several
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada suggest that any appearance of multiple
forums is illusory; the Court is more likely to take an exclusive jurisdiction approach to
potential multiple venues, and to leave claimants who made the wrong choice without
any venue at all.658
The HRTO has the power to dismiss an application, in accordance with its rules,
“… if the Tribunal is of the opinion that another proceeding has appropriately dealt with
the substance of the application”;659 the reality of multiple legal venues in which human
rights issues can be raised has produced hotly contested issues for the HRTO in terms of
whether it has a special, and potentially supervisory role, in relation to human rights
issues, or whether it is simply one of many adjudicative bodies that can address human
rights issues. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada appear to have resolved
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this issue against according human rights tribunals any special over supervisory role
where human rights issues have been addressed by other tribunals or by courts, although
some chinks may remain.660 These decisions also seem to confirm that although human
rights issues can be raised in multiple venues, in most cases claimants will only be able to
select one of these venues, and this selection will not always be easy.

Conclusion to Chapter Three
The evolution of statutory human rights that led to the critiques of the human
rights commission claims resolution process and the Bill 107 debates paint a complex
picture of the promise and practice of human rights law. This historical record provokes
questions about tensions between the role of law as directing particular social outcomes
and the role of law as providing a process in which parties can argue about what the
social outcomes should be. In my view, it also demonstrates increasing tension between
social goals and legal goals - to what extent do social goals become subordinated to legal
goals and to what extent might legal goals be subordinated to social goals? Were
advocates for “direct access” pursuing social equality goals through law, or were they
seeking to engage with legal process in order to pursue social equality goals?
As I note earlier, it may be unfair to criticize the Bill 107 debates for their heavy
focus on legal process and for failing to include discussion about the substantive issues to
which these processes are addressed. However, it does seem fair to ask what it means to
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debate the relative merits of different legal processes in the absence of debate over the
substantive goals that may be pursued through these legal processes. This focus on legal
process suggests that process has, in some sense, taken the place of substance.
This historical record also provokes questions about the role of different forms of
legal process, and demonstrates on-going tensions between public and private goals, and
between informal and formal legal processes. In this context, I discuss my concluding
reflections on how the three case studies contribute to examining the potential for law as
a tool in struggles against social inequalities.
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Concluding Reflections on the Promise and Practice of Law

“Justice means children with full bellies sleeping in warm beds under
clean sheets.” I have often reflected upon the wisdom of Mari Matsuda’s
words, which remind us of the importance of articulating the meaning of
human rights concepts in concrete, everyday terms. For if we cannot
translate the rhetoric of justice, democracy, human rights and equality into
the concrete contexts of everyday injustices, we will not be able to build
upon these norms to effect social change.661

The history of statutory human rights in Ontario (and Canada), as examined
through the preceding three case studies, paints a complex picture of the promise and
practice of anti-discrimination law as a tool for achieving concrete justice. In these
Concluding Reflections, I reflect on this history in relation to the three themes discussed
in the Introduction - law and social power, agency through law, and responsibility at law
– together with the overlaying theme of tensions between public and private aspirations,
and public and private processes for pursuing these aspirations.
In the first section of these Concluding Reflections, I examine the themes of law,
social power, and agency in relation to tensions between the aspirational significance of
the coercive power of law and its equivocal role in the practice of statutory human rights.
In the second section of these Concluding Reflections, I examine the theme of
661
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responsibility at law in relation to tensions between the moral condemnation and remedial
dimensions of the aspirations and practice of legislated human rights norms. In the third
and final section of these Concluding Reflections, I return to questions of law, social
power and agency through law in relation to tensions between law as an end in itself and
law as a tool for social outcomes.

1

The Equivocal Power of Law
If access to the power of law is a key element of law’s appeal as a tool in

struggles against social inequalities, as I argued in the Introduction, what does the
historical record examined in this dissertation suggest about access to the power of law in
the context of statutory human rights? In my view, this historical record demonstrated
considerable achievement in harnessing the legislative power of the state to enact antidiscrimination legal norms, and a more complex experience with efforts to harness the
power of law to enforce these legislated norms.662 In particular, this record demonstrated
that the most coercive power of law - the adjudicative process – has been the power least
used in the practice of human rights law. While adjudication is not the only way to use
legislated norms, it has been the primary way for legislated norms to develop public,
concrete meaning. Thus, the enforcement record raises questions about how “public” the
OHRC enforcement process really was, and questions about the role of social power in
the everyday efficacy of engaging with legislated human rights norms.
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The anti-discrimination legislated norms established by fair practices legislation,
and then the Human Rights Code, were and continue to be very open-ended. These
norms contain only two statutorily prescribed elements - the social areas covered by
human rights statutes, and the requirement for a link between social conduct or practices
and prohibited grounds of discrimination. The social areas are broad and have for the
most part been broadly interpreted since Bell v. McKay.663 In terms of the link between
conduct or practices and prohibited grounds of discrimination, the legal norm was first
targeted at direct discrimination, that is, at conduct and practices that were intentionally
linked with prohibited grounds of discrimination. This understanding of discrimination
has remained an important paradigm, but was never explicitly written into the statutory
language. The open-ended statutory language thus created ample room for adjudicators
to decide that adverse effect discrimination came within the legislative protection as well.
The open-ended nature of anti-discrimination legislated norms similarly created the
potential for many different concrete situations to come forward as claims of
discrimination. How those claims were and are received is a question of the practice of
human rights law.
The extent to which legislated norms may increase the social power of relationally
disempowered individuals and groups is a question of how the norms can be used and are
used. Like all legal norms, anti-discrimination legislated norms receive concrete
meaning, and have social impact, through their application to everyday conduct and
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practices. The case studies discussed in this dissertation showed citizens using human
rights legislated norms and legal processes in two ways as tools in struggles against
discrimination: they engaged with the process for direct enforcement of statutory human
rights, and they introduced anti-discrimination norms into other legal processes through
which the norms have, in effect, been indirectly enforced. Citizens have also engaged
directly with legislated human rights norms outside of legal processes, using them as a
tool in a range of ways to inform social conduct and practices. Citizens’ experiences with
these three ways of engaging with anti-discrimination legal norms reflect different ways
in which the power of the state has, or has not, been available to facilitate citizens’
agency in struggles against discrimination.
Turning first to citizen agency in relation to processes for direct enforcement of
statutory human rights, the human rights commission enforcement model enlisted the
power of the state directly in the enforcement of human rights claims. From one
perspective, the human rights commission model enhanced the agency of relationally
disempowered citizens by connecting claimants directly with state power. However, this
model also connected respondents directly with state power. In effect, the state was
inserted between the claimant and the respondent, and the state had to decide to what
extent it would engage the coercive power of law in favour of claimants and against
respondents. This model therefore gave the state considerable power to determine which
concrete instances of social conduct and practices would be considered contrary to the
anti-discrimination legal norm, and which would not.
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The historical record has told us that the state rarely engaged the most coercive
enforcement power, namely, adjudication. Therefore, we can say that in practice the
formal legal process was rarely used to develop the meaning of the legal norm in relation
to everyday social conduct and practices. This also meant that the commission
enforcement model rarely used the state’s most coercive power to engage the
adjudication process on behalf of claimants. However, the historical record also told us
that we can only speculate about the reasons for state reluctance to refer more cases to
adjudication, since there is no evidence of the state’s rationales for dismissing cases that
did not resolve voluntarily. We can speculate that in at least some cases the state decided
to dismiss a claim to avoid taking on the challenges and costs of litigation. We can also
speculate that in some cases the respondent’s social power may have been a factor in the
state’s decision not to refer a claim to adjudication.664
In order to gain more access to the coercive power of law, citizens turned to using
legislated human rights norms in legal processes outside the direct statutory human rights
enforcement process. Although initially these efforts were blocked, as in the Bhadauria
case, legal processes outside the human rights commission enforcement process
increasingly became a more effective route to using legislated human rights norms to
advance claims of discrimination. This method allowed citizens to engage more directly
664
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with the power of the legislated norm because they could, in principle, exercise more
independent agency over how they wanted to frame the claim and how far they wanted to
pursue the claim. In practice, of course, their actual ability to advance claims depended
on the social power available to them, including financial resources, and it is no
coincidence that much of this litigation was initiated and supported by trade unions.
These efforts to pursue legislated human rights norms in non-human rights legal
processes did not affect the legal power of the norm, as such. However, having nonhuman rights adjudicators develop the meaning of these norms by applying them to
concrete situations was, in effect, a form of indirectly enforcing the norm and, as I
discuss later, questions have been raised about the implications of having non-human
rights adjudicators significantly involved in developing the meaning of legislated human
rights norms.
Citizens have also engaged directly with legislated human rights norms without
any recourse to legal process. As expressed in the following passage from a 1977 report
of the Ontario Human Rights Commission, legislated norms are tools in and of
themselves, which may enhance citizens’ social power by providing evidence of the
state’s endorsement of expectations for social conduct and practices:

Legislation on human rights can and should perform several functions
in relation to community consensus. It should sum up and declare public
policy, officially and unequivocally. It should, thereby, encourage people
to take a personal stand against imagined or real pressures to ‘go along
with’ discriminatory practices. It should provide legal redress for
individuals and minority groups whose rights are being over-ridden. It
should create peaceful means for resolving inter-group tensions that might
otherwise seek more explosive solutions. Human rights legislation should
in itself be an expression of the decent values of its community and
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provide support by example and by law for better public understanding
and respect for these values.665

Legislated human rights norms are well known and have become part of the social
landscape. They have, for example, been used as educational and organizing tools, been
incorporated into employment contracts, policies, and practices, and been incorporated
into service standards, including education policies and practices.
Taken as a whole, then, the historical record prior to the implementation of the
“direct access” model in Ontario suggests that the power of law enhanced the agency of
socially disempowered citizen primarily through the establishment of legislated norms
and through citizen engagement with these norms outside the statutory enforcement
process. This observation suggests that citizens’ ability to use law was shaped not only
by legislated norms and legal processes for enforcing these norms, but also by the
existing social power they brought to their engagements with law. The legislated norm
establishes a tool, but the extent to which this tool can be used effectively continues to be
informed by social power independent of the norm and of legal processes.
Because the statutory enforcement process relied primarily on the more private
voluntary resolution method than on the more public adjudication method of resolving
claims, the practice of the statutory enforcement process also had limited effect on
developing public concrete meanings for legislated human rights norms.666 The
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preference for voluntary resolution in the OHRC enforcement process thus resulted in the
public norms remaining largely abstract, and their concrete meanings remaining largely
private.667 Philip Stenning similarly argued that infrequent recourse to adjudication
stunted the development (and in his view the acceptance) of anti-discrimination legislated
norms, although, he made this point in relation to the even less frequent recourse to
adjudication through prosecution. I agree with Stenning that infrequent recourse to
adjudication in the statutory enforcement process has affected the development of
legislated human rights norms, but I do not share his view this development could or
should have happened only through prosecutorial adjudication rather than through board
of inquiry adjudication.
A large proportion of cases continues to be resolved informally under Ontario’s
“direct access” model. One of Andrew Pinto’s recommendations was that (anonymized)
content of these settlements be made publicly available, so that there can be more public
awareness of how the legislated norms are being used in concrete situations. I agree with
this recommendation. Although information about settlement outcomes would not
formally contribute to developing the public meaning of the legislated norms, this
information could provide some guidance as to how others might try to use the norm.
Will there be more use of the coercive power of law with the implementation of
“direct access” enforcement in Ontario and, if so, will this be a positive development? In
principle, the “direct access” model creates more potential for adjudication. It is
interesting, then, that the initial data suggested little difference between the OHRC model
667
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and the “direct access” model in terms of the proportion of cases adjudicated on the
merits. Indeed, it is arguable that the “direct access” model in practice to date looks
considerably like the OHRC model, with the exception that the state is no longer directly
involved and the process moves more quickly. At the same time, more cases are being
adjudicated, with the result that there will be more decisions on the merits of claims and
these decisions will affect the public development of legislated human rights norms.
Adjudication is important for publicly demonstrating how legislated norms can be
used – or not used. However, for individuals and groups who have at least some ability
to compete with the social power of the individuals or groups against whom they wish to
bring claims, informal resolution processes may ultimately be more effective. The
findings in the Pinto Report about the disparity between claimant and respondent legal
representation at hearings also provide a basis for some concern about how the HRTO
adjudication process will contribute to the development of human rights legal norms. In
my view, the greatest potential for engaging with the adjudicative process will probably
lie with social activist groups and advocacy organizations; and their ability to exercise
this potential will depend on whether they choose to make their resources available for
engaging with formal legal process. Thus, it remains to be seen how Ontario’s “direct
access” model will in practice contribute to the public definition of the concrete
aspirations of legislated human rights norms.
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2

Moral Condemnation, Remedy and Responsibility
As I argued in the Introduction, an important goal of seeking agency through law

in struggles against social inequalities is to establish norms for responsible conduct and
practices and methods for imposing responsibility when those norms are not fulfilled.
The historical record examined in the case studies demonstrated a strong focus on public
responsibility, but also a changing understanding of what public responsibility meant in
the context of statutory human rights. The historical record also demonstrated a tension
between moral condemnation and remedial aspirations as motivators for accepting and
imposing responsibility through legislation and legal process.
The advocacy for fair practices legislation drew on a rich and robust analysis of
public responsibility, emphasizing both state responsibility and citizens’ responsibility.
Fair practices advocates argued that discrimination was both a public harm and a private
harm, and the analysis of discrimination as public harm was seen in all three cases studies
as a rationale for the commission-based, public enforcement model. Fair practices
advocates also drew a parallel between anti-discrimination law and criminal law, and
relied on this comparison both to support the argument that discrimination was conduct
requiring moral condemnation and to support the argument for a strong public role in
enforcing anti-discrimination legislation. The parallel between anti-discrimination law
and criminal law continued to be drawn throughout the historical record; however, in
subsequent periods it was relied on primarily as part of the rationale for a state-controlled
enforcement model. Advocates for “direct access” challenged the view that public
responsibility for discrimination required a state-controlled enforcement process similar
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to the criminal law enforcement model. They argued that public responsibility would be
fulfilled by state funding for an adjudicative process, claimants’ access to this process,
and a continuing role for the OHRC as a public advocate for human rights. Opponents
of “direct access” continued to support the commission-based model as the appropriate
model of public responsibility and the appropriate method for fulfilling public
responsibility to address discriminatory conduct and practices.
Moral condemnation of discrimination, the second basis for the comparison
between anti-discrimination and criminal law, was an important element of the advocacy
for fair practices legislation. We saw that this more negative perspective on the need for
anti-discrimination legislation was also in tension with a more positive perspective,
which sought to place anti-discrimination legislation within a remedial framework rather
than a punitive framework. In the subsequent periods, we saw continuing efforts to
emphasize remedy over fault. An important argument underlying the OHRC preference
for voluntary, private resolution over more coercive, public adjudication was that moral
condemnation, and the consequent social stigma, would have a negative impact on the
potential to achieve remedies for claimants. The Supreme Court of Canada’s reasons for
recognizing adverse effect discrimination similarly emphasized that discrimination
should be approached from a remedial perspective rather than a fault-based perspective,
and that the consequences for discrimination should be remedial rather than punitive,
focusing on compensation for past harm and prevention of future harm. We saw a similar
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analysis of the appropriate consequences for discrimination in the board of inquiry
decisions examined in Chapter Two.668
Despite the repeated emphasis on remedy over fault, however, it is my view that
there continues to be a link between discrimination and moral condemnation. I suggest
that the historical record examined in the case studies resonates with Angela Harris’s
argument, in the context of anti-racism struggles in the United States, that success in
attaching moral opprobrium to discrimination has had the consequence of undermining
effective enforcement of anti-discrimination laws:

The elevation of antiracism to a fundamental moral principle in
American life represents the strongest repudiation yet of centuries of racebased slavery, violence, exploitation, and exclusion in constitutional and
political discourse. Yet the moralization of antiracism has at the same
time limited its potential effects. Socially, it allows everyone who is not
actually a racist skinhead or member of the Klu Klux Klan to feel
innocent, to condemn racism without taking any responsibility for one’s
own unwitting complicity with it. Legally, it insulates vast expanses of
American life from scrutiny and attributes discriminatory effects to
preference, ‘private’ bigotry, or the faults of racial minorities
themselves.669

In my view, the moral condemnation associated with discrimination contributed to
enhancing the social importance attached to the anti-discrimination legislated norms in
the Ontario (and Canadian) context. At the same time, this moral condemnation
contributed to the challenges of addressing discrimination through adjudicative processes.
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Thus, from the responsibility perspective as well from the agency perspective, the
historical record on anti-discrimination legislation and enforcement has demonstrated
reliance on voluntary assumption of responsibility over imposition of responsibility
through formal legal process.
Establishing a new legal norm for conduct and practices called upon citizens to
accept responsibility by ensuring that their conduct and practices complied with the new
legal norm. The spectre of moral condemnation has produced an emphasis on voluntary
resolution as the most effective route to remedial outcomes. For cases that reach formal
adjudication, emphasizing remedy over fault has not mitigated the challenges associated
with establishing responsibility for discrimination through statutory adjudication
processes. Concerns about the stigma attached to a finding of discrimination affect both
direct and adverse effect discrimination claims, and call for a heightened concern to
ensure procedural fairness for respondents. Direct discrimination claims are further
plagued by the challenges associated with proving a respondent’s intention. Adverse
effect discrimination claims are further plagued by the challenge of holding people
responsible for negative impact of conduct and practices otherwise considered “normal”
and acceptable:

[T]he social and cultural relations of any particular workplace can be
assessed as ongoing and unfolding social and cultural processes, practices
and values present in a society as a whole. This is to treat ‘power’ as a
‘concrete’ social form and relation with a specific history and locale – not
as an abstract concept, and this is the only way to point out the systemic
socio-structural and historical aspects of sexism or racism. This moves
our understanding of oppression from intentionality (good/bad people
story) to a more fundamental notion of social organization, where such
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experiences are routinely possible because they are intrinsic to the
properties of certain organizations.670

It is difficult for adjudicative processes to engage with claims that challenge everyday
norms and seek to have these norms judged discriminatory because of their unintended,
differential impact on particular groups and individuals. In this regard, it is useful to
recall that advocates for “direct access” argued that the OHRC had an important role in
tackling these forms of discrimination and that its methods would likely focus on
education and policy development rather than on litigation.
It may be interesting to explore, however, whether questions of responsibility and
fault in relation to discrimination are considered differently when human rights issues are
addressed outside the statutory human rights enforcement process. Are non-human rights
adjudicative bodies concerned about questions of fault and potential moral condemnation
resulting from findings of discrimination? Or is their approach to discrimination and
human rights issues driven by how they approach the interaction between human rights
issues and the social context in which the human rights issues are being raised? For
example, when labour arbitrators are asked to address human rights issues, they are
required to consider whether, and if so how, human rights issues might change their
analysis of the collective agreement issue(s). Is it possible that they do not view findings
of discrimination through the lens of moral condemnation, and that they are more
concerned with how to assess the social impact of imposing responsibility? And if so, is
it possible that this different orientation contributes to questions, which I consider in the
670
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next section, about whether human rights issues can be “properly” decided by nonstatutory human rights legal processes?

3

Social Goals in Tension with Legal Goals
One way of looking at human rights statutes is that they promise concrete changes

in the lives of people who have experienced various forms of negative and exclusionary
treatment because they are identified with particular social categories or groups. Another
way of looking at human rights statutes is that they do not “prejudge” their concrete
goals, but rather create a method for citizens to come forward and seek changes through
the legal process. I suggest that the historical record examined in this dissertation
demonstrates a shift away from viewing human rights legislation as a tool for achieving
specific social outcomes and toward viewing human rights legislation as a tool for
seeking to define and then achieve social outcomes. The first approach clearly gives
priority to social outcomes over law. The second approach does not abandon social
outcomes, but can lead to tension between legal process as a goal in itself and legal
process as a tool for achieving social outcomes. I also suggest that this shift reflects three
developments in the promise and practice of human rights. The first development was
the expansion of the potential social conduct and practices about which discrimination
claims might be raised; the second development was the increasing recourse to enforcing
legislated human rights norms outside the statutory human rights enforcement process;
and the third development was an evolving sense that there is a distinct value in the
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process of engaging with law for the purpose of achieving social impact, separate from
the social impact that may or may not be achieved in that process.
As we saw in Chapter One, anti-discrimination legislation was first sought as a
response to a specific form of social conduct and practice. Advocates for fair practices
legislation argued for law as a tool to achieve specific, concrete changes for racialized,
religious and ethnic minority individuals and groups. Their advocacy “prejudged” the
concrete goals for the law in the sense that they were campaigning for the legislation as a
tool to assist them in achieving already-defined social goals. As the scope of human
rights legislative protection was expanded to include more prohibited grounds of
discrimination and to recognize adverse effect discrimination, there was no longer a
clearly-defined paradigm of discrimination, as there had been in the advocacy for fair
practices legislation. Enlarging the scope of human rights legislative protection also
significantly expanded the range of social conduct and practices that might be challenged
as discriminatory. Recognition of adverse effect discrimination, in particular, made it
more difficult to “prejudge” concrete goals for human rights law because, unlike direct
discrimination for which there was a relatively clear paradigm, there was no clearlydefined paradigm of adverse effect discrimination that could correspond to the many
potential claims.
As the universe of social conduct and practices that might be found discriminatory
grew, it arguably became easier for social discourse to rely on the more abstract, legal
norms as shorthand for the social conduct and practices that could be challenged using
the legal norm. It similarly became easier to view the role of law as not being to
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prescribe particular social outcomes but instead to create a forum in which to use the
legislated norm to argue for particular social outcomes. Within the commission-based
enforcement model, the OHRC’s role as arbiter of what social outcomes should be
required by the legislated norms became increasingly more complex as the scope of
human rights legislative protection expanded. Through its policy documents, the OHRC
has demonstrated considerable leadership by providing guidance about how and why
social conduct and practices should or might be considered discriminatory.671 However,
as we know from the historical record, the OHRC (and human rights commissions across
Canada) provided relatively little leadership in seeking to develop the concrete meaning
of the legislated norms through adjudication.
A shift away from viewing legislation as prescribing concrete social outcomes to
viewing legislation as establishing a framework and process for citizens to argue for
concrete social outcomes was also consistent with the arguments against state imposed
social outcomes, which increasingly dominated public discourse beginning in the
1980s.672 At the same time, this shift is also consistent with the responsive regulation
arguments for more participatory processes of norm establishment and enforcement.
Increasing the citizen participation in norm development and enforcement also resonates
with different approaches to who has “expertise” in the nature of social issues and
potential remedies for social harms: advocates for “direct access” viewed claimants as
671
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being the primary experts about the claims they wished to advance, whereas advocates
for maintaining the OHRC model saw the OHRC as having expertise and an important
role in contributing to the development of legislated human rights norms. These shifts
are all consistent with the tension between striving to achieve social outcomes through
common, public norms and striving to achieve the best specific resolutions of individual
claims, which will often best be achieved voluntarily and have little or no public audience
or impact.
The possibility of addressing human rights issues outside the statutory human
rights process opened up new opportunities to develop legislated human rights norms.
This development also raised new questions about the role of statutory human rights
enforcement and the relationship between direct and indirect enforcement of legislated
human rights norms. By the time the “direct access” model was implemented in both
British Columbia and in Ontario, statutory human rights enforcement was no longer the
only legal process venue for addressing legislated human rights norms. Pursuing human
rights “justice in many rooms” 673 created opportunities for the meaning of legislated
human rights norms to be considered directly in their own contexts. As Colleen Sheppard
has written:

… an integrated approach to enforcing anti-discrimination norms is
considered particularly important with regard to systemic or structural
discrimination, which is not easily redressed through retroactive
complaints processes that tend to focus on discrete and severe incidents of
discrimination. From this more pluralist perspective, the legal norm of
equality is subject to interpretation and application by numerous
673
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institutional actors; legal interpretation and enforcement are not the
exclusive domain of lawyers and adjudicators. Indeed, legal norms will be
most effectively enforced when they form the normative backdrop for
institutional decision-making. In such a context, anti-discrimination law
operates indirectly as facilitative law. Law enforcement does not simply
refer to formal, state-based processes. Rather, legal norms and principles
become embedded in the institutional culture and practice of everyday
life.674

Engaging with human rights legal norms in their social context is consistent with the idea
that human rights legal norms do not and should not belong simply to human rights legal
process, since their ultimate purpose is to achieve positive social impact in the concrete
social situations to which they apply. The argument from this perspective is that human
rights legal norms have greater potential for social impact if they also permeate the
concrete social contexts to which they apply, and if they are engaged with through the
various legal and non-legal processes that are part of those social contexts. This
argument gives priority to the social goals that may be achieved using legislated human
rights norms as a tool.
The competing argument is that non-statutory human rights adjudicators may
dilute the potential force and impact of human rights legal norms, by subordinating them
to other norms specifically related to the social contexts in which the human rights norms
are being engaged. As discussed in Chapter Three, this argument has so far not been
successful - it is now generally thought to be a good thing for human rights issues to be
addressed in their social contexts, and human rights adjudication has not received special
status or authority. However, “direct access” is still in the early stages, and new issues
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may well arise as the system matures. For example, at some point there may be conflicts
between how the HRTO addresses human rights issues and how non-statutory human
rights adjudicative bodies address them. It also remains to be seen whether the
perception of better access to statutory human rights enforcement will affect how
individuals, associations and organizations view their independent responsibility for
human rights issues. For example, will trade unions and other organizations that stepped
into the enforcement void now try to unburden themselves of some of this responsibility?
Thus, it seems likely that there will be further elaborations of the relationship between
statutory human rights enforcement and indirect enforcement of human rights issues in
other legal venues.
Finally, there is the question of the distinct value of access to legal process as a
tool in struggles against social inequalities. As I argued in Chapter Three, it is my view
that supporters of “direct access” were more focused on claimant access to legal process
than on the social goals that might be achieve through this access, whereas opponents of
“direct access” were more focused on achieving social goals than on achieving access to
legal process. The arguments for “direct access” emphasized citizen agency and the
potential for greater citizen participation in defining social equality goals and developing
the meaning of legislated human rights norms. Two key challenges to fulfilling these
goals, anticipated during the Bill 107 debates and now emerging with the implementation
of “direct access”, are the ability to ensure that “direct access” provides meaningful
access to legal process and the potential for access to legal process to become a substitute
for achieving social outcomes. The arguments against “direct access” placed greater
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emphasis on social outcomes than on legal process, and on substantive public
responsibility for achieving social outcomes. However, the historical record suggests that
the state enforcement process was rarely, if ever, effective, and a weak public
enforcement system can have a negative impact on enforcement of human rights legal
norms in other contexts.
As the new system continues to evolve, I believe it is important to find a better
way of tracking and communicating what the “direct access” system is achieving in
substantive terms. The fact that all HRTO decisions are publicly available through
CanLII is small comfort for everyone, including people who might want to provide legal
services to human rights applicants and respondents. There are currently approximately
13,250 HRTO decisions published on CanLII for the period from 1 January 2008 through
31 August 2014.675 A significant proportion of these decisions address a wide range of
procedural issues, which can sometimes be as important as substantive issues. Although
there are a few human rights textbooks, none of them is really designed to assist people
find their way through the fast-growing human rights jurisprudence. There are, however,
many people who read most, if not all, of these decisions, including people at the Human
Rights Legal Support Centre and people at the Ontario Human Rights Commission. In
my view, it would be useful to find a way to capture the time people are investing in
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reading these decisions and turn their efforts into a useful public guide to the substance
and procedure of human rights enforcement at the HRTO.
I conclude by returning to Diana Majury’s cautionary call to “Using law against
itself, seeing law simultaneously as a tool, as foe, and as focus for change, demystifying
law as institution, and recognizing law as presenting multiple sites of struggle rather than
a solid one-dimensional monolith …”.676 Law is many things, always a work in progress,
and not something that can be ignored. As Carol Smart has suggested, law is “…. a
refracted agency, full of contradictions and largely unpredictable in its outcomes, which
in turn responds to different pressures at different times.”677 I am not sure I would say
that law is “largely” unpredictable, but it certainly can be unpredictable at least as often
as it can be predictable. And law is always a work in progress because of its on-going
responses to different social conditions and pressures. Thus, law can be a powerful tool
in struggles against social inequalities, but it is a tool to be used with caution. Claims
that challenge social power will be often be resisted by the “siren call of abstract
formalism” and of legal process for its own sake.678
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